Preliminary validation of a hope scale for a rare health condition using web-based methodology

An evaluation of a health condition-specific hope scale adapted from the more general dispositional Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) is provided. Participants (N = 202) with a rare, debilitating, and potentially stigmatising health condition were recruited from readers of the Anal Fissure Self Help Page. Data were gathered anonymously using an online survey linked to the website. Consistent with hope theory, this new measure yielded a pathways factor (perceived capacity to find ways to achieve desired goals) and an agency factor (perceived motivation to pursue goals energetically). Respondents with stronger pathways thoughts reported greater benefits from website information for understanding and generating strategies for managing anal fissures. Stronger agency beliefs were related to more frequent website visits, more rereading of first-hand patient accounts, and shorter duration of fissure symptoms. Results offer preliminary support for validity of this scale and for using web-based methodologies to study conditions, such as anal fissure.     

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology.     

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.     

A study of families' satisfaction with a family interventions in psychosis service in Somerset

Although research has shown the efficacy of family interventions in psychosis, there has been little research into families' own experience of services in routine clinical settings. Fifteen of the first twenty-two referrals to a Somerset Family Interventions Service agreed to take part in semi-structured interviews regarding family satisfaction and clinical outcome. High levels of engagement and satisfaction with the service were reported in spite of initial apprehension regarding family sessions. Family members thought that the sessions had helped them deal more effectively with problems and relatives' symptoms. They valued the opportunity for open discussion, developing new perspectives and problem-solving, as well as liaison/closer working with mental health services. Positive therapeutic qualities/skills (e.g. empathic, non-judgemental approach; mutually agreed goals) were highlighted. This study also indicated that successful engagement in family work requires referral at an early stage. The findings of this study, particularly those relating to the therapeutic relationship, are discussed, including their relevance for future research.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.