Validity of a brief interview for assessing reflective function

The Reflective Function Scale was developed by Fonagy and colleagues (1998) to empirically measure the capacity to mentalize thoughts, intentions, feelings, and beliefs about oneself and others. Reflective Function (RF) has been reliably measured by the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Main and Goldwyn 1998), but its length (45-90 minutes) and the labor required to administer, transcribe, and code for RF may be prohibitive for many research studies. The present study measured the reliability and validity of the Brief Reflective Function Interview (BRFI; Rudden, Milrod, and Target 2005) by administering it to 27 undergraduate participants previously assessed using the AAI in another research study (Morrison 2010). The BRFI was coded reliably by two independent raters (ICC = .79) and yielded a highly significant positive correlation (r = .71) between RF scores obtained by BRFI and by AAI. The average administration time of the BRFI (M = 24.15 minutes) was significantly shorter than that of the AAI (M = 44.65 minutes). These findings suggest that the BRFI may offer a reliable, valid, and streamlined alternative to the AAI as a measure for coding RF.     

The compensation and capitalization models: A test of two approaches to individualizing the treatment of depression

Despite long-standing calls for the individualization of treatments for depression, modest progress has been made in this effort. The primary objective of this study was to test two competing approaches to personalizing cognitive-behavioral treatment of depression (viz., capitalization and compensation). Thirty-four adults meeting criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (59% female, 85% Caucasian) were randomized to 16-weeks of cognitive-behavioral treatment in which strategies used were selected based on either the capitalization approach (treatment matched to relative strengths) or the compensation approach (treatment matched to relative deficits). Outcome was assessed with a composite measure of both self-report (i.e., Beck Depression Inventory) and observer-rated (i.e., Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) depressive symptoms. Hierarchical linear modeling revealed a significant treatment approach by time interaction indicating a faster rate of symptom change for the capitalization approach compared to the compensation approach (d = .69, p = .03). Personalizing treatment to patients' relative strengths led to better outcome than treatment personalized to patients' relative deficits. If replicated, these findings would suggest a significant change in thinking about how therapists might best adapt cognitive-behavioral interventions for depression for particular patients.     

Can survival processing enhance story memory? Testing the generalizability of the adaptive memory framework

Research from the adaptive memory framework shows that thinking about words in terms of their survival value in an incidental learning task enhances their free recall relative to other semantic encoding strategies and intentional learning (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008). We found similar results. When participants used incidental survival encoding for a list of words (e.g., "Will this object enhance my survival if I were stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land?"), they produced better free recall on a surprise test than did participants who intentionally tried to remember those words (Experiment 1). We also found this survival processing advantage when the words were presented within the context of a survival or neutral story (Experiment 2). However, this advantage did not extent to memory for a story's factual content, regardless of whether the participants were tested by cued recall (Experiment 3) or free recall (Experiments 4-5). Listening to a story for understanding under intentional or incidental learning conditions was just as good as survival processing for remembering story content. The functionalist approach to thinking about memory as an evolutionary adaptation designed to solve reproductive fitness problems provides a different theoretical framework for research, but it is not yet clear if survival processing has general applicability or is effective only for processing discrete stimuli in terms of fitness-relevant scenarios from our past.     

Does delaying judgments of learning really improve the efficacy of study decisions? Not so much

A widely held assumption in metamemory is that better, more accurate metamemory monitoring leads to better, more efficacious restudy decisions, reflected in better memory performance--we refer to this causal chain as the restudy selectivity hypothesis. In 3 sets of experiments, we tested this hypothesis by factorially manipulating metamemory monitoring accuracy and self-regulation of study. To manipulate monitoring accuracy, we compared judgments of learning (JOLs) made contemporaneously with a delayed retrieval attempt to JOLs either made at a delay without attempting retrieval or made immediately after study; in previous studies, delayed retrieval-based JOLs have robustly predicted recall with greater relative accuracy than have the other JOL types. To manipulate self-regulation of study, in Experiments 1A-1C and 2A-2C, we compared conditions in which participants' restudy selections were honored with conditions in which they were completely or randomly dishonored; in Experiments 3A-3C, we randomly honored or dishonored half of the restudy selections and half of the nonselections. Results revealed that the benefit of delayed, retrieval-based JOLs for final memory performance was due largely to the selection of more items for restudy rather than to better discriminations between items that would benefit more versus less from restudy. In most cases, gains in recall due to greater self-regulation of study did not increase with better monitoring accuracy; when they did, the effect was extremely small. The surprising conclusion was that restudy decisions were not very much more efficacious under conditions that yield greater monitoring accuracy than under those that do not.     

