Pushing dualism to an extreme: On the philosophical impetus of a new materialism

This article discusses the way in which a group of contemporary cultural theorists in whose work we see a “new materialism” (a term coined by Braidotti and DeLanda) at work constitutes a philosophy of difference by traversing the dualisms that form the backbone of modernist thought. Continuing the ideas of Lyotard and Deleuze they have set themselves to a rewriting of all possible forms of emancipation that are to be found. This rewriting exercise involves a movement in thought that, in the words of Bergson, can be termed “pushing dualism to an extreme.” By this movement, Deleuze has stated, “difference is pushed to the limit,” that is, using Colebrook’s words, “difference is shown differing.” The article addresses the ways in which modernity’s dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms) are traversed, and how a new conceptualization, and ontology, of difference (structured by an affirmative relation) comes to be constituted along the way. New materialism leaves behind all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern dualist thinking since a difference structured by affirmation does not work with predetermined relations (e.g., between mind and body) nor does it involve a (counter-)hierarchy between terms. The article makes explicit the methodology of the current-day rise of non-dualist thought, both in terms of its non-classificatory mode of (Deleuzian) thinking and in terms of the theory of the time of thought thus effectuated (Lyotard’s notion of ‘rewriting modernity’ is not a post-modernism). Throughout the article we will engage with an example in order to demonstrate the ontology that is being practiced following this methodology: How does a new (feminist) materialism traverse the sexual dualisms that structure modernist (feminist) thinking? This example also shows how a feminist post-modernism (found in the canonical work of Butler) has remained dualist, and what makes new materialism “new.” Freed from a dualist methodology, the modernist emancipatory project comes to full fruition in new materialism.     

Taking your place or matching your face: two paths to empathic embarrassment

Empathic responding may be elicited by different processes, depending on the available situational and affective cues. We investigated two such processes, perspective-taking and nonverbal mimicry. In Study 1, participants watched an embarrassed or unembarrassed confederate dancing to music while either remaining objective or engaging in perspective-taking. Both manipulations affected empathic embarrassment. Study 2 further examined the effects of targets' embarrassment displays and observers' prior experience with the situation upon spontaneous perspective-taking, expressive mimicry, and empathic embarrassment. Embarrassment displays increased mimicry, but also spontaneous perspective-taking and subsequent empathy. Prior experience moderated the effects of embarrassment displays on perspective-taking and empathy. Path analyses demonstrated that embarrassment displays exerted indirect effects on empathic embarrassment through both perspective-taking and mimicry. The results suggest that available affective and situational cues can activate different routes to empathy, and highlight the value of simultaneously investigating target- and observer-based sources of influence.     

Moving faces, looking places: validation of the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES)

We report two studies validating a new standardized set of filmed emotion expressions, the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES). The ADFES is distinct from existing datasets in that it includes a face-forward version and two different head-turning versions (faces turning toward and away from viewers), North-European as well as Mediterranean models (male and female), and nine discrete emotions (joy, anger, fear, sadness, surprise, disgust, contempt, pride, and embarrassment). Study 1 showed that the ADFES received excellent recognition scores. Recognition was affected by social categorization of the model: displays of North-European models were better recognized by Dutch participants, suggesting an ingroup advantage. Head-turning did not affect recognition accuracy. Study 2 showed that participants more strongly perceived themselves to be the cause of the other's emotion when the model's face turned toward the respondents. The ADFES provides new avenues for research on emotion expression and is available for researchers upon request.     

Contextual conditioning in rats as an animal model for generalized anxiety disorder

Animal models of psychiatric disorders are important translational tools for exploring new treatment options and gaining more insight into the disease. Thus far, there is no systematically validated animal model for generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), a severely impairing and difficult-to-treat disease. In this review, we propose contextual conditioning (CC) as an animal model for GAD. We argue that this model has sufficient face validity (there are several symptom similarities), predictive validity (it responds to clinically effective treatments), and construct validity (the underlying mechanisms are comparable). Although the refinement and validation of an animal model is a never-ending process, we want to give a concise overview of the currently available evidence. We suggest that the CC model might be a valuable preclinical tool to enhance the development of new treatment strategies and our understanding of GAD.     

