Factorial validity of the Conners' Parent Rating Scale-revised: short form with psychiatric outpatients

To assess the factorial validity of the 27-item Conners' Parent Rating Scale-Revised: Short Form (CPRS-R:S; Conners, 1997), 100 (50%) male and 100 (50%) female psychiatric outpatients between 5 and 16 years old were rated by a parent. A confirmatory factor analysis of the 18 item ratings from the CPRS-R:S Oppositional, Cognitive Problems, and Hyperactivity scales provided only tentative support for scoring these scales as Conners (1997) recommended. However, an exploratory principal-axis factor analysis with all 27 item ratings found 2 dimensions: 1 dimension was composed of the 6 items in the Oppositional scale, and other dimension contained the remaining 21 items. An attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) Total Symptoms scale was constructed by summing the ratings for these 21 symptom ratings, and this scale was found to be as effective as the Hyperactivity scale was in discriminating between youth who were and were not eventually diagnosed with an ADHD. We discuss the results as providing an alternate way of scoring the CPRS-R:S to screen for an ADHD in child and adolescent psychiatric outpatients.     

Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.     

In support of anti-intellectualism

Intellectualist theories attempt to assimilate know how to propositional knowledge and, in so doing, fail to properly explain the close relation know how bears to action. I develop here an anti-intellectualist theory that is warranted, I argue, because it best accounts for the difference between know how and mere “armchair knowledge.” Know how is a mental state characterized by a certain world-to-mind direction of fit (though it is non-motivational) and attendant functional role. It is essential of know how, but not propositional knowledge, that it makes possible performance errors and has the functional role of guiding action. The theory is attractive, in part, because it allows for propositional, non-propositional and perhaps even non-representational varieties of know how.     

Conventions,morals and strategy: Greta’s dilemma and the incarceration game

Synthese - I articulate the question of the value of common knowledge, or the question of why common knowledge is preferred to mere widespread knowledge. I argue that common knowledge often enjoys...     

Does Gratitude Promote Resilience During a Pandemic? An Examination of Mental Health and Positivity at the Onset of COVID-19

Journal of Happiness Studies - Researchers have emphasized the detrimental effects of COVID-19 on mental health, but less attention has been given to personal strengths promoting resilience during...     

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection.     

Activation of shape and semantic information during ambiguous homophone processing: eye tracking evidence from Hindi

In two visual world eye tracking studies, we examined the activation of subordinate meanings of ambiguous homophones in Hindi and particularly when the sentence context is biased towards the dominant meaning. Participants listened to sentences that were either neutral or biased towards the dominant meaning of the homophone and saw a display containing four pictures. In experiment 1, the display had a shape competitor of the subordinate meaning of the homophone in both neutral and biased conditions along with three unrelated distractors. Experiment 2 had semantic competitors of the subordinate meaning of the homophones along with three distractors. Proportion of fixations to different objects overtime suggested that participants activated the subordinate meanings and oriented their attention to the shape and semantic competitors even when the prior context was biased towards the dominant meaning. Overall, these data from Hindi provide further support to those models of lexical access that assume exhaustive access of both the meanings of an ambiguous homophone. These data suggest even a dominant bias does not eliminate the activation of perceptual and conceptual features of the subordinate meaning.