As We Forgive—Case History of a Burglary

In 1979, Pastoral Psychology published the first of a series of articles I wrote based on non-risk-free research. The last was The Extra Mile—Case History of a Homicide (1993) and in it a point was stressed: Ministers who practice psychotherapy will profit prophetically if pastoral theology accepts the responsibility to (1) articulate contemporary ultimateconcerns, (2) clarify healthy avenues for compensation, and (3) tell stories about the hopeful revelations of God's providence in a broken world. As We Forgive is also a case study—wrapped in a novella—and it illustrates these three ingredients with an emphasis on spiritual self-awareness and thereality of Providence.     

Myth and Therapy

In the context of psychology, myth takes on a therapeutic aspect that moves it beyond the negative connotations of common usage to a position of religious significance.     

Visual representation of malleable and rigid objects that deform as they rotate

Most studies and theories of object recognition have addressed the perception of rigid objects. Yet, physical objects may also move in a nonrigid manner. A series of priming studies examined the conditions under which observers can recognize novel views of objects moving nonrigidly. Observers were primed with 2 views of a rotating object that were linked by apparent motion or presented statically. The apparent malleability of the rotating prime object varied such that the object appeared to be either malleable or rigid. Novel deformed views of malleable objects were primed when falling within the object's motion path. Priming patterns were significantly more restricted for deformed views of rigid objects. These results suggest that moving malleable objects may be represented as continuous events, whereas rigid objects may not. That is, object representations may be "dynamically remapped" during the analysis of the object's motion.     

The early acquisition of verb meaning in German by normally developing and language impaired children

The research reported here focuses on the early acquisition of event structure in German. Based on longitudinal studies from 5 normally developing (ND) and 6 language-impaired (LI) children, a model of "event structural bootstrapping" is presented that spells out how ND children log into the verb lexicon. They project a target-consistent event tree, depicting the head-of-event of transitions. Young LI children, failing to employ this bootstrapping strategy, resort to radically underspecified event representations. The results from a truth-value judgment experiment with 16 ND and 16 LI children showed that ND children perform correctly on transitional verbs, while LI children perform at chance level on the same tasks. These findings are accounted for by the model of event structural bootstrapping to the extent that LI children lack an explicit representation of the head-of-event.     

Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes--in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing, including, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention-allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, selection, and inference stage, which accesses long-term memory. These two stages provide the primary ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments from computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of "problem solving." The cases of apparently intelligent interpretation sometimes cited in support of this claim do not show cognitive penetration; rather, they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect what is seen. In each case it is concluded that the evidence is more readily assimilated to the view that when cognitive effects are found, they have a locus outside early vision, in such processes as the allocation of focal attention and the identification of the stimulus.     

Emotional intelligence meets traditional standards for an intelligence

An intelligence must meet several standard criteria before it can be considered scientifically legitimate. First, it should be capable of being operationalized as a set of abilities. Second, it should meet certain correlational criteria: the abilities defined by the intelligence should form a related set (i.e., be intercorrelated), and be related to pre-existing intelligences, while also showing some unique variance. Third, the abilities of the intelligence should develop with age and experience. In two studies, adults (N=503) and adolescents (N=229) took a new, 12-subscale ability test of emotional intelligence: the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). The present studies show that emotional intelligence, as measured by the MEIS, meets the above three classical criteria of a standard intelligence.     

Feeding-based arousal effects on visual recognition memory in early infancy.

Arousal effects on a 1-trial visual recognition paired-comparison task were studied at newborn, 1-month, and 4-month test ages. Infants were tested before and after feeding, with arousal assumed to be lower after feeding. Newborns and 1-month-olds shifted from a familiarity preference before feeding to a novelty preference after feeding. A control group tested only after feeding confirmed that this shift was not due to increased stimulus exposure from the prefeeding test. By 4 months, infants showed novelty preferences independent of feeding. This age by arousal interaction for recognition memory extends previous knowledge by including endogenous arousal with age, stimulus, and length of exposure as contributors to familiarity-novelty preferences. It also extends and provides converging evidence for arousal effects on visual attention in early infancy found previously with preferential looking. A shift from subcortical to cortical dominance is supported.