Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization.     

An Analysis of Motor Coordination Components for Various Localization Tasks

Localization abilities of subjects in three perceptual-motor tasks were considered before and after an exposure to a visual distortion. During this distortion the subject observed his hand ballistically point to an invisible but audible target while either receiving or not receiving knowledge of results (KR) concerning pointing accuracy. Also, subjects either received a 1-or a 4-sec rest period between each of 30 exposure ballistic pointing actions. The pre-and postexposure tasks involved the ability of a subject to accurately point to an occluded and stationary auditory target, to point to the straight-ahead position in space, and to indicate when a moving, auditory target was perceived as being in the straight-ahead position. For these tasks, the pre-vs. postexposure localization difference scores are referred to as the negative aftereffect, the proprioceptive shift, and the auditory shift, respectively. Wilkinson’s (1971) two-component additive model (negative aftereffect= proprioceptive shift plus auditory shift) held when KR was given regardless of amount of rest between exposure pointing responses. With a 4-sec rest and no KR, the relationship between coordination components was nonadditive (negative aftereffect greater than proprioceptive shift plus auditory shift).     

Social problem solving in early childhood: Developmental change and the influence of shyness

The purpose of this study was to examine developmental change and the influence of shyness on social problem-solving (SPS). At 24, 36, and 48 months, children (N = 570) were observed while interacting with an unfamiliar peer during an SPS task and at 24 months, maternal report of shyness was collected. Results showed that across the full sample, children displayed low but stable levels of withdrawn SPS and increasing levels of SPS competence over development. In addition, results showed multiple trajectories of withdrawn and competent SPS. Shyness was associated with high-increasing and high-decreasing withdrawn SPS trajectories compared with the low-increasing withdrawn SPS trajectory. Shyness was also associated with the low-increasing compared with the high-increasing SPS competence trajectory. Findings demonstrate the development of SPS competence over early childhood, and the influence of early shyness on this developmental course, with some shy children showing improvement in SPS skills and others continuing to show SPS difficulties over time.     

The Moderating Effect of Machiavellianism on the Psychological Contract Breach–Organizational Identification/Disidentification Relationships

Purpose

We explore whether Machiavellianism—a personality trait which describes the extent to which individuals ignore values and ethical considerations when the ends justify the means—will influence their responses to their employing organizations’ failure to fulfil promised obligations (psychological contracts). Specifically, we draw on psychological contracts theory and the group value model to argue that Machiavellianism will moderate the relationships between psychological contract breach and (1) organizational identification; and (2) organizational disidentification.

Design/Methodology/Approach

We tested our hypotheses in a study of 262 employees from various organizations at two points in time.

Findings

We found that psychological contract breach was negatively related to organizational identification and positively related to organizational disidentification. Furthermore, employees with higher levels of Machiavellianism tended to disidentify with their organizations to a greater extent (at Time 2) in response to psychological contract breach (at Time 1) than did employees with low levels of Machiavellianism. Machiavellianism did not moderate the relationship between psychological contract breach and organizational identification.

Implications

Our study contributes to extant research exploring the importance of Machiavellianism in the workplace. Specifically, we show that employees with high levels of Machiavellianism are more likely to disidentify in response to psychological contract breach but do not tend to identify to a lesser degree.

Originality/Value

This study builds on the extant research exploring individual differences in the psychological contract dynamics by considering Machiavellianism as a moderator of the breach–outcome relationship.     

Priming the mental time-line: effects of modality and processing mode

The notion of a mental time-line (i.e., past corresponds to left and future corresponds to right) supports the conceptual metaphor view assuming that abstract concepts like “time” are grounded in cognitively more accessible concepts like “space.” In five experiments, we further investigated the relationship between temporal and spatial representations and examined whether or not the spatial correspondents of time are unintentionally activated. We employed a priming paradigm, in which visual or auditory prime words (i.e., temporal adverbs such as yesterday, tomorrow) preceded a colored square. In all experiments, participants discriminated the color of this square by responding with the left or the right hand. Although the temporal reference of the priming adverb was task irrelevant in Experiment 1, visually presented primes facilitated responses to the square in correspondence with the direction of the mental time-line. This priming effect was absent in Experiments 2, 3, and 5, in which the primes were presented auditorily and the temporal reference of the words could be ignored. The effect, however, emerged when attention was oriented to the temporal content of the auditory prime words in Experiment 4. The results suggest that task demands differentially modulate the activation of the mental time-line within the visual and auditory modality and support a flexible association between conceptual codes.     

Encouraging Inquiring Men and Women: Teaching,Windsurfing, and Duck à l’Orange

Fay Fransella set up the Centre for Personal Construct Psychology as a bold experiment to make the theory more accessible to whoever might find it useful. The process of its establishment and its changing nature are outlined in this article. In its implementation and promotion of the theory, the Centre had important impacts on people's professional and personal lives, as evidenced in my own life. Fransella's pragmatic approach to life, her bold experiments, and her creative solutions were reflective of an adoption of a theory as something to be lived, not just an intellectual pursuit.     

Visual mental representations supporting object drawing: How naming a novel object with a novel count noun impacts on young children's object drawing

Object drawing can be supported by a number of cognitive resources, each making available visual information about the object being drawn. These resources include perceptual input, short-term visual memory, and long-term visual memory. Each of these resources has the potential to make available distinct forms of visual representation, including viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-independent representations, object-specific and category representations, and separate representations of object colour. We review neuropsychological and developmental evidence supporting these claims, including evidence that the same drawing can reflect the influence of multiple forms of visual representation. Seven experiments are then reported, investigating object drawing by 4- to 6-year-old children, to confirm the support for drawing provided by different forms of visual representation. Young children are selected for investigation because their drawing is relatively unconstrained by culturally determined norms which, in our culture, dictate that objects should be drawn just as they appear from the vantage point of the drawer. To distinguish the support provided by object and category representations, the experiments exploit the privileged links between count nouns as object labels, and representations of object categories. In addition, pre-established representations, visual or otherwise, are precluded from influencing drawing by asking the children to draw novel objects, and by creating novel count nouns with which to label the objects. The results reveal how viewpoint-specific perceptual representations, object-specific representations of shape and of colour, and category representations of shape can each impact on object drawing, and in some circumstances on the same drawing. It appears that simple drawing tasks have the potential to reveal some of the distinct types of representation able to support visual cognition.