Artificial Intelligence &; Games: Should Computational Psychology be Revalued?

The aims of this paper are threefold: To show that game-playing (GP), the discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned with the development of automated game players, has a strong epistemological relevance within both AI and the vast area of cognitive sciences. In this context games can be seen as a way of securely reducing (segmenting) real-world complexity, thus creating the laboratory environment necessary for testing the diverse types and facets of intelligence produced by computer models. This paper aims to promote the belief that games represent an excellent tool for the project of computational psychology (CP).  To underline how, despite this, GP has mainly adopted an engineering-inspired methodology and in doing so has distorted the framework of cognitive functionalism. Many successes (i.e. chess, checkers) have been achieved refusing human-like reasoning. The AI has appeared to work well despite ignoring an intrinsic motivation, that of creating an explanatory link between machines and mind.  To assert that substantial improvements in GP may be obtained in the future only by renewed interest in human-inspired models of reasoning and in other cognitive studies. In fact, if we increase the complexity of games (from NP-Completeness to AI-Completeness) in order to reproduce real-life problems, computer science techniques enter an impasse. Many of AI’s recent GP experiences can be shown to validate this.  The lack of consistent philosophical foundations for cognitive AI and the minimal philosophical commitment of AI investigation are two of the major reasons that play an important role in explaining why CP has been overlooked.     

The Ponzo illusion with auditory substitution of vision in sighted and early-blind subjects

We tested the effects of using a prosthesis for substitution of vision with audition (PSVA) on sensitivity to the Ponzo illusion. The effects of visual experience on the susceptibility to this illusion were also assessed. In one experiment, both early-blind and blindfolded sighted volunteers used the PSVA to explore several variants of the Ponzo illusion as well as control stimuli. No effects of the illusion were observed. The results indicate that subjects focused their attention on the two central horizontal bars of the stimuli, without processing the contextual cues that convey perspective in the Ponzo figure. In a second experiment, we required subjects to use the PSVA to consider the two converging oblique lines of the stimuli before comparing the length of the two horizontal bars. Here we were able to observe susceptibility to the Ponzo illusion in the sighted group, but to a lesser extent than in a sighted non-PSVA control group. No clear effect of the ilusion was obtained in early-blind subjects. These results suggest that, at least in sighted subjects, perception obtained with the PSVA shares perceptual processes with vision. Visual experience appears mandatory for a Ponzo illusion to occur with the PSVA.     

Further evidence for the role of inferential reasoning in forward blocking

Previous studies on human causal learning (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002) showed that secondary task difficulty (performing an easy vs. a difficult secondary task during the main causal learning task) and ceiling information (outcome occurs with a maximal vs. submaximal intensity) had an influence on forward blocking (i.e., lower causal ratings for cue T when AT+ trials are preceded by A+ trials than when no A+ trials are presented). We extended these studies by also examining self-reports of participants about the reasons behind their causal ratings. Blocking was found only for participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. Furthermore, secondary task difficulty and ceiling information influenced the number of participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. These findings point to a major impact of inferential reasoning in human causal learning.     

A comparative analysis of global and local processing of hierarchical visual stimuli in young children (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Cebus apella)

Results obtained with preschool children (Homo sapiens) were compared with results previously obtained from capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in matching-to-sample tasks featuring hierarchical visual stimuli. In Experiment 1, monkeys, in contrast with children, showed an advantage in matching the stimuli on the basis of their local features. These results were replicated in a 2nd experiment in which control trials enabled the authors to rule out that children used spurious cues to solve the matching task. In a 3rd experiment featuring conditions in which the density of the stimuli was manipulated, monkeys' accuracy in the processing of the global shape of the stimuli was negatively affected by the separation of the local elements, whereas children's performance was robust across testing conditions. Children's response latencies revealed a global precedence in the 2nd and 3rd experiments. These results show differences in the processing of hierarchical stimuli by humans and monkeys that emerge early during childhood.     

The role of working memory in attentional capture

Much previous research has demonstrated that visual search is typically disrupted by the presence of a unique “singleton” distractor in the search display. Here we show that attentional capture by an irrelevant color singleton during shape search critically depends on availability of working memory to the search task: When working memory is loaded in a concurrent yet unrelated verbal short-term memory task, capture increases. These findings converge with previous demonstrations that increasing working memory load results in greater distractor interference in Stroop-like tasks (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004), which support the hypothesis that working memory provides goal-directed control of visual selective attention allowing to minimize interference by goal-irrelevant distractors.     

APP23 mice as a model of Alzheimer's disease: an example of a transgenic approach to modeling a CNS disorder

Animal models are considered essential in research ensuing elucidation of human disease processes and subsequently, testing of potential therapeutic strategies. This is especially true for neurodegenerative disorders, in which the first steps in pathogenesis are often not accessible in human patients. Alzheimer's disease is vastly becoming a major medical and socioeconomic problem in our aging society. Valid animal models for this uniquely human condition should exhibit histopathological, biochemical, cognitive, and behavioral alterations observed in Alzheimer's disease patients. Major progress has been made since the understanding of the genetic basis of Alzheimer's disease and the development and improvement of transgenic mouse models. All present Alzheimer's disease models developed are partial but nevertheless essential in further unraveling the nature and spatial and temporal development of the complex molecular pathology underlying this condition. One of the more recent transgenic attempts to model Alzheimer's disease is the APP23 transgenic mouse. This article describes the development and assessment of this human amyloid precursor protein overexpression model. We summarize histopathological and biochemical, cognitive and behavioral observations made in heterozygous APP23 mice, thereby emphasizing the model's contribution to clarification of neurodegenerative disease mechanisms. In addition, the first therapeutic interventions in the APP23 model are included.     

Mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria: maintained attention to and impaired disengagement from negative information

Attentional bias to negative information has been proposed to be a cognitive vulnerability factor for the development of depression. In 2 experiments, the authors examined mood-congruent attentional bias in dysphoria. In both experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants performed an attentional task with negative, positive, and neutral word cues preceding a target. Targets appeared either at the same or at the opposite location of the cue. Overall, results indicate that dysphoric participants show maintained attention for negative words at longer stimulus presentations, which is probably caused by impaired attentional disengagement from negative words. Furthermore, nondysphoric participants maintain their attention more strongly to positive words. These results are discussed in relation to recent developments in the pathogenesis and treatment of depression.     

The odd-even effect in addition: an analysis per problem type

The odd-even effect is a well documented finding in the literature on mental arithmetic, at least for multiplication. It implies that false answers with the same parity as the correct answer are rejected more slowly than false answers with a different parity. For addition, this effect is not so well documented. The study by Krueger and Hallford (1984) is the only one that investigated odd-even effects for addition. However, they did not investigate odd-even effects per problem, even though there are indications that problem type can modulate odd-even effects for multiplication (Lemaire & Reder, 1999). Therefore, we wanted to get more insight into odd-even effects for addition by investigating odd-even effects per problem type. Our results extended the findings of Krueger and Hallford. First of all, we found an interaction between split and problem type. The most important and new result of present study, however, was a strong parity effect for E + E problems. We discuss our results in terms of two alternative explanations for odd-even effects, namely use of a parity rule on the one hand and familiarity with even outcomes on the other.