When promoting a charity can hurt charitable giving: A metacognitive analysis

Charities need to come to mind to enter a potential donor's consideration set. However, feeling familiar with a charity and its cause can facilitate or impair giving. In most cases, perceived good memory for details of the cause fosters the impression of personal importance, which increases giving (Studies 1 and 3). But when the charity aims to increase awareness of a cause, good memory for the cause suggests that awareness is already high, which impairs giving (Studies 2 and 3). Hence, promotions for awareness-raising charities can actually have negative consequences, confirming the predictions of a metacognitive analysis.     

Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution

This research examined how and why group membership diminishes the attribution of mind to individuals. We found that mind attribution was inversely related to the size of the group to which an individual belonged (Experiment 1). Mind attribution was affected by group membership rather than the total number of entities perceived at once (Experiment 2). Moreover, mind attribution to an individual varied with the perception that the individual was a group member. Participants attributed more mind to an individual that appeared distinct or distant from other group members than to an individual that was perceived to be similar or proximal to a cohesive group (Experiments 3 and 4). This effect occurred for both human and nonhuman targets, and was driven by the perception of the target as an entitative group member rather than by the knowledge that the target was an entitative group member (Experiment 5).     

(Re)assembling Natures,Cultures, and (Nano)technologies in Public Engagement

Abstract

Practices of ordering are powerful means of giving structure to people's lives and providing a sense of control. The analysis of three episodes from discussion groups on nanotechnology in Austria shows that citizens evaluate new technologies with regard to how they intersect with, support, or disturb existing orders. The concept of discursive assemblages serves as a lens for recognising the non-fixed character of the discursive process, while still allowing the analyst to identify how specific elements, such as conceptions of nature, culture, and technology, are (re)assembled at particular moments. Each of the three episodes represents a specific way of creating and negotiating assemblages: the first case demonstrates how discussants collectively discuss a nature–technology hybrid (nano-bamboo socks) against the backdrop of a highly valued ideal of keeping ‘the natural’ and ‘the technological’ separate; the second episode exemplifies a clash of two assemblages as participants argued for or against the application of nanotechnology in food products; and the third example illustrates the process of collective experimentation with different assemblages to make sense of a highly futuristic nanochip for brain enhancement. Together the episodes demonstrate that participants in public engagement settings do not address nanotechnology as a simple question of choice between acceptance and rejection but rather engage in processes of care regarding how a society might develop when technological innovations such as nanotechnology threaten to blur existing boundaries and orders, such as the distinction between nature and culture.     

Do Male Politicians Have Big Heads? Face-ism in Online Self-Representations of Politicians

Headshot portraits of all U.S. Governors, Senators, and Representatives and members of Parliament in Canada, Australia, and Norway are analyzed. In all countries, male politicians are represented with higher facial prominence than female politicians, paralleling a pervasive gender bias in media portraits. For American Congresswomen, high facial prominence is associated with a more pro-feminist voting record. Finally, anthropometric data show that gender differences in the facial prominence in portraits cannot be traced to gender differences in actual body proportions.     

Variations on a Montagovian theme

What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates.     

Moving the eyes along the mental number line: comparing SNARC effects with saccadic and manual responses

Bimanual parityjudgments about numerically small (large) digits are faster with the left (right) hand, even though parity is unrelated to numerical magnitude per se (the SNARC effect; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993). According to one model, this effect reflects a space-related representation of numerical magnitudes (mental number line) with a genuine left-to-right orientation. Alternatively, it may simply reflect an overlearned motor association between numbers and manual responses--as, for example, on typewriters or computer keyboards--in which case it should be weaker or absent with effectors whose horizontal response component is less systematically associated with individual numbers. Two experiments involving comparisons of saccadic and manual parity judgment tasks clearly support the first view; they also establish a vertical SNARC effect, suggesting that our magnitude representation resembles a number map, rather than a number line.     

Age differences in the effects of social influence on children's eyewitness performance and their metacognitive monitoring

The current work investigated the effects of social influence on children's recall accuracy and metacognitive monitoring. Two studies were conducted in which 8- and 10-year-olds were confronted with postevent information in an interview situation. An interviewer (Study 1) or a confederate (Study 2) provided postevent information with two levels of assertiveness, inducing (a) a variation of conformity pressure and (b) a variation of information credibility. Afterwards, children's confidence judgments were assessed. The results revealed significant age differences in children's ability to adequately cope with variations of social influence. Although conformity pressure was especially important for the 8-year-olds, effects of informative social influence were independent of age. However, 10-year-olds were also able to act appropriately on low credibility, thereby demonstrating a more sophisticated consideration of social influence sources. Moreover, varying assertiveness also affected the quality of children's confidence judgments by improving their metacognitive differentiation skills.