Tag, you're it: Tagging as an alternative to yes/no recognition in item method directed forgetting

The current study contrasted a standard yes/no recognition task with a tagging recognition task in the context of an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. During the study phase, a series of words was presented one at a time, each followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). The retention of R and F study words was tested using either a typical yes/no recognition task or a tagging recognition task in which participants labeled each word as “R”, “F” or “New”. The directed forgetting effect observed in each task was equivalent in magnitude. However, the tagging recognition task afforded an additional analysis of the errors of misattribution that was not possible with the more typical yes/no recognition task. Interestingly, when falsely recognizing a Foil word, participants were more likely to assign an “F” tag than an “R” tag. These errors of misattribution are consistent with existing accounts of directed forgetting that suggest R words are better encoded than F words. We argue for the utility of the tagging procedure, given it does not alter the directed forgetting effect normally seen with yes/no recognition but provides additional information about errors of misattribution.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Reward improves cancellation and restraint inhibition across childhood and adolescence

Inhibitory control allows for the regulation of thought and action and interacts with motivational variables, such as reward, to modify behavior adaptively as environments change. The authors examined the effects of reward on two distinct forms of inhibitory control, cancellation and restraint. Typically developing children and adolescents completed 2 versions of the stop signal task (cancellation and restraint) under 3 reward conditions (neutral, low reward, and high reward), where rewards were earned for successful inhibitory control. Rewards improved both cancellation and restraint inhibition, with similar effects of reward on each form of inhibitory control. Rewards did not alter the speed of response execution in either task, suggesting that rewards specifically altered inhibition processes without influencing processes related to response execution. Adolescents were faster and less variable than children when executing and inhibiting their responses. There were similar developmental effects of reward on the speed of inhibitory control, but group differences were found in terms of accuracy of inhibition in the restraint task. These results clarify how reward modulates two different forms of regulatory behavior in children and adolescents.     

An integrated theory of whole number and fractions development

This article proposes an integrated theory of acquisition of knowledge about whole numbers and fractions. Although whole numbers and fractions differ in many ways that influence their development, an important commonality is the centrality of knowledge of numerical magnitudes in overall understanding. The present findings with 11- and 13-year-olds indicate that, as with whole numbers, accuracy of fraction magnitude representations is closely related to both fractions arithmetic proficiency and overall mathematics achievement test scores, that fraction magnitude representations account for substantial variance in mathematics achievement test scores beyond that explained by fraction arithmetic proficiency, and that developing effective strategies plays a key role in improved knowledge of fractions. Theoretical and instructional implications are discussed.     

Evil,fine-tuning and the creation of the universe

Could God have created a better universe? Well, the fundamental scientific laws and parameters of the universe have to be within a certain miniscule range, for a life-sustaining universe to develop: the universe must be ‘Fine Tuned’. Therefore the ‘embryonic universe’ that came into existence with the ‘big bang’ had to be either exactly as it was or within a certain tiny range, for there to develop a life-sustaining universe. If it is better that there exist a life-sustaining universe than not, then it was better that the embryonic universe was one of this small set of very similar embryonic universes than that it was not. Furthermore, there are no firm grounds for claiming that of this small set of very similar embryonic universes, there is one which would have developed into a universe better than ours. Therefore there are no firm grounds for claiming that God could have created a better universe than ours.     

Consideration of the BDNF gene in relation to two phenotypes: hoarding and obesity

The gene coding for the brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) has emerged as an interesting candidate for multiple brain and brain disorder-related phenomena. The primary aim of the present investigation was to consider the relationship between the BDNF Val66Met variant and two phenotypes: compulsive hoarding as a symptom dimension of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and body mass index (BMI). We examined the BDNF gene in a large (N=301) clinical sample of probands with OCD. Participants were classified as hoarding or nonhoarding using a strict, multimeasure grouping approach. Results revealed that the Val/Val genotype was linked with hoarding classification and more severe hoarding behaviors, as well as greater BMI levels. Hoarding status was also associated with greater BMI scores, with individuals in the hoarding group being far more likely to be classified as obese compared with the nonhoarding group. Our findings may provide a distinct avenue through which hoarding and BMI could be linked. These findings are suggestive of a complex gene, body weight, and psychopathology relationship wherein a primitive, survival "thrifty gene" strategy may be conserved and represented in a subgroup of humans manifesting severe hoarding symptoms.     

Restricted interests and teacher presentation of items

Restricted and repetitive behavior (RRB) is more pervasive, prevalent, frequent, and severe in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) than in their typical peers. One subtype of RRB is restricted interests in items or activities, which is evident in the manner in which individuals engage with items (e.g., repetitious wheel spinning), the types of items or activities they select (e.g., preoccupation with a phone book), or the range of items or activities they select (i.e., narrow range of items). We sought to describe the relation between restricted interests and teacher presentation of items. Overall, we observed 5 teachers interacting with 2 pairs of students diagnosed with an ASD. Each pair included 1 student with restricted interests. During these observations, teachers were free to present any items from an array of 4 stimuli selected by experimenters. We recorded student responses to teacher presentation of items and analyzed the data to determine the relation between teacher presentation of items and the consequences for presentation provided by the students. Teacher presentation of items corresponded with differential responses provided by students with ASD, and those with restricted preferences experienced a narrower array of items.     

Exercising Theory: A Perspective on its Practice

What is the task of educational theory or philosophy if it is not merely conceived as specification of philosophical doctrines in the realm of education? In my view it is the particular task of educational-philosophical theory to work critically on the historically developed cultural constructs that shape our (educational) experience. Thus, the activity that educational theorists are to perform is the critical reflection of the “limits of our world” by drawing on philosophical references and theories. In this text I describe this activity drawing from my own research practice with a particular focus on its relation to what is called thinking.     

Does the familiarity bias hypothesis explain why there is no masked priming for “NO” decisions?

Traditional "activation" views of masked priming explain the identity priming effect in terms of facilitation due to ‘pre-activation’ of stored representations. Norris and Kinoshita's (2008) Bayesian Reader theory of masked priming instead explains priming in terms of the evidence that the prime contributes towards the decision required to the target. In support of the Bayesian Reader account, Norris and Kinoshita showed that the absence of priming for nonwords in the lexical decision task and for targets requiring a Different decision in the same–different match task can be explained based on a single principle. Against this, Bowers (2010) argued that the absence of priming should be explained instead by a combination of sublexical priming and "familiarity bias". As evidence, Bowers cited Bodner and Masson’s (1997) finding that nonword priming did emerge with targets presented in visually unfamiliar cAsE-AlTeRnAtEd format. We present evidence that this finding was due to the use of an ambiguous letter in case-alternated format; when using unambiguous letters, we consistently failed to find priming of case-alternated nonwords. We suggest that the Bayesian Reader, rather than the familiarity bias hypothesis, explains the absence of priming.