Neuroscientific Evidence About the Distinction Between Short- and Long-Term Memory

ABSTRACT— What have neuroscientific techniques contributed to the development of psychological theory about short- and long-term memory? We argue that the contributions have been varied: In some cases, data about brain mechanisms have been vital to the advancement of psychological theory; in other cases, neuroscientific data and behavioral data from normal participants have made equal contributions; and in yet other cases, the data from neuroscientific approaches have actually led psychological theory astray. We illustrate these various contributions by focusing on the relationship of short- to long-term memory.     

Are preferences in emotional processing affected by distraction? Examining the age-related positivity effect in visual fixation within a dual-task paradigm

Recent research has suggested that age-related positivity effects are eliminated under conditions of dual-task load (Knight et al., 2007, Emotion, 7, 705; Mather & Knight, 2005, Psychology and Aging, 20, 554), because the cognitive control resources necessary to enact such preferences are not available when individuals are distracted by competing information. We further examined how older adults' emotional information processing preferences are affected by distracting information by utilizing a within-subjects dual-task measure. Younger and older adults viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral images both in conditions of full and divided attention. Fixation preferences to valenced images were assessed through eye tracking. Regardless of whether images were viewed in full or divided attention conditions, older adults demonstrated a preference in their fixation for positive and neutral in comparison to negative images. These results provide evidence that older adults' positive fixation preferences may not always necessitate full, cognitive control.     

Recruiting Through Job Advertisements: The Effects of Cognitive Elaboration on Decision Making

We applied a model of persuasion – the elaboration likelihood model – to investigate whether individuals' decisions about responding to job advertisements are affected by how deeply they process recruitment messages (i.e., elaboration likelihood, EL). We manipulated individuals' (N=112) motivation and ability to carefully process job advertisements (ads). As hypothesized, individuals in the lower (vs. higher) EL conditions chose more ads containing cues unrelated to the job (e.g., bolded font), and fewer ads containing higher quality arguments. Participants also reported that they “skimmed” and carefully read job ads in the past, providing evidence for variability in EL among job seekers. We discuss the implications of the findings for recruiters who wish to increase the size of their applicant pool.     

Lay personality knowledge and dispositionist thinking: A knowledge-activation framework

We explicate a knowledge-activation framework depicting the link between lay personality knowledge and dispositional judgments, building on work by [Dweck et al., 1995a] and [Dweck et al., 1995b]. According to this framework, most people possess knowledge consistent with an entity theory (personality is fixed) and incremental theory (personality is malleable), which operates according to knowledge-activation principles. Consistent with this claim, we find that people render more confident dispositional judgments when their entity knowledge is made relatively more accessible through priming manipulations that activate aspects of their existing knowledge. Findings also illustrate the usefulness of incorporating both specific and general knowledge in our analysis. The present framework enhances and complements the individual-differences approach to the study of person theories prevalent in the literature.     

ON THE DUAL REFERENT APPROACH TO COLOUR THEORY

A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that 'red' refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts with Peacocke's multi-referent view, according to which such abnormal cases force us to introduce a wholly distinct kind of colour experience. I also argue that the two uses of colour names, arising from their two referents, have different extensions, even in normal perceptual circumstances, a consequence which conflicts with the heart of Rosenthal's dual referent view.     

Basic processes in reading: can functional phonological recoding be blocked?

A widely held view is that phonological processing is always involved in lexical access from print, and is automatic in that it cannot be prevented. This claim was assessed in the context of a priming paradigm. In Experiment 1, repetition priming was observed for both pseudohomophone-word pairs (e.g., brane-brain) and morphologically related word pairs (e.g., marked-mark) in the context of lexical decision. In Experiment 2, subjects searched the prime for the presence of a target letter and then made a lexical decision to a subsequent letter string. Phonological priming from a pseudohomophone was eliminated following letter search of the prime, whereas morphological priming persisted. These results are inconsistent with the claim that a) lexical access from print requires preliminary phonological processing, and b) functional phonological processing cannot be blocked. They are, however, consistent with the conclusion that, for intact skilled readers, lexical access can be accomplished on the basis of orthographic processing alone. These results join a growing body of evidence supporting the claim that there exist numerous points in visual word recognition at which processing can be stopped.     

Necessities of Origin and Constitution

The once deeply held conviction that all necessary truths are known a priori is now widely, although by no means universally agreed to have been subjected to penetrating, if not devastating criticism. Scott Soames, for example, on behalf of Saul Kripke, and indirectly of Hilary Putnam, argues that in respect of natural kinds, the introduction of basic essentialist assumptions grounded in our pre-theoretical habits of thinking and speaking – for example, that atomic or molecular structure provides the underlying essence of a substance – allows a sentence like "water = H₂0," in which the identity sign is flanked by rigid designators to express a metaphysically necessary truth. Yet doubts and puzzlement remain over the status of a posteriori necessities, including those relating to an individual's origin. This paper considers some prominent criticisms that have been made of the Kripke–Putnam approach by A. J. Ayer and Frank Ebersole among others and reveals in what respects they are valid, where they are misplaced, and, perhaps more importantly, why the most valuable aspect of this approach can be seen to reflect aspects of our scientific procedures that do indeed point towards an application for a distinction that roughly mirrors that between epistemic and metaphysical possibility, yet one that is grounded instead in the nature of our actual practices.