Physical attractiveness and its relationship to sex-role stereotyping

On the basis of recent findings showing that physical attractiveness serves as an important evaluative cue in person perception, the present paper reviews evidence which indicates that physical attractiveness differentially affects the judgments of males and females. Recent research seems to indicate that the physical-attractiveness stereotype — which holds that attractive individuals are more positively evaluated across a wide range of dimensions than unattractive individuals — is more potent when applied to women than to men. The origins of this differential stereotyping are discussed in terms of the historically defined roles of men and women in our society. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the physical-attractiveness stereotype for the general problem of sex-role stereotyping.     

Merit,fit, and basic desert

Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral desert will help clarify a central source of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists and assist both sides in resolving the current stalemate.     

A tale of two processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution,domesticating our species,and making us smarter

We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral and political theory and over the nature of extended cognition. We end by noting how Henrich’s view of the source of cultural design and innovation, and the prominence of place he gives to the extended process of cultural evolution, cuts against a cluster of broad but common views about human minds, recasting putative bugs as features and indicating that many of the distinctive features of our individual minds evolved to allow them to be effective cogs in the larger, more productive cultural machine.     

Re-doing the math: making enactivism add up

Philosophical Studies - Mathematical cognition is widely regarded as the epitome of the kind of cognition that systematically eludes enactivist treatment. It is the parade example of abstract,...