Prior knowledge is more predictive of error correction than subjective confidence

Previous research has demonstrated that, when given feedback, participants are more likely to correct confidently-held errors, as compared with errors held with lower levels of confidence, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Accounts of hypercorrection suggest that confidence modifies attention to feedback; alternatively, hypercorrection may reflect prior domain knowledge, with confidence ratings simply correlated with this prior knowledge. In the present experiments, we attempted to adjudicate among these explanations of the hypercorrection effect. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants answered general knowledge questions, rated their confidence, and received feedback either immediately after rating their confidence or after a delay of several minutes. Although memory for confidence judgments should have been poorer at a delay, the hypercorrection effect was equivalent for both feedback timings. Experiment 2 showed that hypercorrection remained unchanged even when the delay to feedback was increased. In addition, measures of recall for prior confidence judgments showed that memory for confidence was indeed poorer after a delay. Experiment 3 directly compared estimates of domain knowledge with confidence ratings, showing that such prior knowledge was related to error correction, whereas the unique role of confidence was small. Overall, our results suggest that prior knowledge likely plays a primary role in error correction, while confidence may play a small role or merely serve as a proxy for prior knowledge.     

A Bifactor Model of Anxiety Sensitivity: Analysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the fit of a bifactor model of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al. Psychological Assessment, 19, 176–188, 2007) as well as to examine measurement invariance of the ASI-3 across gender. Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Cincinnati (n?=?954; 63 % female). Results indicated that the bifactor model was the best fit to the data, and that this model of AS is fully invariant in terms of gender. The current findings suggest that anxiety sensitivity consists of a general factor and three independent group factors (rather than a higher-order factor with three correlated lower-order factors). The ASI-3 subscales from the bifactor model however did not provide incremental predictive utility above and beyond the general AS factor with respect to an external anxiety criterion. Related research and clinical implications are discussed.     

A Methodological Examination of Emotion Inductions in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Comparison of Standardized Versus Idiographic Stimuli

Emotional reactivity is conceptualized as a core feature of borderline personality disorder (BPD) and has been subject to substantial empirical research. The laboratory methods used to elicit emotional reactivity in BPD have varied and findings across studies have been mixed. At present, there is little research evaluating the relative efficacy of different methods in eliciting emotional reactivity in BPD. Thus, the current study examined differences in emotional reactivity among individuals with BPD in response to standardized and idiographic stimuli, and across three specific emotions (sadness, fear, and anger). Individuals with BPD, social anxiety disorder, and healthy controls viewed film clips (i.e., standardized stimuli) or engaged in a personally-relevant imagery task (i.e., idiographic stimuli) while self-reported and physiological indices (skin conductance response and respiratory sinus arrhythmia) of emotion were collected. Results indicated that BPD participants displayed greater reactivity of sadness and anger (but not fear) in response to the idiographic versus standardized stimuli, a pattern that was not exhibited by the other two groups. These findings might explain some of the mixed evidence to date and suggest that idiographic sadness and fear inductions may be more effective for individuals with BPD.     

Adding Types,But Not Tokens,Affects Property Induction

The extent to which we generalize a novel property from a sample of familiar instances to novel instances depends on the sample composition. Previous property induction experiments have only used samples consisting of novel types (unique entities). Because real-world evidence samples often contain redundant tokens (repetitions of the same entity), we studied the effects on property induction of adding types and tokens to an observed sample. In Experiments 1–3, we presented participants with a sample of birds or flowers known to have a novel property and probed whether this property generalized to novel items varying in similarity to the initial sample. Increasing the number of novel types (e.g., new birds with the target property) in a sample produced tightening, promoting property generalization to highly similar stimuli but decreasing generalization to less similar stimuli. On the other hand, increasing the number of tokens (e.g., repeated presentations of the same bird with the target property) had little effect on generalization. Experiment 4 showed that repeated tokens are encoded and can benefit recognition, but appear to be given little weight when inferring property generalization. We modified an existing Bayesian model of induction (Navarro, Dry, & Lee, 2012) to account for both the information added by new types and the discounting of information conveyed by tokens.