Does attention move or spread during mental curve tracing?

There are two theories that attempt to explain how attention is deployed when lines are traced. Initially, it was believed that a covert zoom lens moved along the line. Recent evidence has, however, suggested that attention spreads along the line, rather than moving along it, perhaps as part of an effortful object-parsing process. Three experiments tested the spreading and moving accounts of line tracing. Participants were presented with two intertwined lines and were required to trace one to find the correct target. On half the trials, a masked change occurred, most often near the top of the target line, that reversed the required response. If attention spreads along the line, the participants should have been able to notice the change whenever it occurred during the tracing process. However, the participants found it harder to spot the change if it occurred late in the tracing process. This suggests that resources were less frequently available to detect changes on portions of the line that had already been traced when the change occurred. The results argue against a spreading trace of attention that encompasses the whole line.     

Dynamic visual noise interferes with storage in visual working memory

Several studies have demonstrated that dynamic visual noise (DVN) does not interfere with memory for random matrices. This has led to suggestions that (a) visual working memory is distinct from imagery, and (b) visual working memory is not a gateway between sensory input and long-term storage. A comparison of the interference effects of DVN with memory for matrices and colored textures shows that DVN can interfere with visual working memory, probably at a level of visual detail not easily supported by long-term memory structures or the recoding of the visual pattern elements. The results support a gateway model of visuospatial working memory and raise questions about the most appropriate ways to measure and model the different levels of representation of information that can be held in visual working memory.     

Tracking the R‐to‐K shift: Changes in memory awareness across repeated tests

Participants studied lists of rare words and their definitions (e.g. the fleshy area at the base of the thumb = thenar). They were then given recognition tests in which they were shown the definitions and asked to identify the target from a choice of four. Participants categorised each decision as a remember, know, familiar or guess response and rated their confidence on a seven‐point scale. Recognition tests were administered 5 minutes, 4 weeks, 8 weeks and 6 months after study. Remember responses dominated recognition on the first test but decreased on subsequent tests, whereas know response increased across successive tests. Familiar and guess responses peaked on the second test and then declined. Remember and know responses were associated with higher levels of accuracy and confidence than familiar and guess responses. The findings are consistent with the remember‐to‐know (R‐to‐K) shift and show the trajectory of changes in memory awareness across repeated tests. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reinstating effortful encoding operations at test enhances episodic remembering

Two experiments investigated the effects of reinstating encoding operations on remember and know responses in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that reinstating an effortful encoding task (generating words from fragments) increased remember responses at test but reinstating an automatic encoding task (reading intact words) did not. This pattern was confirmed in Experiment 2 in which words were either read intact or generated from anagrams. These findings show that repeating effortful (but not automatic) encoding operations at test cues not only the recognition of the information that was acquired via those operations but also the conscious recollection of the encoding episode.     

Collaborative false recall in the DRM procedure: Effects of group size and group pressure

Basden, Basden, Thomas, and Souphasith (1998) demonstrated that false recall in collaborative trios is enhanced when group members feel under pressure to output items. In the present study, individuals, pairs, trios, and quartets were presented with lists of words drawn from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Memory was tested under high or low group pressure conditions. It was found that false recall increased in proportion to group size regardless of group pressure, but that groups experiencing the most pressure to output items made a greater number of errors. Furthermore, on a surprise later individual recall test, participants who experienced the most pressure during collaboration retained an equivalent level of critical lures. Collectively these findings demonstrate that group pressure can increase collaborative false recall, and that these false memories can be retained beyond group testing.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Differences in event specificity of spontaneously generated thought

A growing interest has emerged in the role that autobiographical memory retrieval plays in simulation of future events. Cognitive explorations in this domain have generally relied on cue word paradigms with instructions to develop specific (relating to one particular day) memories or future events. However, the usefulness of this paradigm has been questioned with respect to its ability to assess habitual patterns of retrieval within autobiographical memory. The current study investigated similarities and differences in how participants spontaneously remember the past and imagine the future when the specificity constraints inherent in the cue word task are removed. A total of 93 undergraduate students completed two sentence-completion tasks, probing for past and future events. A number of differences emerged between past and future thought; in particular, they were less specific when simulating future events compared with past events. This reduction in specificity was the result of participants producing more future thoughts relating to extended lifetime periods and semantic associates. The findings are discussed in relation to the underlying cognitive processes involved in autobiographical memory retrieval and future event simulation.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

What factors underlie associative and categorical memory illusions? The roles of backward associative strength and interitem connectivity

Factors that affect categorical and associative false memory illusions were investigated in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, backward associative strength (BAS) from the list word to the critical lure and interitem connectivity were manipulated in Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and category list types. For both recall and recognition tasks, the likelihood of producing DRM and category false memories was greater for lists with high BAS and low interitem connectivity. In Experiment 2, DRM and category lists with high BAS showed similar indirect priming effects in a word stem completion task. With low BAS, category lists, unlike DRM lists, showed no priming effect. We discuss the role of BAS, interitem connectivity, and associate-level differences in implicit and explicit measures of false memory production.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.     

The effects of divided attention at study and test on false recognition: A comparison of DRM and categorized lists

Three experiments investigated the effects of divided attention at encoding and retrieval on false recognition. In Experiment 1, participants studied word lists in either full or divided attention (random number generation) conditions and then took part in a recognition test with full attention. In Experiment 2, after studying word lists with full attention, participants carried out a recognition test with either full or divided attention. Experiment 3 manipulated attention at both study and test. We also compared Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and categorized lists, due to recent claims regarding the locus of false memories produced by such lists (Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, & Choi, 2002). With both list types, false "remember" responses were reduced by divided attention at encoding and increased by divided attention at retrieval. The findings suggest that the production of false memories occurs as a result of the generation of associates at encoding and failures of source monitoring retrieval. Crucially, this is true for both DRM and categorized lists.