Mindfulness Based Flourishing Program: A Cross-Cultural Study of Hong Kong Chinese and British Participants

The Mindfulness Based Flourishing Program (MBFP) is an online 8-week intervention developed for enhancing wellbeing with the use of mindfulness practices, through targeting a range of positive variables. The efficacy of the MBFP has been demonstrated in a randomized controlled trial, and in order to further establish it as an intervention with widespread application, cross-cultural validation is warranted. The current study was conducted with the primary aim of testing the validity of the MBFP with a Hong Kong Chinese population, as well as verifying its positive effects. A randomized wait-list controlled design was adopted with 115 participants (92 females, mean age = 31.50). Intervention outcomes were compared between Hong Kong Chinese and British participants. Five positive variables were examined (self-compassion, meaning in life, positive and negative emotions, gratitude, and mindfulness), and measures were taken pre- and post-intervention. Significant gains in wellbeing measures were observed in both the Hong Kong Chinese and the British experimental groups. Levels of wellbeing post-intervention were also higher for the two experimental groups as compared to their control counterparts. The current study provides preliminary evidence for the MBFP’s cross-cultural validity, and strengthens previous claims for its efficacy as a new, accessible alternative for enhancing wellbeing.     

A new look at the schema therapy model: organization and role of early maladaptive schemas

This study reexamined the organization of Young’s 18 early maladaptive schemas and their hypothesized associations with experiences of need-thwarting parental experiences in childhood and the “vulnerable child” mode of emotional distress in adulthood. A large Danish sample (N = 1054) of 658 clinical- and 391 nonclinical adults completed measures of early maladaptive schemas, parenting styles, and the vulnerable child mode. We identified four higher-order schema domains as most appropriate in terms of interpretability and empirical indices (“Disconnection & Rejection”, “Impaired Autonomy & Performance”, “Excessive Responsibility & Standards”, and “Impaired Limits”). All four schema domains were differentially associated with conceptually relevant need-thwarting parental experiences. Apart from “Impaired Limits”, the schema domains meaningfully accounted for the association between need-thwarting parental experiences in childhood and emotional states of feeling like a “vulnerable child” in adulthood. We conclude that four domains of early maladaptive schemas are empirically and conceptually consistent with Young’s schema therapy model of personality pathology and longstanding emotional disorders. Findings warrant replication using different populations and if possible a prospective multi-method design. A scoring key for computing the four schema domains is provided.     

Effects of gender similarity on relationships between person–group value fit and work attitudes

The present study assessed the effect of gender similarity as a potential moderator of the relationships between person–group (P–G) value fit and work attitudes. Specifically, we predicted that the effect of P–G value fit (in terms of social integration values) on individual attitudes would be stronger for individuals who had a similar gender than those of a different gender. Based on data obtained from 197 employees in South Korea, we found that when the focal individual had high gender similarity with his or her group, the relationships between P–G value fit and job satisfaction and between P–G value fit and turnover intentions were more prominent. Furthermore, these moderating effects were significant for men, but not for women.     

The powers of noise-fitting: reply to Barth and Paladino

Barth and Paladino (2011) argue that changes in numerical representations are better modeled by a power function whose exponent gradually rises to 1 than as a shift from a logarithmic to a linear representation of numerical magnitude. However, the fit of the power function to number line estimation data may simply stem from fitting noise generated by averaging over changing proportions of logarithmic and linear estimation patterns. To evaluate this possibility, we used conventional model fitting techniques with individual as well as group average data; simulations that varied the proportion of data generated by different functions; comparisons of alternative models' prediction of new data; and microgenetic analyses of rates of change in experiments on children's learning. Both new data and individual participants' data were predicted less accurately by power functions than by logarithmic and linear functions. In microgenetic studies, changes in the best fitting power function's exponent occurred abruptly, a finding inconsistent with Barth and Paladino's interpretation that development of numerical representations reflects a gradual shift in the shape of the power function. Overall, the data support the view that change in this area entails transitions from logarithmic to linear representations of numerical magnitude.     

Differential priming effect for subliminal fear and disgust facial expressions

Compared to neutral or happy stimuli, subliminal fear stimuli are known to be well processed through the automatic pathway. We tried to examine whether fear stimuli could be processed more strongly than other negative emotional stimuli using a modified subliminal affective priming paradigm. Twenty-six healthy subjects participated in two separated sessions. Fear, disgust and neutral facial expressions were adopted as primes, and 50% happy facial stimuli were adopted as a target to let only stronger negative primes reveal a priming effect. Participants were asked to appraise the affect of target faces in the affect appraisal session and to appraise the genuineness of target faces in the genuineness appraisal session. The genuineness instruction was developed to help participants be sensitive to potential threats. In the affect appraisal, participants judged 50% happy target faces significantly more 'unpleasant' when they were primed by fear faces than primed by 50% happy control faces. In the genuineness appraisal, participants judged targets significantly more 'not genuine' when they were primed by fear and disgust faces than primed by controls. These findings suggest that there may be differential priming effects between subliminal fear and disgust expressions, which could be modulated by a sensitive context of potential threat.     

Impaired body but not face perception in patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder

Background. Empirical evidence involving the processing of social information by patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) has been relatively scarce. Our study investigated the perceptual abilities of patients with OCD to recognize human faces and bodies. Method. Fifty‐four drug‐free or drug‐naïve patients with OCD and 42 healthy controls performed discrimination tasks consisting of four types of stimuli: two sets of faces that were manipulated with regard to configuration and features, human bodies, and chairs. The stimuli were presented in upright and upside‐down orientations. Results. Patients with OCD were significantly less accurate in discriminating pairs of bodily postures implying actions. However, we found no significant differences between patient and control groups in the ability to recognize faces and chairs. The inversion effects for bodies and faces were also comparable between the two groups. Conclusions. The current findings suggest that patients with OCD experience difficulty in perceiving static forms of bodily postures, but are able to adequately recognize human faces. Our data indicate a selective deficit in the perception of bodily postures in those with OCD and suggest that this deficit is probably not related to the abnormal configurational processing of social objects.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Perceptual categories and the computation of “grandmother”

Abstract

Recent theoretical approaches to understanding face recognition have used converging evidence from studies of normal face processing, everyday errors and patterns of neuropsychological impairment to suggest how different face processing modules are related to each other. This paper disuses four issues that arise from this body of work. These concern the nature of representations involved in face recognition, the existence of parallel pathways for processing different types of information, the relationship between recognition and awareness, and the question of how faces become familiar. Current research provoked by these issues is reviewed in the paper and suggestions are made about the ways in which such research will help refine theories of face processing.     

The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not.