Verbal rehearsal and selective attention in children with learning disabilities: A developmental lag

To investigate the development of verbal rehearsal strategies and selective attention in learning disabled children, Hagen's Central-Incidental task was administered to younger learning disabled (M CA = 8.68 years) and normal (M CA = 8.62 years) boys in Experiment 1 and to intermediate (M CA = 10.18 years) and older (M CA = 13.48 years) learning disabled boys in Experiment 2. Also, in Experiment 2, an experimentally induced verbal rehearsal condition was included to determine its effects on serial recall and selective attention performance. In Experiment 1, the serial postion curve of the normals revealed both a primacy and a recency effect, whereas that of the learning disabled revealed a recency effect only. In Experiment 2, both the intermediate and the older learning disabled exhibited both primacy and recency effects under both standard and rehearsal conditions. A developmental analysis of central recall for the three learning disabled groups revealed constant age-related increases in overall central recall and in primacy recall. That the normals recalled more central, but not more incidental, information than the learning disabled in Experiment 1 suggests that the learning disabled are deficient in selective attention. Correlational findings suggest that the selective attention of the learning disabled improves with age. The results were interpreted as support for the hypothesis of a developmental lag in the learning disabled population.     

The problem of pointlessness — a challenge for counselling

A sense of pointlessness is a deep problem which underlies many more familiar problems. Its origins lie in deeply-rooted feelings of personal insignificance which can only be resolved by a genuine experience of relationship. The possibilities of establishing such a relationship in a counselling setting are examined with reference to condensed case-histories and relevant psycho-dynamic theory.     

Physical attractiveness and its relationship to sex-role stereotyping

On the basis of recent findings showing that physical attractiveness serves as an important evaluative cue in person perception, the present paper reviews evidence which indicates that physical attractiveness differentially affects the judgments of males and females. Recent research seems to indicate that the physical-attractiveness stereotype — which holds that attractive individuals are more positively evaluated across a wide range of dimensions than unattractive individuals — is more potent when applied to women than to men. The origins of this differential stereotyping are discussed in terms of the historically defined roles of men and women in our society. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of the physical-attractiveness stereotype for the general problem of sex-role stereotyping.     

Utility Monsters for the Fission Age

One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter‐intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible (though not uncontroversial) doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so‐called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit‐style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics.     

Against Substitutive Harm

Frances Kamm's Principle of Secondary Permissibility (PSP) specifies a class of exceptions to the general rule not to kill as a means. The principle allows us to harm as a means some of those who would have been otherwise harmed as side effects. ‘For example, suppose it is impermissible to paralyze A's legs as a means to a greater good. It would still be permissible to do this as the alternative to permissibly killing A as a mere indirect side effect.’ I argue that, despite of its great appeal, PSP is incorrect; it is simply not true that the victims of substitutive harm are not worse off than they would otherwise permissibly have been. In fact, there is no moral difference between the purportedly substitutive harm licensed by PSP (and its extension) and the standard sort of harming as means repudiated by nonconsequentialists.