Executive dysfunctions across adulthood: measurement properties and correlates of the DEX self-report questionnaire

Difficulties in executive processes can disturb daily life functioning. Using data obtained from two independent community-dwelling samples (n(1) = 468, n(2) = 669, 18-97 years), we examined the factor structure of the Dysexecutive Functioning Questionnaire (DEX) and explored the frequencies and potential correlates of self-reported executive difficulties. Our results revealed that executive problems are parsimoniously described with one underlying factor. Everyday executive dysfunctions were moderately frequent throughout adulthood. Reports of executive problems were associated with individual difference characteristics including age, subjective health, personality, affect, and cognition. We also found that, although executive functions are known to decline with advancing adult age, younger age groups reported more problems than older groups, an effect that was partially mediated by a negative affect factor. We discuss implications for the validity of the instrument as well as directions for future research on executive functioning difficulties in everyday life.     

Graspability and object processing in infants

This review pursues the idea that a dual visual system approach is fruitful for interpreting work on infant cognition. We provide examples from the visual perception and cognition literature demonstrating that the potential graspability of stimuli typically used in infant studies influence how these stimuli are processed by the infant brain. Specifically, we argue that small, local, familiar and moving stimuli are more likely to be processed by the dorsal (how or action) stream of visual processing. In contrast, larger, stationary objects are likely to be processed by the ventral (what or perception) stream. This analysis clarifies apparently conflicting results in the literature.     

Learning to perceive object unity: a connectionist account

To explore questions of how human infants begin to perceive partly occluded objects, we devised two connectionist models of perceptual development. The models were endowed with an existing ability to detect several kinds of visual information that have been found important in infants’ and adults’ perception of object unity (motion, co‐motion, common motion, relatability, parallelism, texture and T‐junctions). They were then presented with stimuli consisting of either one or two objects and an occluding screen. The models’ task was to determine whether the object or objects were joined when such a percept was ambiguous, after specified amounts of training with events in which a subset of possible visual information was provided. The model that was trained in an enriched environment achieved superior levels of performance and was able to generalize veridical percepts to a wide range of novel stimuli. Implications for perceptual development in humans, current theories of development and origins of knowledge are discussed.     

The Role of Formal Mentoring on Business Success and Self-Esteem in Participants of a New Business Start-Up Program

The current study investigated the relationship between career-related mentoring, psychosocial mentoring, business success, and self-esteem in participants of a program that was designed to assist in the establishment of a new business. Seventy-seven protégés and their matched mentors were included in the study. A comparison of mentor and protégé perceptions revealed that mentors considered themselves to provide higher levels of psychosocial support than did the protégés. Protégé perceptions of business success were predicted by the frequency of mentor contact and the level of career-related support provided by their mentor.     

Choice preferences without inferences: subconscious priming of risk attitudes

We present a procedure for subconscious priming of risk attitudes. In Experiment 1, we were reliably able to induce risk‐seeking or risk‐averse preferences across a range of decision scenarios using this priming procedure. In Experiment 2, we showed that these priming effects can be reversed by drawing participants' attention to the priming event. Our results support claims that the formation of risk preferences can be based on preconscious processing, as for example postulated by the affective primacy hypothesis, rather than rely on deliberative mental operations, as posited by several current models of judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nearly unbiased estimators for the three‐parameter Weibull distribution with greater efficiency than the iterative likelihood method

The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method is the most commonly used method to estimate the parameters of the three‐parameter Weibull distribution. However, it returns biased estimates. In this paper, we show how to calculate weights which cancel the biases contained in the MLE equations. The exact weights can be computed when the population parameters are known and the expected weights when they are not. Two of the three weights' expected values are dependent only on the sample size, whereas the third also depends on the population shape parameters. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the practicability of the weighted MLE method. When compared with the iterative MLE technique, the bias is reduced by a factor of 7 (irrespective of the sample size) and the variability of the parameter estimates is also reduced by a factor of 7 for very small sample sizes, but this gain disappears for large sample sizes.     

Coherence and Truth: A Cognitive Model of Propositional Truth Attribution

The truth value assigned to a proposition is treated by philosophers, logicians, and most psychologists as an abstract construct, a theoretical object outside the cognitive system. Breaking away from this consensus, we propose to carry out a psychological investigation to analyse the objective, verifiable properties of representations categorized as true by human individuals. We shall reject the conception whereby attributing a truth value to a proposition is the result of the activation of knowledge about the truth of that proposition. We shall also exclude the conception of truth as the result of the establishment of a correspondence with the world. We propose that truth be understood as the result of a decision about the values taken on by the conditions for fulfilment of the act of referencing in a mental model. Our cognitive model of propositional truth attribution is built on the assumption that the truth value of a proposition is determined by the ability of that proposition to fit into the theory of the field to which it refers. This attribution is viewed as a two-stage cognitive activity. During the first stage, the features defining the coherence of the proposition in the activated mental model determine its plausibility value. This defines a generally inconsistent set of truth candidates. The second stage involves selecting the subset containing all propositions which, in context, will be considered true. Two selection criteria are used: maximum consistency and connectivity. The preliminary experimental results proved to be compatible with the proposed model.