Evidentialism and skeptical arguments

Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (??skepticism??) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world??e.g., my current belief that I have hands??aren??t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism??the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument??from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it??s clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than the Underdetermination Argument??s key premise. Next I examine ways of motivating each argument??s key premise. I argue that attempts to motivate them which appeal to one??s having the same evidence in skeptical scenarios, to skeptical hypotheses?? alleged ability to explain our evidence just as well as real world hypotheses, or to the fact that if skeptical scenarios were true everything would appear just as it does all fail to provide any motivation for the premises or for skepticism. But I close by considering a different argument for the key premises and skepticism that lacks the central defect of these other arguments. Future work on skepticism should focus on this final argument at the expense of the others.     

'The World is the Totality of Things, Not of Facts': A Strawsonian Reply to Searle

John R. Searle (1995; 1998, Ch. 9) claims that P.F. Strawson's well known objections to correspondence theories of truth (Strawson 1950) can be side-stepped, if we regard the correspondence theorist's facts as 'conditions in the world' (1998, p. 392) rather than as complex objects. In response, I claim both that Searle's notion of a 'condition in the world' is obscure, and that such conditions cannot be the facts of a correspondence theorist on account of their being unsuited for truthmaking.
The failure of Searle's attempt to come up with a correspondence theory which evades Strawson's objections does not indicate that we should seek to formulate a correspondence theory in some other way. I argue that that the correspondence theorists's truthmaker axiom is improperly motivated, and, in the light of this, suggest that facts be treated as true propositions rather than as items which make propositions true. The article ends with a defence of this position against two recent objections.     

Freud's baby: Beyond autoerotism and narcissism

The prevailing notion in the psychoanalytic literature is that Freud's thinking on neonatal object relations is completely captured in terms of his concepts of autoerotism and primary narcissism. Indeed, for Freud, autoerotism and primary narcissism conceptualize the earliest libido distributions, but these concepts do not exhaust Freud's model of early mental life. In this paper, the author endeavors to show that Freud's hypothetical infant arrives at autoerotism and narcissism at the expense of, and secondary to, primitive object-relatedness. More specifically, an appreciation of Freud's views on primitive object relations in light of the self-preservative instinct demonstrates his view that the infant is born into a state of mutual adaptation with the mother. The author makes detailed use of Freud's writings to show his conception of an infant who, from the inception of neonatal life, has the mental sophistication to maintain complex relations with instinctual objects, the sources of gratification or frustration, part-objects confusedly perceived because of cognitive immaturity and/or fantasy distortion. Such complexity includes the infant's capacity for primitive forms of perception, boundary formation, reality testing, and defensive, splitting-based projections and introjections.     

Linear transformations of the payoff matrix and decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

The effects of payoff-matrix multiplication, payoff-matrix addition, the presence of long-run gains versus long-run losses, category discriminability, and base rate on decision criterion learning were examined in 2 perceptual categorization experiments. Observers were found to be sensitive to the effects of payoff-matrix multiplication (and category discriminability) on the steepness of the objective reward function in line with predictions from the flat-maxima hypothesis and contrary to the predictions from the payoff-variance hypothesis. Decision criterion learning was best in base-rate conditions, was worst when losses were associated with incorrect responding, and was intermediate when no losses were associated with incorrect responding. This performance profile was well captured by the competition between reward and accuracy (COBRA) hypothesis. A hybrid model framework that instantiates both the flat-maxima and COBRA hypotheses was necessary to account for the data from both experiments.