Experiencing malevolent voices is associated with attentional dysfunction in psychotic patients

Inattention in people with schizophrenia is common. However, there has been little research on the association between inattention and auditory hallucinations. The aim of the study was to investigate how inattention is affected by beliefs about voices as benevolent and malevolent and perceived control of voices. A total of 31 patients who experienced auditory hallucinations and who met the criteria for schizophrenia or other psychosis completed the attention subscale of the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the Connors’ Continuous Performance Test II (CCPT‐II). The revised Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ‐R) was used to assess malevolent and benevolent beliefs about voices, and severity of auditory hallucinations (the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales; PSYRATS) was used to assess perceived control of voices and frequency of voices. Levels of depression (the Beck Depression Inventory; BDI), anxiety (the Beck Anxiety Inventory; BAI), severity of overall psychiatric symptoms (the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; BPRS), and severity of negative symptoms (SANS) were assessed to control for their potential confounding effects. The relations between the variables were explored with correlations and multiple hierarchical regression analyses. The results indicated that more malevolent, but not more benevolent, beliefs about voices predicted lower levels of attention, independently of general psychiatric symptoms and various other psychotic symptoms such as frequency of and perceived control of voices. These findings suggest an important relationship between malevolent beliefs about voices and levels of inattention. The possible impact of changing beliefs about voices to improve attentional functioning is discussed.     

Proper and common nouns: form class judgments in Broca's aphasia

Studies of agrammatic Broca's aphasics' comprehension of sentences containing articles have demonstrated profound deficits. It has not been clear whether the impairments are due to an inability to isolate the article in the stream of speech, or to difficulty in the construction and/or interpretation of various syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic levels of representation. This paper reports three experiments on Broca's aphasics' ability to distinguish between common nouns (e.g., "a rose") and proper nouns (e.g., "Rose"). This grammatical form class decision is signaled by the presence or absence of an article, and is represented at the lexical node level of linguistic analysis. The three experiments demonstrated that Broca's aphasics point to pictures representing classes of objects when asked to point to "the X" and point to pictures representing unique individuals when asked to point to "X". Thus, they were shown to be able to use the presence or absence of an article to determine lexical category. Their performance was especially accurate in an oral language context which was highly redundant and in a written language context where patients themselves could control the rate of information flow. They were quantitatively impaired, relative to controls, in a third study, which made higher information processing demands. Moreover, in this third study nonsense syllables preceding the noun which are phonologically similar to a known article were much more likely to evoke the misclassification of its noun as common than were phonologically distinct nonsense syllables. These data indicate that Broca's aphasics indeed have some difficulty isolating the article in the stream of speech. Nevertheless, detailed analyses of aphasics' performance revealed their ability to distinguish between common nouns and proper nouns even under these demanding conditions. Taken together, the three studies show that insofar as agrammatic patients are able to keep track of the presence or absence of articles, they can make a grammatical decision at the lexical node level of linguistic analysis. We conclude, then, that agrammatic Broca's aphasics are particularly impaired in the use of articles to construct and/or interpret phrasal constituents.     

An ARC-REM model for accuracy and response time in recognition and recall

This article presents a model for accuracy and response time (RT) in recognition and cued recall, fitted to free-response and signal-to-respond data from Experiment 1 of P. A. Nobel and R. M. Shiffrin (2001). The model posits that recognition operates through parallel activation in a single retrieval step and cued recall operates as a sequential search. Because the data for recognition showed that variations in list length and study time per list had a large effect on accuracy but a small or negligible effect on (a) free-response RT distributions and (b) retrieval dynamics in signal-to-respond, the timing of the recognition decision is based on an assessment of retrieval completion (ARC), rather than on a sufficiency of evidence in favor of 1 of the response options. By assuming within-trial forgetting, the model predicts both the dissociation of accuracy and RT and the finding that errors are slower than correct responses. For cued recall, this model was incorporated as the 1st step in a search consisting of cycles of sampling and recovery.     

Radical behaviorism and buddhism: complementarities and conflicts

Comparisons have been made between Buddhism and the philosophy of science in general, but there have been only a few attempts to draw comparisons directly with the philosophy of radical behaviorism. The present review therefore considers heretofore unconsidered points of comparison between Buddhism and radical behaviorism in terms of their respective goals, conceptualization of human beings, and the outcomes of following either philosophy. From these comparisons it is concluded that the commonalities discerned between these two philosophies may enhance both philosophical systems.     

Response to Bishop’s “How a Modest Fideism May Constrain Theistic Commitments”

Bishop’s main claims are: (I) that James’ criteria on the admissibility of faith leaps need the addition of two moral criteria to be complete; (II) that a Kantian, at least, could not admissibly leap toward God, classically understood, and (III) that a Kantian, and anyone else, could admissibly leap toward God, understood his way. Here I will affirm (I) with a qualification; deny (II); affirm (III); and close with some reservations about Bishop’s novel model of God. This paper was delivered at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.