Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internal control beliefs and reference frame concurrently impact early performance monitoring ERPs

This study investigated the impact of criterion-based vs. social reference frames on behavioural and neural correlates of performance monitoring while taking individual differences in control beliefs into account. We conducted two experiments administering a time estimation task in which feedback was either delivered pertaining to participants’ own performance (nonsocial/criterion-based reference) or to the performance of a reference group of previous participants (social reference). In Experiment 1, 34 male volunteers participated. To test generalizability of the observed results to both sexes/genders, we recruited 36 female volunteers for Experiment 2. P2 and P300 amplitudes were generally larger in social than in nonsocial reference trials in the male participants of Experiment 1. ΔFRN amplitudes were larger for social compared to non-social reference trials in Experiment 1. No effects of reference frame were found in the female sample of Experiment 2. Rather, P2 and ΔFRN effects showed opposing patterns for nonsocial versus social reference frames. However, stronger internal control beliefs were accompanied by larger FRN amplitudes of negative social reference trials in both samples, suggesting generalizable effects independent of sex/gender. Enhanced P2 and ΔFRN amplitudes for social versus nonsocial reference trials suggest enhanced attentional capture and higher saliency of socially framed feedback in male participants only. In both sexes/genders, however, the social reference frame possibly challenges internal control beliefs and by this enhances performance monitoring. Our results demonstrate the complex interplay of trait variables and reference frames during performance monitoring influencing our daily lives-reference frames are omnipresent in education and one’s working environment.     

Self-projection in middle childhood: a study on the relationship between theory of mind and episodic future thinking

Cognitive Processing - Growing evidence suggests that theory of mind (ToM) and episodic future thinking (EFT) are closely related at both brain and functional level. This study explored the...     

Affect in Play Scale-Preschool Version: Validation on a Sample of School Age Italian Children

The Affect in Play Scale-Preschool version is a semi-structured measure of cognitive and affective pretend play processes using a 5?min standardized play task devised for preschool children. This study investigated an extension of the scale in a sample of 333 children, aged 6–10 years. Participants were assessed using another measure of play processes, the Affect in Play Scale, a divergent thinking task, the Alternate Uses Test, a measure of school coping, the School Coping measure, and a measure of empathy, the Index of Empathy for Children. External validity with these measures was investigated, using correlational analyses. Construct validity of the scale was assessed using a confirmatory factor analysis approach. A correlated two-factor structure with a cognitive and an affective factor demonstrated the best fit. Implications for the use of this extension to assess cognitive and affective processes in pretend play and developmental outcomes were discussed.     

How does bilingualism improve executive control? A comparison of active and reactive inhibition mechanisms

It has been claimed that bilingualism enhances inhibitory control, but the available evidence is equivocal. The authors evaluated several possible versions of the inhibition hypothesis by comparing monolinguals and bilinguals with regard to stop signal performance, inhibition of return, and the attentional blink. These three phenomena, it can be argued, tap into different aspects of inhibition. Monolinguals and bilinguals did not differ in stop signal reaction time and thus were comparable in terms of active-inhibitory efficiency. However, bilinguals showed no facilitation from spatial cues, showed a strong inhibition of return effect, and exhibited a more pronounced attentional blink. These results suggest that bilinguals do not differ from monolinguals in terms of active inhibition but have acquired a better ability to maintain action goals and to use them to bias goal-related information. Under some circumstances, this ability may indirectly lead to more pronounced reactive inhibition of irrelevant information.     

New remarks on the cosmological argument

We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ??cause?? and ??causality?? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.     

Noticing and commenting on what’s new: differences and similarities among 22‐month‐old typically developing children,children with Down syndrome and children with autism

Twenty 22‐month‐old typically developing children (TD), 11 children with Down syndrome (DS) and 10 children with autism (A), all functioning at a one‐ or two‐word linguistic level, were given eight series of four toys to explore. In each series, the first three toys (i.e. Trials 1–3) were identical, but the fourth toy (i.e. Trial 4) differed on a property or in identity. The children sat beside their mother and the experimenter while exploring the toys. Of interest was whether (1) the TD children would show more exploratory and communicative behavior related to the toys on Trials 1 and 4 than 2 and 3, and (2) how the response patterns of nontypically developing children would compare. The DS group showed a pattern of responding similar to that of the TD group with respect to their attention and interest in the toys, although a much lower rate of communicating with their mother. In contrast, the A group differed significantly from both other groups with respect to both the toys they found of interest and the timing of their topic initiations. Implications for observing declarative communication among children with Down syndrome and children with autism are discussed.