I can see myself helping: The effect of self-awareness on prosocial behaviour

Many studies indicate that increasing self-awareness leads to individuals reflecting on their values and ideals (Silvia & Duval, 2001). This self-reflection appears to increase prosocial behaviour (Berkowitz, 1987). However, previously studies typically manipulated self-awareness in situations in which the individual may have felt pressure from the researcher to help. Thus, experimenter pressure to behave prosocially confounds the self-awareness explanation provided in past research. We used a novel experimental paradigm to manipulate self-awareness and remove the researcher's presence to decrease the likelihood that the participant would conform to experimenter demand. Participants were 36 college students (M_age = 19.52; 25 women). The results indicated a strong probability that the experimental condition participants were more prosocial than control condition participants. These findings provide additional support for the hypothesis that self-reflection increases prosocial behaviour, even without experimenter demands. These findings and the importance of studying objective self-awareness in light of the coronavirus are discussed.     

Clients' perspectives on problems many years after traumatic brain injury

This study investigated the types of self-reported main problems that persons report many years following a traumatic brain injury. This preliminary study is part of a large ongoing study of disability and handicap in adults following traumatic brain injury. As part of an extensive interview, subjects were asked an open-ended question regarding their current main problems which they thought resulted from their traumatic brain injury. Responses were obtained from 166 adult subjects (119 men and 47 women) whose time postinjury ranged from 9 to 24 years. Categories for responses were subsequently developed. The most commonly reported categories of problems were those relating to movement (39%), cognition (36%), and sensory impairment (31%). Findings suggest that subjects' long-term concerns were related to specific impairments more than to psychosocial, emotional, or behavioral issues. Methodological issues concerning this research are discussed in relation to findings.     

Is developing scientific thinking all about learning to control variables?

Academically low-performing urban sixth graders engaged in inquiry activity received a suggestion that they focus their investigation on the role of a single factor. This suggestion had significant effects on their use of a superficially dissimilar strategy--controlling the variation of other factors. This latter strategy has received the lion's share of attention in research on the development of scientific reasoning. These results have implications, we propose, for what undergoes development with respect to scientific thinking and how this development can best be facilitated.     

Are there interactions among dysfunctional beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder?

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive-compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2- and 3-way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.