Constructing other persons: A limit on the effect

Numerous studies have documented the effect that expectancies have on perceivers' perceptions of targets, but in few of these studies have the targets been aware of the perceivers' expectancies. In the present study, some perceivers were led to believe that their future interaction partners had a cold personality while others held no such expectancy. Orthogonal to this manipulation, some targets were told that their partners expected them to be cold while others received no such information. Results indicate that expectancy confirmation occurs only when perceivers with expectancies interact with naive targets. Targets who were told that the perceiver held an expectancy about them were able to overcome this expectancy. The relevance of these findings to the process of expectancy confirmation is discussed, and some predictions are made about the conditions under which expectancy confirmation will and will not occur.     

Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others?

Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect to the content of moral beliefs, we find that beliefs about the moral properties of negatively valenced acts are seen as reliably more objective than beliefs about the moral properties of positively valenced acts. With respect to the social representation of moral beliefs, we find that the degree of perceived consensus regarding a moral belief positively influences its perceived objectivity. The present experiments also demonstrate that holding a moral belief to be objective is associated with a more ‘closed’ response in the face of disagreement about it, and with more morally pejorative attributions towards a disagreeing other person.     

Retributive and restorative justice: Importance of crime severity and shared identity in people's justice responses

Retributive and restorative justice present two different responses to wrongdoing: one that focuses on addressing the moral wrong through punitive sanctions (retribution) and one that focuses on addressing the harm that has been caused through reparative sanctions (restoration). Psychological investigations of what factors influence which justice outcome that people desire (retributive, restorative, or both) have focused on two constructs: crime severity and shared identity. The crime severity approach contends that people can have multiple justice goals, and which justice goals people want to fulfil is dependent on the salient features of the situation (such as offence seriousness). The shared identity approach argues that people's desire for restoration or retribution is dependent on the shared identity and perceptions of value consensus between offender and victim in the judgement context. The findings related to both of these factors are reviewed, and possibilities for future research integrating these two approaches are discussed.     

Casuistry and social category bias

This research explored cases where people are drawn to make judgments between individuals based on questionable criteria, in particular those individuals' social group memberships. We suggest that individuals engage in casuistry to mask biased decision making, by recruiting more acceptable criteria to justify such decisions. We present 6 studies that demonstrate how casuistry licenses people to judge on the basis of social category information but appear unbiased--to both others and themselves--while doing so. In 2 domains (employment and college admissions decisions), with 2 social categories (gender and race), and with 2 motivations (favoring an in-group or out-group), the present studies explored how participants justify decisions biased by social category information by arbitrarily inflating the relative value of their preferred candidates' qualifications over those of competitors.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

Appraising the threat of illness: a mental representational approach

This article (a) describes a mental model underlying initial evaluations of illness signs and (b) reports an experiment demonstrating the model's utility by showing how the model represents evidence of defensiveness among people who test positively for a sign of illness. The model consists of a set of cognitive elements that people consider to evaluate the threat represented by a sign of possible illness. Seventy-two undergraduates were led to believe that they tested positively or negatively on a saliva test for a fictitious risk factor for a disease. In addition, half the participants were told about the existence of a simple preventive treatment for the disease, whereas the others were not. Subsequently the participants answered questions about elements of the threat-appraisal model. Analysis of their responses reveals evidence of defensiveness on several elements of the model. Those testing positively for the risk factor, especially those uninformed about its treatment, minimized threat by (a) increasing their estimates of the false-positive rate of the test, (b) decreasing their estimates of the seriousness of the risk factor, and (c) decreasing their estimates of the extent to which the disease itself is life-threatening. Applications of the model to actual illness threats and the relation between threat-related judgments and health-related behavior are discussed.     

Predicting Summer Energy Consumption from Homeowners' Attitudes1

Two surveys were conducted to examine the relationship between homeowners' attitudes toward energy use and their actual summer electric consumption. In Survey 1, 56 couples filled out questionnaires concerning their energy attitudes. A factor analysis of their responses revealed four factors: comfort and health concerns, effort to conserve and monetary savings, role of the individual, and legitimacy of the energy crisis. The factors were entered into a multiple regression analysis to predict actual summer electric consumption. The attitudinal factors together significantly accounted for 55% of the variance in summer electric consumption. The comfort and health factor by itself explained 30% of the consumption variance. Survey 2, consisting of 69 couples, was conducted to elaborate the meaning of the factors. The results of the factor analysis of Survey 2 revealed six factors: comfort, health, individual's role, belief in science, legitimacy of the energy crisis, and effort to conserve. An overall regression analysis showed that the factors significantly explained nearly 60% of the summer consumption variance. The comfort factor was again the best predictor of summer electric consumption, accounting for 42% of the variance. It was concluded that attitudes about one's comfort are significantly related to household energy consumption (primarily air conditioning). The implications for energy conservation campaigns were discussed.     

“I Am Moral,But You Are Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law1

This research examined the different attributions that individuals make for law‐abiding behavior by different people. Experiment 1 reveals that individuals believe that they and other highly moral people are motivated to obey laws because of internal reasons (e.g., laws reflect valued rules and moral behavior), whereas they believe that criminals are motivated by external reasons (e.g., fear of punishment). However, Experiment 2 shows that even some criminals are seen as motivated to obey laws regarding particular types of crimes because of internal factors. Experiment 3 replicates these general findings using a between‐subjects design. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that individuals believe that they are motivated to obey laws regarding minor transgressions (e.g., speed limits) for both internal and external reasons. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for both psychological theory and social policy.