Applicability of a cognitive model of worry to children and adolescents

BackgroundIntolerance of uncertainly (IU), cognitive avoidance (CA) and positive beliefs about worry (PB) independently predict worry frequency in older adolescents and adults, and when targeted together in treatment produce significant reductions in both worry and anxiety in this age range. The present study addresses a gap in the literature by testing whether a cognitive model of excessive worry and anxiety incorporating these process variables is applicable to children and adolescents.MethodPrimary and secondary school students (n = 515; aged 7–19 years) completed modified self-report measures of worry frequency, anxiety, IU, CA and PB and a path analysis undertaken to test whether IU was a higher order variable for CA and PB and whether the relationship between IU/CA/PB and anxiety was mediated by worry frequency.ResultsSignificant (bivariate) correlations were observed between the measures of IU, PB, CA, worry and anxiety across the age range. However separate path models had to be fitted for children (aged 7–12 years) and adolescents (aged 13–19) with PB being dropped from the child model. CA was related to anxiety only through worry in children while IU showed direct paths to worry and anxiety in both children and adolescents.ConclusionsCognitive models of persistent worry in adults and older adolescents may, with some modification, have applicability to children. Further testing and refinement of these cognitive models of worry may lead to improvements in existing treatments for anxious youth.     

How do spatial representations enhance cognitive numerical processing?

Several philosophical theories attempt to explain how actions performed in the world enhance cognitive processing: internalism, active externalism, and cognitive integration. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the use of spatial representations in arithmetic can shed light on this debate. Relying on philosophical analysis, on a discussion of empirical work in the cognitive neuroscience of number, and on a historical case study, I will show that spatial representations of number indicate an integration between internal and external cognitive processes.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

Errant Learning for a Foam World: Glissant,Sloterdijk, and the Foam of Pedagogy

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Through an educational reading of Édouard Glissant and Peter Sloterdijk, this article draws out and develops latent pedagogical philosophies that bear...