Diminished heart rate complexity in adolescent girls: a sign of vulnerability to anxiety disorders?

Background and Objectives: Diminished heart rate variability has been found to be associated with high anxiety symptomatology. Since adolescence is the period of onset for many anxiety disorders, this study aimed to determine sex- and anxiety-related differences in heart rate variability and complexity in adolescents.

Methods: We created four groups according to sex and anxiety symptomatology: high-anxiety girls (n?=?24) and boys (n?=?25), and low-anxiety girls (n?=?22) and boys (n?=?24) and recorded their cardiac function while they performed regular school activities. A series of two-way (sex and anxiety) MANOVAs were performed on time domain variability, frequency domain variability, and non-linear complexity.

Results: We obtained no multivariate interaction effects between sex and anxiety, but highly anxious participants had lower heart rate variability than the low-anxiety group. Regarding sex, girls showed lower heart rate variability and complexity than boys.

Conclusions: The results suggest that adolescent girls have a less flexible cardiac system that could be a marker of the girls’ vulnerability to developing anxiety disorders.     

Psychometric Aspects of the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire: Implications for Clinical Assessment and Research

The Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (DEQ) is a self-report measure that assesses self-criticism and dependency, 2 personality traits that confer vulnerability to depression (Blatt, 2004 Blatt, S. J. (2004). Experiences of depression: Theoretical, clinical, and research perspectives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Over several decades, different, shortened versions of the DEQ have been constructed to offer an alternative to the complex scoring procedure of the original DEQ. This study explores the factor structure as well as the construct and convergent validity of the DEQ by comparing a clinical and nonclinical sample. We also compared the original DEQ with 5 shortened versions. There were 621 participants (358 university students and 263 outpatients). Fit indexes for models of the original DEQ did not meet minimum fit criteria. Moreover, the only versions with satisfactory fit were the Theoretical Depressive Experiences Questionnaire–21 (TDEQ–21) and the Theoretical Depressive Experiences Questionnaire–12 (TDEQ–12), which also showed acceptable construct and convergent validity. Finally, the diagnostic and clinical applicability of the DEQ is discussed.     

No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension

In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current study, their claim that people develop “unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.     

Reference to Self and Other in the Digital Public Sphere: The Case of Political Blogs

In this paper, we analyze how a political blog author (Spanish Alejo Vidal-Quadras) establishes the reference to self and other in his blog entries. We furthermore look into how the commentators to this blog react and establish reference to self and other in the digital public sphere. More concretely, we show that they not only take up the references established by the main blog author but also create new references. These allow, on the one hand, for profiling themselves as part of a group and, on the other hand, identifying their interlocutor among the variety of possible interlocutors in the digital public sphere. By addressing different interlocutors, the commentators turn the comments section into a dialogic space, a dimension that is lacking in the main blog entries. However, the fact that they almost invariably identify interlocutors other than Vidal-Quadras but address Vidal-Quadras without explicitly identifying him, shows that Vidal-Quadras remains the main ratified interlocutor in view of his ownership of the blog. This paper shows then how participants in the digital public sphere create a complex relationship of self and other reference in political blogs.     

The development and validation of an implicit measure of competence need satisfaction

Research on self-determination theory has typically relied on explicit measures when examining the concept of competence need satisfaction. As a result, we know relatively little about competence need satisfaction that arises under conditions of automaticity. Across four studies, we developed and validated implicit measures of competence need satisfaction by drawing on two tasks: a relational variant of the implicit association test (IAT; Study 1, 3, and 4) and the implicit relational assessment procedure (IRAP; Study 2–3). Results across these studies revealed that both implicit measures were either unrelated or moderately related to their explicit counterpart. They were also unrelated to one another. Unlike the IRAP, the IAT was found to be reliable, to display discriminant validity, and to yield meaningful but modest relations with constructs in a nomological network. Together, these results provide modest support for the usefulness of the competence need satisfaction IAT but not of the competence need satisfaction IRAP as an implicit measure of the need for competence. Future research examining the unique predictive value of this IAT is needed, together with research on possible explanations for the low reliability of the IRAP.     

Psychometric Properties of the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale of Hewitt in a Dutch-Speaking Sample: Associations With the Big Five Personality Traits

We administered the Dutch Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale of Hewitt and Flett (1991, 2004) in a large student sample (N = 959) and performed a confirmatory factor analysis to test the factorial structure proposed by the original authors. The existence of a method factor referring to the negatively keyed items in the questionnaire was investigated by including it in the tested models. Next, we investigated how the 3 perfectionism dimensions are associated with the Five-factor model (FFM) of personality. The 3-factor structure originally observed by the authors was confirmed, at least when a method factor that refers to the negatively keyed items was included in the model. Self-oriented and socially prescribed perfectionism were both distinguished by low extraversion and low emotional stability. Self-oriented perfectionism's positive relationship with both conscientiousness and openness to experience differentiated the 2 perfectionism dimensions from each other. Other-oriented perfectionism was not well-characterized by the Big Five personality traits.     

Embodiment Effects and Language Comprehension in Alzheimer's Disease

It has been shown that when participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences that describe a transfer of an object toward or away from their body, they are faster to respond when the response requires a movement in the same direction as the transfer described in the sentence. This phenomenon is known as the action compatibility effect (ACE). This study investigates whether the ACE exists for volunteers with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whether the ACE can facilitate language comprehension, and also whether the ACE can still be produced if the order of the two events is inverted, that is, whether overt movement can prime comprehension of transfer sentences. In Study 1, participants with AD, younger, and older adults were tested on an adaptation of the ACE Paradigm. In Study 2, the same paradigm was modified to include an arm movement that participants had to perform prior to sentence exposure on screen. In Study 1, young, older adults, and individuals with AD were faster to respond when the direction of the response movement matched the directionality implied by the sentence (ACE). In Study 2, no traditional ACE was found; participants were faster when the direction of the movement immediately preceding the sentence matched the directionality of the sentence. It was found that compatibility effects generated a relative advantage, that transfer schemata are easier to process, and that an ACE‐like effect can be the result of mutual priming between language and movement. Results suggested preservation in AD of the neural systems for action engaged during language comprehension, and conditions under which comprehension in AD can be facilitated in real life may be identified.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.