Conceptual,methodological, and clinical issues in cognitive-behavioral assessment

This article reviews cognitive-behavioral assessment principles and procedures. The functions of such assessments are noted, and issues and advances in cognitive assessment are discussed. The need for integrated cognitive, behavioral, and affective assessments is then explored. Finally, conceptual methodological, and clinical issues in the integration of assessments and study of reciprocal determinants are presented.Preparation of this paper was supported in part by a General Research Board Faculty Research Award from the University of Maryland. The author would like to thank Steve Graham, Donald Meichenbaum, Barbara Keogh, and Bernice Wong for their feedback during the preparation of this paper.     

Stability and Change in Type A Components and Cardiovascular Reactivity in Medical Students During Periods of Academic Stress1

This study examined the effects of academic stress upon components of Type A behavior and cardiovascular reactivity. In a longitudinal design, heart rate and blood pressure responses to the Type A Structured Interview (SI) and additional laboratory challenges were measured in medical students at three points during an academic semester. Sessions 1 and 3 were scheduled during vacation periods; Session 2 took place during an intensive examination week. Results indicated that three “stylistic” components of Pattern A derived from the SI—loud and explosive speech, short response latency, and potential for hostility—increased significantly during the exam period. Similar increases achieved marginal significance for another stylistic component, rapid and accelerated speech. By contrast, global Type A assessments did not increase with academic demands. Cardiovascular reactivity was significantly but only moderately stable across the three sessions, showing less consistency than has been reported in previous research. In addition, there was little evidence in this study that cardiovascular reactivity was potentiated by academic stress or by Type A behavior. These results demonstrate the influence of naturalistic environmental factors on overt behavioral components that have recently been suggested as coronary risk factors. Therefore, it is advisable for future experimental and epidemiological research to examine the social and environmental context in which these behaviors occur.     

Midline and off-midline tongue and right- and left-hand vibrotactile thresholds of stutterers and normal-speaking individuals

Vibrotactile thresholds for 7 male stutterers and 7 normal-speaking men (age range for both groups = 19 to 32 yr.) were obtained from the right, midline, and left sides of the lingual dorsum, and the thenar eminences of both hands. The stutterers showed slightly higher (less sensitive) mean thresholds than the normal speakers for all three lingual test sites. This was not the case for the thresholds obtained from both hands. The preliminary data suggest that oral peripheral sensory integrity might be somewhat different for stutterers than for normal-speaking individuals.     

Book Reviews

The Psychological Record -     

The interaction of stressful life events and chronic strains on community mental health

One of the possible adaptive costs of coping with stress is diminished capacity to respond to subsequent adaptive demands. This paper examined the complex interplay between major life events and one source of chronic strain. Residents of the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area exposed to higher levels of smog, who had also experienced a recent stressful life event, exhibited poorer mental health than those exposed to pollution who had not experienced a recent stressful life event. There were, however, no direct effects of smog levels on mental health. These patterns of results were replicated in both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study. The interplay of psychosocial vulnerability and environmental conditions is discussed.     

The principle of charity and the problem of irrationality (translation and the problem of irrationality)

Common formulations of the principle of charity in translation seem to undermine attributions of irrationality in social scientific accounts that are otherwise unexceptionable. This I call the problem of irrationality. Here I resolve the problem of irrationality by developing two complementary views of the principle of charity. First, I develop the view (ill-developed in the literature at present) that the principle of charity is preparatory, being needed in the construction of provisional first-approximation translation manuals. These serve as the basis for explanatory accounts and associated refinements in the translation manual. In developing such explanatory accounts, the principle of charity is no longer constraining. Thus, the principle of charity applies only in the early stages of constructing translation manuals, and there is no problem of irrationality in the later stages of constructing translation manuals. Second, I reduce the principle of charity, where it does apply, to a special case of what I call the principle of explicability: so translate as to attribute explicable beliefs and practices to the speakers of the source-language. I show that the appropriate formulation of the principle of charity counsels just what the principle of explicability requires in the early stages of social scientific investigation.I am grateful to Robert Barrett, Roger Gibson, and Paul Roth for their generous assistance.     

Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving

People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically demonstrated here, be used to define insight.