With Liberty and Some Justice for a Few: Thinking Theologically about Criminal Justice

The current crisis in the American criminal justice system begs for theological response, and its sources need theological critique. The recent proposed statement of the ELCA draws attention to the needs of victims of crime and their families, and makes sensible recommendations for paths to greater justice. In doing so it is important to remember what forms of justice are possible under the jurisdiction of fallible, earthly institutions.     

High Mathematical Creativity in a Pair of Identical Twins

This article reports an incidental finding in an investigation undertaken by the author (Haylock, 1984) into aspects of mathematical creativity in 11- to 12-year-old children. The two most mathematically creative pupils in the sample of 280 were identical twin boys. Moreover, these two boys were found to have almost identical profiles in a series of assessments of some significant personality and attitude characteristics.     

Consumer conviction and commitment: An appraisal‐based framework for attitude certainty

This paper explores consumers' commitment to and conviction about their beliefs in the form of attitude certainty. Based on a review of past research, we present a new framework for understanding attitude certainty and how consumers' attitude certainty is shaped by their resisting or yielding to persuasive messages, or even by their reflections on the evidence supporting their attitudes. We propose that attitude certainty is formed and changed largely through an attribution-based reasoning process linked to a finite set of distinct appraisals. Our framework is used to both organize past research and offer guidance for future research endeavors. In addition, we distinguish our framework of appraisal-based attitude certainty from past models in attitudes and persuasion research that have referenced or taken note of the attitude certainty construct. Implications and future directions for the study of consumer behavior are discussed.     

Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection

Recent research has indicated a negative relation between the propensity for analytic reasoning and religious beliefs and practices. Here, we propose conflict detection as a mechanism underlying this relation, on the basis of the hypothesis that more-analytic people are less religious, in part, because they are more sensitive to conflicts between immaterial religious beliefs and beliefs about the material world. To examine cognitive conflict sensitivity, we presented problems containing stereotypes that conflicted with base-rate probabilities in a task with no religious content. In three studies, we found evidence that religiosity is negatively related to conflict detection during reasoning. Independent measures of analytic cognitive style also positively predicted conflict detection. The present findings provide evidence for a mechanism potentially contributing to the negative association between analytic thinking and religiosity, and more generally, they illustrate the insights to be gained from integrating individual-difference factors and contextual factors to investigate analytic reasoning.     

Emotion Regulation Mediates the Association Between ADHD and Depressive Symptoms in a Community Sample of Youth

The purpose of this study was to examine the longitudinal relationship between attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms, emotion regulation (ER) ability, and depressive symptoms within a diverse community sample of 277 youth, ages 9–12 (56 % male). Participants were drawn from a larger study examining adolescent risk behaviors, and completed annual assessments over 3 years. Youth ADHD symptoms were assessed at Time 1 (T1) using the parent-reported Disruptive Behavior Disorders Rating Scale, ER was assessed with the parent-reported Emotion Regulation Checklist at Time 2 (T2), and youth depressive symptoms were assessed using the self-reported Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales at Time 3 (T3). Analyses examined T2 ER as a mediator between T1 ADHD symptoms (including the unique contributions of inattentive [IA] versus hyperactive/impulsive [HI] symptoms) and T3 depressive symptoms. Structural equation modeling (SEM) indicated the path model specified provided an excellent fit to the data. Tests of indirect effects suggested that T2 ER appears to be a significant mechanism that underlies the relationship between T1 ADHD and T3 depression, even when accounting for T1 oppositional defiant and depressive symptoms. Furthermore, while both T1 IA and HI symptoms had significant indirect effects on T3 depression through the mechanism T2 ER, HI proved a more robust predictor of T2 ER than IA. Results of this prospective study support cross-sectional findings pointing to ER as a potential mechanism linking ADHD and depressive symptoms in youth. Clinical implications and future directions are discussed.     

When psychology undermines beliefs

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.     

Deliberators Must Be Imperfect

This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do (omniscient beings, the paper argues, will always meet the relevant provisos). Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.     

Discrepant integration times for upright and inverted faces

Judgments of upright faces tend to be more rapid than judgments of inverted faces. This is consistent with encoding at different rates via discrepant mechanisms, or via a common mechanism that is more sensitive to upright input. However, to the best of our knowledge no previous study of facial coding speed has tried to equate sensitivity across the characteristics under investigation (eg emotional expression, facial gender, or facial orientation). Consequently we cannot tell whether different decision speeds result from mechanisms that accrue information at different rates, or because facial images can differ in the amount of information they make available. To address this, we examined temporal integration times, the times across which information is accrued toward a perceptual decision. We examined facial gender and emotional expressions. We first identified image pairs that could be differentiated on 80% of trials with protracted presentations (1 s). We then presented these images at a range of brief durations to determine how rapidly performance plateaued, which is indicative of integration time. For upright faces gender was associated with a protracted integration relative to expression judgments. This difference was eliminated by inversion, with both gender and expression judgments associated with a common, rapid, integration time. Overall, our data suggest that upright facial gender and expression are encoded via distinct processes and that inversion does not just result in impaired sensitivity. Rather, inversion caused gender judgments, which had been associated with a protracted integration, to become associated with a more rapid process.     

Self-image bias in drug use attributions

The aim was to examine the degree to which people's personal drug use affects how they perceive other drug users, with a view to investigating the possibility that drug use attributions are a function of self-image bias. University students (n = 60), categorized post hoc as drug users or nonusers, completed questionnaires assessing locus, control, and stability attributions about their own personal drug use or imagined drug use. Attributions pertaining to presented vignettes of light and heavy drug use by others were also assessed. Heavy drug use elicited the most "addicted" attributions (dispositional locus, low control, and high stability) and drug-using participants made more addicted attributions about their own personal drug use than did nonusing participants about their imagined use. Additionally, attributions made by non-drug users regarding their imagined personal drug use were similar to those they made for the light drug use described in presented vignettes. Conversely, drug users made attributions which were similar for their personal drug use and for the heavy drug-use vignette. These data lend support to conceptualizing addiction as a product of the functional attribution process-"addict" attributions being applied mainly where drug use is more problematic (heavy) and thus in need of explanation. The data also lend support to the notion that a self-image bias is operating in drug use attributions when people can identify with the behavior of others.