So Close,Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so‐called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine‐grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been taken to be paradigmatic instances in which DDE applies to intended harm. In this paper, we consider and reject a number of recent attempts to solve the closeness problem. We argue that the failure of these proposals strongly suggests that the closeness problem is intractable, and that the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm is not morally significant. Further, we argue that there may be a deeper reason why such attempts must fail: the rationale that makes the best fit with DDE, namely, an imperative not to aim at evil, is itself irredeemably flawed. While we believe that these observations should lead us to abandon further attempts to solve the closeness problem for DDE, we also conclude by showing how a related principle that is supported by a distinct rationale and avoids facing the closeness problem altogether nevertheless shares with DDE its most important features, including an intuitive explanation of a number of cases and a commitment to the relevance of intentions.     

Willingness of Mentally Ill Individuals to Sign Up for a Novel Proposal to Prevent Firearm Suicide

The study goal was to determine whether a significant number of high suicide risk individuals would confidentially put their own names onto a list to prevent future gun purchases. An anonymous written survey was administered in an inpatient psychiatric unit and two outpatient psychiatric clinics at an academic medical center. Two hundred forty individuals were approached to fill out the survey, of whom 200 (83.3%) did so. Forty‐six percent of participants stated that they would put their own name onto the list. This novel suicide prevention proposal, a Do‐Not‐Sell List, would appeal to many people at high risk for suicide.     

Self–Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe

In the debate over the nature of self–deception, "intentionalists" argue that self–deception requires an intention to deceive oneself, and "motivationists" argue that a desire, and not an intention, typically plays a crucial causal role in self–deception. Intentionalists have criticized motivationist views for ignoring what is distinctive about self–deception, and for failing to account for cases of "twisted" self–deception. I offer a new motivationist account whose distinctive element is the desire to believe. I argue that this account identifies what is common to cases of both "twisted" and "straight" self–deception, and that it captures what is distinctive about self–deception.     

Food, mood, and attitude: reducing risk for eating disorders in college women.

Food, Mood, and Attitude (FMA) is a CD-ROM prevention program developed to decrease risk for eating disorders in college women. Female 1st-year students (N = 240) were randomly assigned to the intervention (FMA) or control group. Equal numbers of students at risk and of low risk for developing an eating disorder were assigned to each condition. Participants in the FMA condition improved on all measures relative to controls. Significant 3-way interactions (Time x Condition x Risk Status) were found on measures of internalization of sociocultural attitudes about thinness, shape concerns, and weight concerns, indicating that at-risk participants in the intervention group improved to a greater extent than did low-risk participants. At follow-up, significantly fewer women in the FMA group reported overeating and excessive exercise relative to controls.     

Frontotemporal Dementia and the Reactive Attitudes: Two Roles for the Capacity to Care?

People who have a particular behavioural variant of Frontotemporal Dementia (bvFTD) suffer from a puzzling early set of symptoms. They appear to caregivers to cease to care about things that they did before, without manifesting certain other significant deficits that might be expected to accompany this change. Are subjects with bvFTD appropriate objects of reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation that seem to presuppose responsible agency? I explore two possible routes to answering this question in the negative that both appeal to the role of the capacity to care in accounts of responsible agency. The first appeals to the capacity to care as fundamental in determining the aptness of moral demands and appraisals; the second appeals to the capacity to care as required for the very possibility of being someone who could in principle receive deserved praise or blame. In order to assess these lines of reasoning, it will be necessary to settle on a plausible account of caring, and the case of subjects with bvFTD can help in illuminating the relevant capacities. I suggest that the two routes, when clarified, are promising, but that interesting questions about the nature of desert and its relationship to caring remain open.     

Endogenous shifts of attention cause distortions in the perception of space: Reviewing and examining the attentional repulsion effect

ABSTRACT

The functioning of spatial attention and its effects on visual processing are typically studied using chronometric and accuracy measures of behaviour. However, a growing body of literature has studied the attentional repulsion effect (ARE). Simply put, when attention is focused on one location in the visual field, stimuli appearing nearby the attended location are perceived as being located further away from the attended location than they physically are. The ARE is particularly compelling, as it is best explained by considering the receptive field properties of visual cells, thus allowing for more direct comparisons between behaviour and neural functioning. Nonetheless, most research testing the ARE has manipulated spatial attention exogenously. Furthermore, for studies that have explored endogenous attention and the ARE, empirical evidence is conflicting. Therefore, the aim of the current study was to address this inconsistency by testing the effect of voluntary attention on spatial repulsion using an optimal operationalization of endogenous attention. Centrally presented, highly informative double-cues were used to shift attention, and placeholders were included in the display to help anchor attention. Overall, we observed strong spatial repulsion effects when attention was shifted endogenously, providing compelling evidence that voluntary deployments of attention can cause perceptual distortions of space.