Does the name-race implicit association test measure racial prejudice?

Research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has shown that names labeled as Caucasian elicit more positive associations than names labeled as non-Caucasian. One interpretation of this result is that the IAT measures latent racial prejudice. An alternative explanation is that the result is due to differences in in-group/out-group membership. In this study, we conducted three different IATs: one with same-race Dutch names versus racially charged Moroccan names; one with same-race Dutch names versus racially neutral Finnish names; and one with Moroccan names versus Finnish names. Results showed equivalent effects for the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Finnish IATs, but no effect for the Finnish-Moroccan IAT. This suggests that the name-race IAT-effect is not due to racial prejudice. A diffusion model decomposition indicated that the IAT-effects were caused by changes in speed of information accumulation, response conservativeness, and non-decision time.     

Incongruence in number–luminance congruency effects

Congruency tasks have provided support for an amodal magnitude system for magnitudes that have a "spatial" character, but conflicting results have been obtained for magnitudes that do not (e.g., luminance). In this study, we extricated the factors that underlie these number-luminance congruency effects and tested alternative explanations: (unsigned) luminance contrast and saliency. When luminance had to be compared under specific task conditions, we revealed, for the first time, a true influence of number on luminance judgments: Darker stimuli were consistently associated with numerically larger stimuli. However, when number had to be compared, luminance contrast, not luminance, influenced number judgments. Apparently, associations exist between number and luminance, as well as luminance contrast, of which the latter is probably stronger. Therefore, similar tasks, comprising exactly the same stimuli, can lead to distinct interference effects.     

Cognitive and affective Theory of Mind in mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease

Theory of Mind (ToM) allows one's own and others' cognitive and emotional mental states to be inferred. Although many patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) display impaired social functioning as their disease progresses, very few studies have investigated ToM in AD. Those that have done so suggest that patients' ToM deficits are the consequence of other cognitive impairments. The aim of this study was thus to investigate changes in both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of ToM in AD, using tasks designed to circumvent the patients' comprehension difficulties. Sixteen mild to moderate AD patients and 15 healthy controls matched on age, sex and education level underwent cognitive (preference judgment and first‐ and second‐order false belief) and affective (Reading the Mind in the Eyes) ToM assessments. Comprehension of false belief stories was verified and an additional neuropsychological examination was undergone. We observed impaired performances by AD patients on all the ToM tasks. While working memory and executive functioning impairments contributed to the deterioration in the more complex aspects of cognitive ToM abilities as highlighted by a correlation analysis, we failed to observe any comprehension difficulties in patients who performed poorly on simple cognitive ToM tasks, which suggests that AD truly affects cognitive ToM.     

Visual imagery and memory: Do retrieval strategies affect what the mind's eye sees?

A variety of visual mental imagery tasks have been shown to activate regions of visual cortex that subserve the perception of visual events. Here fMRI was used to examine whether imagery‐related visuocortical activity is modulated if imagery content is held constant but there is a change in the memory retrieval strategy used to invoke imagery. Participants were scanned while visualising common objects in two different conditions: (a) recalling recently encoded pictures and (b) based on their knowledge of concrete nouns. Results showed that retrieval‐related activations in frontal cortex were bilateral when pictures were visualised but left‐lateralised when nouns were visualised. In posterior brain regions, both imagery conditions led to activation in the same set of circumscribed areas in left temporal‐parietal cortex, including a region of the left fusiform gyrus that has previously been implicated in visual imagery. These findings suggest that the posterior network activated during imagery did not vary with strategic task‐related changes in the frontal network used to retrieve imagery content from memory.