Use of a distracting task to obtain defensive head movements to looming visual stimuli by human adults in a laboratory setting.

Defensive responses to looming visual stimuli have been obtained in a wide variety of species, including human infants as young as one week. This phenomenon has not, however, been formally demonstrated for adults under laboratory conditions. In this paper it is reported that similar responses, namely avoidance movements of the head, can be obtained in most human adults provided that they are suitably distracted by playing a computer tracking game. Such behaviours were not obtained when subjects were not so distracted. The use of control conditions also ruled out the possibility that simple movement cues from stimuli presented on a noncollision trajectory are sufficient stimulus to obtain defensive responses. It is of interest to note that latencies for avoidance movements were significantly shorter than those for orienting movements in the same situation, but were no different from the latencies for orienting movements when subjects were not distracted. It is argued that these findings are consistent with the proposition that defensive head movements to looming stimuli, like orienting movements to novel peripheral stimuli, represent a basic visual competence that is normally suppressed (or subsumed) by higher competences. The decision to avoid is probably based on the computation of time to contact, and may reflect the operation of a subcortical system for elementary analysis of optic flow.     

I—From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia ) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists.