Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation

Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams, etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation, and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that, as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary.     

A Top-Down Approach to a Complex Natural System: Protein Folding

We develop a general method for applying functional models to natural systems and cite recent progress in protein modeling that demonstrates the power of this approach. Functional modeling constrains the range of acceptable structural models of a system, reduces the difficulty of finding them, and improves their fidelity. However, functional models are distinctly different from the structural models that are more commonly applied in science. In particular, structural and functional models ask different questions and provide different kinds of answers. As we clarify these differences and articulate how to use these models jointly, we extend our ability to do science and gain insight into the proper use of the terms organization, order, and emergence when describing systems in nature.     

Doomed to Read in a Second Language: Implications for Learning

The aim of the study was to elucidate whether and how reliance on a second language impacts the learning of new information under very basic learning conditions. The paradigm used to investigate this issue required individuals to learn a series of associations between numerals and particular letter strings. Participants were two groups of university students: (1) individuals for whom spoken Hebrew was the mother tongue and written Hebrew a primary orthography (L1 group), and (2) individuals for whom Hebrew, both spoken and written, was a second language (L2 group). Data were collected under two conditions. In the language-dependent condition (LDC), the paradigm required learning associations between eight numerals and the letter strings of eight familiar Hebrew words. In the language-independent condition (LIC), it required learning associations between eight numerals and eight random letter strings in Hebrew. Results suggest that learners may be significantly disadvantaged when compelled to learn new information mediated in a second language. This disadvantage appears to manifest itself at a very basic learning level and in instances where new information is mediated by language that is fairly overlearned by the L2 learner.     

The contingent a priori and the publicity of a priori knowledge

Kripke maintains that one who stipulatively introduces the term ‘one meter’ as a rigid designator for the length of a certain stick s at time t is in a position to know a priori that if s exists at t then the length of s at t is one meter. Some (e.g., Soames 2003) have objected to this alleged instance of the contingent a priori on the grounds that the stipulator's knowledge would have to be based in part on substantive metalinguistic knowledge. I examine Soames's argument for the a posteriority of the relevant metalinguistic knowledge, and I argue that its main premise is false.     

The Old Book Switcheroo: Or Anatomy of a Delusion

In this paper, an aging baby boomer “tells all” about his personal experience with some of the “pitfalls of organized religion,” as observed from his somewhat unusual perspective as a Jew by birth and a Roman Catholic by choice, and a lifelong Asperger’s sufferer, the butt of practical jokes in a variety of juvenile and adult settings. His conclusion, echoing H.L. Mencken’s famous statement that “the cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy,” is that the best antidote to these “pitfalls” may be found simply in the responsible practice of religion, including both Judaism and Christianity. The author also believes his own survival in life despite some “ogres and tricksters” along the way validates the Jungian philosophy of synchronicity. He believes that the storms of life are best weathered by accepting them as parts of a Merciful Providence’s “vast eternal plans” for all His children on Earth.