Multiattribute Decision Making in Context: A Dynamic Neural Network Methodology

A theoretical structure for multiattribute decision making is presented, based on a dynamical system for interactions in a neural network incorporating affective and rational variables. This enables modeling of problems that elude two prevailing economic decision theories: subjective expected utility theory and prospect theory. The network is unlike some that fit economic data by choosing optimal weights or coefficients within a predetermined mathematical framework. Rather, the framework itself is based on principles used elsewhere to model many other cognitive and behavioral data, in a manner approximating how humans perform behavioral functions. Different, interconnected modules within the network encode (a) attributes of objects among which choices are made, (b) object categories, (c) and goals of the decision maker. An example is utilized to simulate the actual consumer choice between old and new versions of Coca-Cola. Potential applications are also discussed to market decisions involving negotiations between participants, such as international petroleum traders.     

Coping, locus of control, social support, and combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder: a prospective study

We examined the relations between coping, locus of control, and social support and combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The sample consisted of 262 Israeli soldiers who suffered a combat stress reaction episode during the 1982 Lebanon war and were followed 2 and 3 years after their participation in combat. Cross-sectional analyses revealed significant relations between locus of control, coping, and social support and PTSD at the two points of assessment. Changes in PTSD from Time 1 to Time 2 were also associated with changes in coping. We discuss theoretical and methodological implications of the findings.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.     

Intentional and incidental visual memory as a function of cognitive level and color of the stimulus

Performance of two groups of youngsters, educable mentally retarded (CA 15-5; MA 11-4; IQ 74.3) and those of average ability (CA 10-5; MA 11-3; IQ 109.1) was compared for intentional and incidental visual memory as a function of cognitive level and color of the stimulus. Nonretarded subjects performed significantly better than the retarded ones of equal MA. Both groups performed better with a color than black-white card, and both groups did better on the tasks involving intentional rather than incidental memory.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Repairing the Microsoft BASIC RND function

Difficulties with the Microsoft BASIC function for generating random numbers (RND) are cited and new problems reported. Fixes are suggested that allow use of some of the speed of the original function and that produce greatly improved pseudorandom numbers. A published generator is combined with the RND function as a compromise solution.     

Apple slide tachistoscope

We outline a BASIC program and subsidiary machine language timing routines that enable the Apple II series of computers to be employed as control devices for the tachistoscopic presentation of 35-mm slides and the collection of response latencies. The program is functional for experiments that require pictorial stimuli to be presented in up to three separate fields, with precise display times, precise interstimulus and intertriai intervals, and the collection of manual or vocal reaction times with millisecond accuracy. The major advantages of this system are that initial setup costs are substantially lower than those for other similar systems (e.g., Loftus, Gillispie. Tigre, & Nelson, 1984) and that user customization of the program may be accomplished by anyone possessing rudimentary knowledge of the BASIC programming language.