Easier Said Than Done? Task Difficulty's Influence on Temporal Alignment,Semantic Similarity,and Complexity Matching Between Gestures and Speech

Gestures and speech are clearly synchronized in many ways. However, previous studies have shown that the semantic similarity between gestures and speech breaks down as people approach transitions in understanding. Explanations for these gesture–speech mismatches, which focus on gestures and speech expressing different cognitive strategies, have been criticized for disregarding gestures’ and speech's integration and synchronization. In the current study, we applied three different perspectives to investigate gesture–speech synchronization in an easy and a difficult task: temporal alignment, semantic similarity, and complexity matching. Participants engaged in a simple cognitive task and were assigned to either an easy or a difficult condition. We automatically measured pointing gestures, and we coded participant's speech, to determine the temporal alignment and semantic similarity between gestures and speech. Multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis was used to determine the extent of complexity matching between gestures and speech. We found that task difficulty indeed influenced gesture–speech synchronization in all three domains. We thereby extended the phenomenon of gesture–speech mismatches to difficult tasks in general. Furthermore, we investigated how temporal alignment, semantic similarity, and complexity matching were related in each condition, and how they predicted participants’ task performance. Our study illustrates how combining multiple perspectives, originating from different research areas (i.e., coordination dynamics, complexity science, cognitive psychology), provides novel understanding about cognitive concepts in general and about gesture–speech synchronization and task difficulty in particular.     

Do Humans and Deep Convolutional Neural Networks Use Visual Information Similarly for the Categorization of Natural Scenes?

The investigation of visual categorization has recently been aided by the introduction of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which achieve unprecedented accuracy in picture classification after extensive training. Even if the architecture of CNNs is inspired by the organization of the visual brain, the similarity between CNN and human visual processing remains unclear. Here, we investigated this issue by engaging humans and CNNs in a two-class visual categorization task. To this end, pictures containing animals or vehicles were modified to contain only low/high spatial frequency (HSF) information, or were scrambled in the phase of the spatial frequency spectrum. For all types of degradation, accuracy increased as degradation was reduced for both humans and CNNs; however, the thresholds for accurate categorization varied between humans and CNNs. More remarkable differences were observed for HSF information compared to the other two types of degradation, both in terms of overall accuracy and image-level agreement between humans and CNNs. The difficulty with which the CNNs were shown to categorize high-passed natural scenes was reduced by picture whitening, a procedure which is inspired by how visual systems process natural images. The results are discussed concerning the adaptation to regularities in the visual environment (scene statistics); if the visual characteristics of the environment are not learned by CNNs, their visual categorization may depend only on a subset of the visual information on which humans rely, for example, on low spatial frequency information.     

Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein,Strawson and justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.