Memory and Counterfactual Simulations for Past Wrongdoings Foster Moral Learning and Improvement

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

P. F. Strawson was neither an externalist nor an internalist about moral responsibility

Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. Strawson himself was an externalist. I believe that Ciurria's reading of Strawson is problematic. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Strawson's position with regard to the internalism‐externalism issue against the background of Ciurria's reading of him. I conclude that Strawson was neither an internalist nor an externalist about moral responsibility. I draw extensively upon the whole body of Strawson's work, much of which is sadly neglected in discussions of ‘Freedom and Resentment’, although it illuminates many of the issues discussed there.     

Individual cognitive style affects flood-risk perception and mitigation intentions

Risk perception of natural hazards has been widely studied as one of the potential determinants of people's behaviors and behavioral intentions. However, individual differences can also affect risk perception. The present work focused on the link between an individual cognitive mindset (i.e., level of holism) and flood-risk perception. It also assessed the consequences of such a link on public and personal mitigation intentions, taking into account the sense of connection with the environment, the psychological distance from the adverse event, and the role played by previous personal experience with flooding. Our study (N = 191) showed that the individual cognitive style predicted risk perceptions and personal (for both experienced and no-experience groups) and public (only for experienced group) mitigation intentions, through the mediation of the sense of connection with the environment and the psychological distance from the adverse event. Results are discussed in terms of their practical implications for public communication and policies about environmental hazards.     

Reliability and Validity of a Paper-and-Pencil Test Measuring Hemisphere Preference

The present studies examined the reliability and validity of the Preference Test (PT), a widely used self-report index of preferred hemisphere thinking styles. The PT consists of items that intend to tap left-hemisphere and right-hemisphere cognitions. In the first study (N=47), PT scores were found to have reasonable test–retest stability. In the second study (N=334), a factor analysis of PT scores showed that the PT has a two-factor solution that can best be interpreted in terms of putative left- and right-hemisphere items. In the third study (N=29), background EEG activity (F3, F4, P3 and P4) of subjects was recorded. PT scores were found to be related to EEG asymmetry patterns for frontal, but not for parietal, recording sites. More specifically, subjects with a left-hemisphere preference displayed relatively stronger left frontal activity than subjects with a right-hemisphere preference. By and large, the present findings provide strong support for the reliability and some suggestive evidence for the validity of the PT.     

The Nature of Client Agency Prior to Therapy: A Qualitative Study on Clients’ Narratives

Client agency is considered a crucial contributor to good treatment outcome. Recent studies, however, differ strongly in how they conceptualise and investigate agency. The current study explores the nature of client agency in ten clients’ pre-treatment interviews. Applying Consensual Qualitative Research, we constructed three overarching categories, subdivided into 14 sub-categories capturing both between- and within-person differences in agency before therapy. We found that all participants oscillated between the experience of a lack of grip on problems on the one hand and noticing their involvement in the problem and taking action on the other. These results present a dynamic conceptualisation of client agency. This allows us to ask pertinent questions for both future research and clinical practice.     

Extending the Basic Local Independence Model to Polytomous Data

Psychometrika - A probabilistic framework for the polytomous extension of knowledge space theory (KST) is proposed. It consists in a probabilistic model, called polytomous local independence model,...     

So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy

This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it aims at highlighting one difference (albeit in degree and not in kind) in how counterfactuals work in general history, on the one hand, and in history of the natural sciences, on the other hand. As we show, both in general history and in history of science good counterfactual narratives need to be plausible, where plausibility is construed as appropriate continuity of both the antecedent and the consequent of the counterfactual with what we know about the world. However, in general history it is often possible to imagine a consequent dramatically different from the actual historical development, and yet plausible; in history of science, due to plausibility concerns, imagining a consequent far removed from the results of actual science seems more complicated. The second aim of the paper is to assess whether and to what degree counterfactual histories of science can advance the cause of the so-called “contingency thesis,” namely, the claim that history of science might have followed a path leading to alternative, non-equivalent theories, as successful as the ones that we currently embrace. We distinguish various versions of the contingency thesis and argue that counterfactual histories of science support weak versions of the thesis.

     

New Directions in the Conceptualization and Assessment of Personality—A Dynamic Systems Approach

In this paper, we demonstrate how an integrative approach to personality—one that combines within-person and between-person differences—can be achieved by drawing on the principles of dynamic systems theory. The dynamic systems perspective has the potential to reconcile both the stable and dynamic aspect of personality, it allows including different levels of analysis (i.e. traits and states), and it can account for regulatory mechanisms, as well as dynamic interactions between the elements of the system, and changes over time. While all of these features are obviously appealing, implementing a dynamic systems approach to personality is challenging. It requires new conceptual models, specific longitudinal research designs, and complex data analytical methods. In response to these issues, the first part of our paper discusses the Personality Dynamics model, a model that integrates the dynamic systems principles in a relatively straightforward way. Second, we review associated methodological and statistical tools that allow empirically testing the PersDyn model. Finally, the model and associated methodological and statistical tools are illustrated using an experience sampling methodology data set measuring Big Five personality states in 59 participants (N = 1916 repeated measurements). © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness

In four experiments, we tested whether 20‐month‐old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.