How the moralization of issues grants social legitimacy to act on one's attitudes

Actions that do not have as their goal the advancement or protection of one's material interests are often seen as illegitimate. Four studies suggested that moral values can legitimate action in the absence of material interest. The more participants linked sociopolitical issues to moral values, the more comfortable they felt advocating on behalf of those issues and the less confused they were by others' advocacy (Studies 1 and 2). Crime victims were perceived as being more entitled to claim special privileges when the crime had violated their personal moral values (Studies 3 and 4). These effects were strongest when the legitimacy to act could not already be derived from one's material interests, suggesting that moral values and material interest can represent interchangeable justifications for behavior. No support was found for the possibility that attitude strength explained these effects. The power of moralization to disinhibit action is discussed.     

Finding "meaning" in psychology: a lay theories approach to self-regulation, social perception, and social development

Much of psychology focuses on universal principles of thought and action. Although an extremely productive pursuit, this approach, by describing only the "average person," risks describing no one in particular. This article discusses an alternate approach that complements interests in universal principles with analyses of the unique psychological meaning that individuals find in their experiences and interactions. Rooted in research on social cognition, this approach examines how people's lay theories about the stability or malleability of human attributes alter the meaning they give to basic psychological processes such as self-regulation and social perception. Following a review of research on this lay theories perspective in the field of social psychology, the implications of analyzing psychological meaning for other fields such as developmental, cultural, and personality psychology are discussed.     

Default Probability

A probability may be called “default” if it is neither derived from preestablished probabilities nor based on considerations of frequency or symmetry. Default probabilities presumably arise through reasoning based on causality and similarity. This article advances a model of default probability based on a featural approach to similarity. The accuracy of the model is assessed by comparing its predictions to the probabilities provided by undergraduates asked to reason about mammals.     

Anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety

Trait anxiety is an individual-difference variable reflecting variation in state-anxiety elevations resulting from exposure to a stressor. It is usually measured using questionnaire instruments, such as the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T). The present research conceptually distinguishes, and independently assesses, two hypothetical dimensions of anxiety vulnerability which, it is argued, could plausibly make independent contributions to variance in trait-anxiety scores. These dimensions are anxiety reactivity, the probability of experiencing an anxiety reaction to a stressor, and anxiety perseveration, the persistence of anxiety symptoms once elicited. Participants were asked three questions about each STAI-T item. The traditional STAI-T question assessed how much of the time this symptom was experienced; the anxiety-reactivity question assessed the probability of experiencing the symptom in response to a stressor; and the anxiety-perseveration question assessed how long the symptom persisted, if elicited. Regression analysis determined that anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration scores both accounted for independent variance in trait-anxiety scores. It is argued that models of anxiety vulnerability should seek to differentiate both the causes and the consequences of elevated anxiety reactivity and increased anxiety perseveration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).