Sex differences in the effects of visual contact and eye contact in negotiations

Previous research has proposed that the ability to see others would benefit negotiations. We argue that this view is too narrow and that the impact of visual contact on negotiated agreements depends on the meaning individuals ascribe to either its presence or absence. Based on previous research showing that females are more likely to understand others in the presence of visual contact while males understand others better in the absence of visual contact, we explore how visual contact, eye contact, and sex affect the quality of negotiated agreements in a meta-analysis (Study 1) and a laboratory experiment (Study 2). The two studies combined show that because direct communication via the face facilitates a shared understanding for two unacquainted females, their agreements are of higher quality when they have visual contact compared to when they do not (Study 1), and if they have visual contact, their agreements are better when they have eye contact than when they do not (Study 2). Because communication via the face increases discomfort between two unacquainted males, their agreements are of higher quality when they do not have visual contact (Study 1), and if they do have visual contact, their agreements are better when they have no eye contact than when they do (Study 2).     

Explicit Fixed Points in Interpretability Logic

The problem of Uniqueness and Explicit Definability of Fixed Points for Interpretability Logic is considered. It turns out that Uniqueness is an immediate corollary of a theorem of Smoryski.     

On the “recovery” of masked targets

Subjective magnitude characteristics for vibrotaction were determined by the method of numerical magnitude balance for three body sites varying in the density of neural innervation: the distal pad of the middle finger, the thenar eminence, and the volar forearm. The effects of a rigid surround upon threshold and the rate of growth of subjective intensity were measured. The results support the suggestion that absolute threshold and the rate of growth of subjective intensity are inverse functions of the total number of sensory neural units stimulated rather than being related simply to the density of neural innervation.     

The 3DPT dimensions S,E, and N: A critical evaluation of Eysenck's Psychoticism model

In this article a critical evaluation is given of Eysenck's Psychoticism model. It is argued that in this model two sub-models can be distinguished, which, contrary to Eysenck's presentation, cannot be regarded as true extensions of each other. With respect to one of these models, the ?genotypic’? P-model, the theory is criticized in that both schizophrenia and affective psychosis are determined by a common genetic predisposition which can phenotypically manifest itself in variations of P. Instead of this theory, the likelihood is put forward that a high EPQ-P score, albeit in combination with a high N and a low E score (and notwithstanding the fact that criminals or psychopaths can also obtain high P scores), is (only) related to the schizoid state, and hence, that P seems to be relevant either as a predisposing factor contributing to the development of schizophrenic psychosis, or as a factor on which biological relatives of schizophrenics obtain higher scores on average than normals do. In this respect, Eysenck's theory that the non-schizoid form of psychopathy can also be found among first-degree relatives of schizophrenics, and hence, that psychopathy and schizoidia are genetically related, is also criticized. Furthermore, it is argued that Eysenck's EPQ-P scale is not optimal for measuring those traits of the schizoid personality which are independent of N and/or E. Both arguments regarding the contents of this scale and arguments with respect to the demonstrated lack of invariance of the EPQ-P factor are adduced to support this statement. Thus, an alternative scale for measuring ?P’? (labelled S or Insensitivity) was designed by us. The S-scale is based on literature concerning the schizoid state and reflects the results of a series of principal components analyses of (potential) S items, together with N and E items, put into execution with the intention of investigating the invariance of the S factor (and of E and N) with respect to six sample and other parameters. These investigations were carried out on a large, representative sample of the Dutch population. Additional investigations were carried out concerning the reliability and validity of the three newly formed scales. The results of these investigations turned out to be very satisfactory or, in some respects, at least promising. Finally, in this article, comments are made on the nature of the S factor, comparing this dimension with both Eysenck's P factor and the dimensions Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, as proposed, for instance, in McCrae and Costa's version of Nor-man's 5-factor model. As against P, the S or Insensitivity factor seems to be only (negatively) related to Agreeableness and not to Conscientiousness. It is also argued that this finding seems to be in accord with the supposed schizoid nature of S and the criticisms levelled at Eysenck's EPQ-P scale.     

The carrot and the stick: affective commitment and acceptance anxiety as motives for discretionary group efforts by respected and disrespected group members

Previous research has demonstrated that intragroup respect can strengthen people's commitment to the group and encourage them to exert themselves on behalf of it. In the present research, the authors argue that similar behavior can ensue from self-focused concerns when group members are disrespected. Experiment 1 (N = 174) confirms that high respect as well as low respect motivates people to increase their actual discretionary efforts on behalf of the group. These findings were replicated and extended in Experiment 2 (N = 138), where it was established that enhanced efforts only emerge when people consider the way they are evaluated by others as diagnostic for their position in the group. In addition, it is demonstrated that whereas the efforts of respected people were primarily motivated by affective commitment to the group (group-focused concerns), the behavior of disrespected people was driven by anxiety about their acceptance into the group (self-focused concerns).