The motor side of emotions: investigating the relationship between hemispheres, motor reactions and emotional stimuli

The aim of the present study was to analyze if the left hemisphere preferentially controls flexion responses toward positive stimuli, while the right hemisphere is specialized toward extensor responses to negative pictures. To this end, right-handed subjects had to pull or push a joystick subsequent to seeing a positive or a negative stimulus in their left or right hemifield. Flexion responses were faster for positive stimuli, while negative stimuli were associated with faster extensions responses. Overall, performance was fastest when emotional stimuli were presented to the left visual hemifield. This right hemisphere superiority was especially clear for negative stimuli, while reaction times toward positive pictures showed no hemispheric difference. We did not find any interaction between hemifield and response type. Neither was there a triple interaction between valence, hemifield and response type. We suppose that response dichotomies in humans are not as tightly linked to a hemisphere- and valence-bound reaction type as previously assumed.     

The influence of response conflict on voluntary task switching: a novel test of the conflict monitoring model

The conflict monitoring model of cognitive control posits that response conflict triggers a top-down enhancement of a task’s representation in working memory. In the present study, we conducted a novel test of the conflict monitoring model using a voluntary task switching paradigm. We predicted that a task’s representation would be enhanced following events associated with high response conflict (i.e., incongruent trials and incorrect responses), leading participants to voluntarily choose to repeat that task more often after these events than after events associated with low response conflict (i.e., congruent trials and correct responses). In two experiments, performance following incongruent trials was consistent with the conflict monitoring model. However, performance following incorrect trials did not fit with the model’s predictions. These findings provide novel support for the conflict monitoring model while revealing new effects of incorrect trials that the model cannot explain.     

“I” and the brain

Many philosophers as well as many biological psychologists think that recent experiments in neuropsychology have definitively discredited any notion of freedom of the will. I argue that the arguments mounted against the concept of freedom of the will in the name of natural causal determinism are valuable but not new, and that they leave intact a concept of freedom of the will that is compatible with causal determinism. After explaining this concept, I argue that it is interestingly related to our use of the first person pronoun “I.” I discuss three examples of our use of “I” in thought and language and submit a few questions I would like neuropsychologists to answer concerning the brain processes that might underlie those uses. I suggest answering these questions would support the compatibilist notion of freedom of the will I have offered in part 1.     

Unique sudden onsets capture attention even when observers are in feature-search mode

Two sources of attentional capture have been proposed: stimulus-driven (exogenous) and goal-oriented (endogenous). A resolution between these modes of capture has not been straightforward. Even such a clearly exogenous event as the sudden onset of a stimulus can be said to capture attention endogenously if observers operate in singleton-detection mode rather than feature-search mode. In four experiments we show that a unique sudden onset captures attention even when observers are in feature-search mode. The displays were rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) streams of differently coloured letters with the target letter defined by a specific colour. Distractors were four #s, one of the target colour, surrounding one of the non-target letters. Capture was substantially reduced when the onset of the distractor array was not unique because it was preceded by other sets of four grey # arrays in the RSVP stream. This provides unambiguous evidence that attention can be captured both exogenously and endogenously within a single task.     

Selective learning enabled by intention to learn in sequence learning

This study investigated whether a target sequence that people intend to learn is learned selectively when it is interleaved with another (non-target) sequence. Three experiments used a serial reaction time task in which different spatial and color stimuli occurred alternately. Each of the two interleaved sequences had structural regularity. Participants in an intentional learning group were instructed to learn the target (spatial) sequence whereas those in an incidental learning group were not. In Experiments 1 and 2 spatial and color sequences were correlated. Results showed that the intentional group learned the spatial sequence better than the incidental group and learned it independently of the color sequence, whereas the incidental group learned the two sequences as a combined sequence. In Experiment 3 the sequences were uncorrelated. Results showed that the intentional group was no longer superior in learning the spatial sequence. Findings indicate that the intention to learn a target sequence enables selective learning of it only when it is correlated with a non-target sequence.