Self-Imagery and Attentional Control Maintenance Factors of Social Anxiety: A Comparison of Trait and State Assessments

Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment - Models of social anxiety (SA) posit that socially-evaluative fears may be maintained by biased cognitive processes such as attention and...     

Interpretation and Expectation in Childhood Anxiety Disorders: Age Effects and Social Specificity

Theory and treatment for childhood anxiety disorders typically implicates children’s negative cognitions, yet little is known about the characteristics of thinking styles of clinically anxious children. In particular, it is unclear whether differences in thinking styles between children with anxiety disorders and non-anxious children vary as a function of child age, whether particular cognitive distortions are associated with childhood anxiety disorders at different child ages, and whether cognitive content is disorder-specific. The current study addressed these questions among 120 7–12 year old children (53% female) who met diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder, other anxiety disorder, or who were not currently anxious. Contrary to expectations, threat interpretation was not inflated amongst anxious compared to non-anxious children at any age, although older (10–12 year old) anxious children did differ from non-anxious children on measures of perceived coping. The notion of cognitive-content specificity was not supported across the age-range. The findings challenge current treatment models of childhood anxiety, and suggest that a focus on changing anxious children’s cognitions is not warranted in mid-childhood, and in late childhood cognitive approaches may be better focussed on promoting children’s perceptions of control rather than challenging threat interpretations.     

Prior knowledge is more predictive of error correction than subjective confidence

Previous research has demonstrated that, when given feedback, participants are more likely to correct confidently-held errors, as compared with errors held with lower levels of confidence, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Accounts of hypercorrection suggest that confidence modifies attention to feedback; alternatively, hypercorrection may reflect prior domain knowledge, with confidence ratings simply correlated with this prior knowledge. In the present experiments, we attempted to adjudicate among these explanations of the hypercorrection effect. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants answered general knowledge questions, rated their confidence, and received feedback either immediately after rating their confidence or after a delay of several minutes. Although memory for confidence judgments should have been poorer at a delay, the hypercorrection effect was equivalent for both feedback timings. Experiment 2 showed that hypercorrection remained unchanged even when the delay to feedback was increased. In addition, measures of recall for prior confidence judgments showed that memory for confidence was indeed poorer after a delay. Experiment 3 directly compared estimates of domain knowledge with confidence ratings, showing that such prior knowledge was related to error correction, whereas the unique role of confidence was small. Overall, our results suggest that prior knowledge likely plays a primary role in error correction, while confidence may play a small role or merely serve as a proxy for prior knowledge.     

The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans

Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task‐dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top‐down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom‐up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top‐down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal‐directed action that goes beyond existing models by operationalizing an interface between two putative systems—a routine and a non‐routine system—thereby demonstrating how explicitly represented goals can interact with the emergent task representations that develop through learning in the routine system. The gradual emergence of task representations offers an explanation for the transfer of control with experience from the non‐routine goal‐based system to the routine system. At the same time it allows action selection to be sensitive both to environmental triggers and to biasing from multiple levels within the goal system.     

A Bifactor Model of Anxiety Sensitivity: Analysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3

The purpose of the current study was to investigate the fit of a bifactor model of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al. Psychological Assessment, 19, 176–188, 2007) as well as to examine measurement invariance of the ASI-3 across gender. Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Cincinnati (n?=?954; 63 % female). Results indicated that the bifactor model was the best fit to the data, and that this model of AS is fully invariant in terms of gender. The current findings suggest that anxiety sensitivity consists of a general factor and three independent group factors (rather than a higher-order factor with three correlated lower-order factors). The ASI-3 subscales from the bifactor model however did not provide incremental predictive utility above and beyond the general AS factor with respect to an external anxiety criterion. Related research and clinical implications are discussed.     

A Methodological Examination of Emotion Inductions in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Comparison of Standardized Versus Idiographic Stimuli

Emotional reactivity is conceptualized as a core feature of borderline personality disorder (BPD) and has been subject to substantial empirical research. The laboratory methods used to elicit emotional reactivity in BPD have varied and findings across studies have been mixed. At present, there is little research evaluating the relative efficacy of different methods in eliciting emotional reactivity in BPD. Thus, the current study examined differences in emotional reactivity among individuals with BPD in response to standardized and idiographic stimuli, and across three specific emotions (sadness, fear, and anger). Individuals with BPD, social anxiety disorder, and healthy controls viewed film clips (i.e., standardized stimuli) or engaged in a personally-relevant imagery task (i.e., idiographic stimuli) while self-reported and physiological indices (skin conductance response and respiratory sinus arrhythmia) of emotion were collected. Results indicated that BPD participants displayed greater reactivity of sadness and anger (but not fear) in response to the idiographic versus standardized stimuli, a pattern that was not exhibited by the other two groups. These findings might explain some of the mixed evidence to date and suggest that idiographic sadness and fear inductions may be more effective for individuals with BPD.     

State-based versus reward-based motivation in younger and older adults

Recent decision-making work has focused on a distinction between a habitual, model-free neural system that is motivated toward actions that lead directly to reward and a more computationally demanding goal-directed, model-based system that is motivated toward actions that improve one’s future state. In this article, we examine how aging affects motivation toward reward-based versus state-based decision making. Participants performed tasks in which one type of option provided larger immediate rewards but the alternative type of option led to larger rewards on future trials, or improvements in state. We predicted that older adults would show a reduced preference for choices that led to improvements in state and a greater preference for choices that maximized immediate reward. We also predicted that fits from a hybrid reinforcement-learning model would indicate greater model-based strategy use in younger than in older adults. In line with these predictions, older adults selected the options that maximized reward more often than did younger adults in three of the four tasks, and modeling results suggested reduced model-based strategy use. In the task where older adults showed similar behavior to younger adults, our model-fitting results suggested that this was due to the utilization of a win-stay–lose-shift heuristic rather than a more complex model-based strategy. Additionally, within older adults, we found that model-based strategy use was positively correlated with memory measures from our neuropsychological test battery. We suggest that this shift from state-based to reward-based motivation may be due to age related declines in the neural structures needed for more computationally demanding model-based decision making.     

Combining Trait Models of Impulsivity to Improve Explanation of Substance Use Behaviour

The UPPS‐P model of impulsivity is gaining popularity among personality and substance use researchers, but questions remain as to whether its five facets have incremental validity in explaining substance use over a more parsimonious model specifying only two facets: reward drive and rash impulsiveness. In three cross‐sectional studies (total N = 486), we investigated whether the novel components of the UPPS‐P model (negative Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation seeking, Positive urgency) predicted typical and problematic alcohol and cannabis use after accounting for reward drive, rash impulsiveness and trait neuroticism (assessed with the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire). Reward drive and rash impulsiveness scores were calculated using principal components analysis of multiple scales, including UPPS‐P premeditation and sensation seeking. Results showed that rash impulsiveness was a robust predictor of typical and problematic substance use. The novel facets of the UPPS‐P did not improve prediction of typical substance use. The urgency scales inconsistently predicted problematic use. Specifically, negative urgency predicted one of three measures of negative consequences from alcohol use, and positive urgency only predicted negative consequences from cannabis use. Results suggest that the three novel facets of the UPPS‐P model add little over a two component model in explaining substance use, although may provide preliminary evidence for the utility of a revised global urgency construct in explaining problematic substance use. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology