Rankian Will

Otto Rank (1884–1939) served as Freud's closest partner in the psychoanalytic movement from 1906 to 1926. From 1923 on, Rank, initially with Ferenczi, focused on making analysis more therapeutic, emphasizing current experience in the session over historical exploration and interpretation. Rank settled on will as a missing factor, and wrote extensively about it after the break with Freud in 1926, when he moved to Paris. He emphasized the here-and-now, redefined “resistance” as a positive aspect of counter-will, and suggested a time limit for analysis. Ousted from analytic circles in 1930, he eventually moved to New York, continuing to treat patients and teach until his unexpected death at 55 in 1939. After decades of obscurity, Rank has gained readers and therapists whose orientation is interpersonal, client-centered, relational, humanistic, or existential. His influence on post-Freudian ego-psychology is finally being acknowledged as are his ideas about creativity, will, life-fear and death-fear, guilt, and ethics.     

The Rank–Ferenczi Relationship,as Seen from France

Seen from France, where Rank's “American” work is not well known, the Rank–Ferenczi relationship does not allow to state that the two learned colleagues were the best friends. Rank met Ferenczi in 1908, but their most valuable and fruitful working relationship is limited to the 1922–1924 time period. Their working relationship must be read in light of the unique transference links of each to Freud, and in light of the tormented history of the analytic movement, especially after the First World War. The sensible reader will not forget that after the fast extinction of their short collaboration they continued their own works in their own ways, Otto Rank in Paris and in America and Sándor Ferenczi in Budapest. No more friends, nor enemies, but both, in a different style, brave and creative analysts.     

Confusion of Wills: Otto Rank’s Contribution to an Understanding of Childism

Drawing from Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's psychological and psychodynamic study of prejudice as a starting point, this paper explores the phenomenon of childism—namely, the prejudice again children—from a Rankian psychodynamic perspective. Young-Bruehl argues that childism is comparable to prejudices such as anti-Semitism, sexism, and racism, and serves such purposes as the elimination of an individual's personhood, sexual exploitation, and the erasure of identity. Adding to Young-Bruehl's analysis of the social and psychological causes and effects of prejudice against children, this paper will examine the nature and dangers of childism explicit and implicit in the writings of Otto Rank. We will examine the development of creative will in child maturation—a development that childist forms of prejudice may obstruct, inhibit, and compromise. We will see that Young-Bruehl's foundational writing on childism echoes many of the observations and writings of Otto Rank in regard to the prejudice against children, and how such prejudice deeply diminishes, undermines, and fractures our unfolding lives and creative will in a shared world.     

Validity of a brief interview for assessing reflective function

The Reflective Function Scale was developed by Fonagy and colleagues (1998) to empirically measure the capacity to mentalize thoughts, intentions, feelings, and beliefs about oneself and others. Reflective Function (RF) has been reliably measured by the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Main and Goldwyn 1998), but its length (45-90 minutes) and the labor required to administer, transcribe, and code for RF may be prohibitive for many research studies. The present study measured the reliability and validity of the Brief Reflective Function Interview (BRFI; Rudden, Milrod, and Target 2005) by administering it to 27 undergraduate participants previously assessed using the AAI in another research study (Morrison 2010). The BRFI was coded reliably by two independent raters (ICC = .79) and yielded a highly significant positive correlation (r = .71) between RF scores obtained by BRFI and by AAI. The average administration time of the BRFI (M = 24.15 minutes) was significantly shorter than that of the AAI (M = 44.65 minutes). These findings suggest that the BRFI may offer a reliable, valid, and streamlined alternative to the AAI as a measure for coding RF.     

The compensation and capitalization models: A test of two approaches to individualizing the treatment of depression

Despite long-standing calls for the individualization of treatments for depression, modest progress has been made in this effort. The primary objective of this study was to test two competing approaches to personalizing cognitive-behavioral treatment of depression (viz., capitalization and compensation). Thirty-four adults meeting criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (59% female, 85% Caucasian) were randomized to 16-weeks of cognitive-behavioral treatment in which strategies used were selected based on either the capitalization approach (treatment matched to relative strengths) or the compensation approach (treatment matched to relative deficits). Outcome was assessed with a composite measure of both self-report (i.e., Beck Depression Inventory) and observer-rated (i.e., Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) depressive symptoms. Hierarchical linear modeling revealed a significant treatment approach by time interaction indicating a faster rate of symptom change for the capitalization approach compared to the compensation approach (d = .69, p = .03). Personalizing treatment to patients' relative strengths led to better outcome than treatment personalized to patients' relative deficits. If replicated, these findings would suggest a significant change in thinking about how therapists might best adapt cognitive-behavioral interventions for depression for particular patients.     

Can survival processing enhance story memory? Testing the generalizability of the adaptive memory framework

Research from the adaptive memory framework shows that thinking about words in terms of their survival value in an incidental learning task enhances their free recall relative to other semantic encoding strategies and intentional learning (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008). We found similar results. When participants used incidental survival encoding for a list of words (e.g., "Will this object enhance my survival if I were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land?"), they produced better free recall on a surprise test than did participants who intentionally tried to remember those words (Experiment 1). We also found this survival processing advantage when the words were presented within the context of a survival or neutral story (Experiment 2). However, this advantage did not extent to memory for a story's factual content, regardless of whether the participants were tested by cued recall (Experiment 3) or free recall (Experiments 4-5). Listening to a story for understanding under intentional or incidental learning conditions was just as good as survival processing for remembering story content. The functionalist approach to thinking about memory as an evolutionary adaptation designed to solve reproductive fitness problems provides a different theoretical framework for research, but it is not yet clear if survival processing has general applicability or is effective only for processing discrete stimuli in terms of fitness-relevant scenarios from our past.     

Does delaying judgments of learning really improve the efficacy of study decisions? Not so much

A widely held assumption in metamemory is that better, more accurate metamemory monitoring leads to better, more efficacious restudy decisions, reflected in better memory performance--we refer to this causal chain as the restudy selectivity hypothesis. In 3 sets of experiments, we tested this hypothesis by factorially manipulating metamemory monitoring accuracy and self-regulation of study. To manipulate monitoring accuracy, we compared judgments of learning (JOLs) made contemporaneously with a delayed retrieval attempt to JOLs either made at a delay without attempting retrieval or made immediately after study; in previous studies, delayed retrieval-based JOLs have robustly predicted recall with greater relative accuracy than have the other JOL types. To manipulate self-regulation of study, in Experiments 1A-1C and 2A-2C, we compared conditions in which participants' restudy selections were honored with conditions in which they were completely or randomly dishonored; in Experiments 3A-3C, we randomly honored or dishonored half of the restudy selections and half of the nonselections. Results revealed that the benefit of delayed, retrieval-based JOLs for final memory performance was due largely to the selection of more items for restudy rather than to better discriminations between items that would benefit more versus less from restudy. In most cases, gains in recall due to greater self-regulation of study did not increase with better monitoring accuracy; when they did, the effect was extremely small. The surprising conclusion was that restudy decisions were not very much more efficacious under conditions that yield greater monitoring accuracy than under those that do not.