Patient preference as a predictor of outcomes in a pilot trial of person-centred counselling versus low-intensity cognitive behavioural therapy for persistent sub-threshold and mild depression

The aim of this analysis was to explore whether pre-treatment intervention preferences were related to outcomes for patients with persistent sub-threshold and mild depression who received one of two treatment types. Thirty-six patients took part in a two-arm, parallel group, pilot randomized controlled trial that compared short term (3 month and 6 month) outcomes of person-centred counselling (PCC) compared with low-intensity, CBT-based guided self-help (LICBT). Patient preferences for the two interventions were assessed at baseline assessment, and analysed as two independent linear variables (pro-PCC, pro-LICBT). Eight out of 30 interactions between baseline treatment preferences and treatment type were found to be significant at the p < .05 level. All were in the predicted direction, with patients who showed a stronger preference for a treatment achieving better outcomes in that treatment compared with the alternative. However, pro-LICBT was a stronger predictor of outcomes than pro-PCC. The findings provide preliminary support that treatment preferences should be taken into account when providing interventions for patients with persistent sub-threshold and mild depression. It is recommended that further research analyses preferences for different treatment types as independent variables, and examines preferences for format of treatment (e.g. guided self-help vs. face-to-face).     

‘The Extremely Difficult Realization That Something Other Than Oneself Is Real’: Iris Murdoch on Love and Moral Agency

Abstract: In the last few years, there has been a revival of interest in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. Despite this revival, however, certain aspects of Murdoch's views remain poorly understood, including her account of a concept that she famously described as ‘central’ to moral philosophy—i.e., love. In this paper, I argue that the concept of love is essential to any adequate understanding of Murdoch's work but that recent attempts by Kieran Setiya and David Velleman to assimilate Murdoch's account of love to neo‐Aristotelian or neo‐Kantian theories of moral agency are misconceived. We will not understand what Murdoch is trying to do unless we understand her position as a radical alternative to such theories. Here, I present a reading of Murdoch's account of love as a form of Platonic eros directed toward two objects: the Good and the particular individual. It is in navigating the tension between these two objects that we find ourselves facing what Murdoch famously described as ‘the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real’. When properly understood, Murdoch's account of love opens up conceptual space for an alternative approach to some of the central questions in contemporary moral theory.     

Fear of missing out: prevalence,dynamics, and consequences of experiencing FOMO

Fear of missing out, known colloquially as FOMO, appears to be a common experience, and has recently become part of the vernacular, receiving frequent mentions in the popular media. The present paper provides a multi-method empirical examination of FOMO. In a first study, experience sampling was used to assess FOMO experiences among college freshmen. Nightly diaries and end-of-semester measures provided data on the short and long-term consequences of experiencing FOMO. Results showed that students experience FOMO frequently, particularly later in the day and later in the week, and while doing a required task like studying or working. More frequent experiences of FOMO were associated with negative outcomes both daily and over the course of the semester, including increasing negative affect, fatigue, stress, physical symptoms, and decreased sleep. A second experimental study investigated FOMO on a conceptual level, distinguishing FOMO from general self-regulation and exploring its links with social media.     

Factors that encourage generalization from extinction to test reduce resurgence of an extinguished operant response

Two experiments investigated methods that reduce the resurgence of an extinguished behavior (R1) that occurs when reinforcement for an alternative behavior (R2) is discontinued. In Experiment 1, R1 was first trained and then extinguished while R2 was reinforced during a 5‐ or 25‐session treatment phase. For half the rats, sessions in which R2 was reinforced alternated with sessions in which R2 was extinguished. Controls received the same number of treatment sessions, but R2 was never extinguished. When reinforcement for R2 was discontinued, R1 resurged in the controls. However, the alternating groups showed reduced resurgence, and the magnitude of the resurgences observed during their R2 extinction sessions decreased systematically over Phase 2. In Experiment 2, R1 was first reinforced with one outcome (O1). The rats then had two types of double‐alternating treatment sessions. In one type, R1 was extinguished and R2 produced O2. In the other, R1 was unavailable and R2 produced O3. R1 resurgence was weakened when O2, but not O3, was delivered freely during testing. Together, the results suggest that methods that encourage generalization between R1 extinction and resurgence testing weaken the resurgence effect. They are not consistent with an account of resurgence proposed by Shahan and Craig (2017).     

Young Children's ability to Discriminate between Antisocial and Prosocial Teases

The present study was designed to (a) examine 5- to 8-year-old children's ability to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases and (b) determine whether their age and experiences within the home are associated with their ability to recognize these two types of teases. Results revealed that the 5- to 8-year-old children were able to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases. Although the children's parents or legal guardians indicated that the children had more frequent experience with prosocial than antisocial teases in the home, (a) the children were better able to correctly identify the intent of antisocial teasers than prosocial teasers and (b) the parents or legal guardians (correctly) indicated that their child would be better able to recognize an antisocial tease than a prosocial tease. Despite the finding that the children's comprehension of antisocial teasing tended to exceed their comprehension of prosocial teasing, the findings indicate that being relatively young (i.e., 5–6 years old vs. 7–8 years old) and having relatively frequent experience with antisocial teasing in the home may be associated with some children's difficulty in recognizing the intent behind antisocial teases.