Mediated priming in the cerebral hemispheres

The present experiment investigates hemispheric differences in mediated priming. Theories of lexical representation have argued for an asymmetrical coding between the right and left hemispheres ([Beeman, 1998]), claiming that the right hemisphere is more diffusely represented compared to the left hemisphere. Thus, the right hemisphere activates a larger semantic field compared to the left hemisphere. Mediated (two-step) priming is an ideal task to examine this representational claim, because of the distant nature of the prime-target pairs. Results showed no difference in the magnitude of priming (both mediated and direct) between the right and left hemispheres. These results suggest that the lexical representation of the two hemispheres is equivalent, not asymmetrical as Beeman suggests.     

Perirhinal cortex lesions impair context aversion learning

Rats with perirhinal cortex lesions were compared with sham controls on a conditional discrimination in which saccharin was paired with LiCl in context 1, but paired with saline in context 2. Perirhinal-lesioned rats were slightly slower to acquire the discrimination but reached control levels by the end of acquisition. Both groups showed transfer to familiar tap water, consuming less in context 1 than in context 2. Unlike sham rats, perirhinal rats failed to show an aversion to context 1 on a place choice test. These data provide neuroanatomical support for the postulated difference between Pavlovian conditioning and conditional learning.     

Efficacy of telephone-administered cognitive behaviour therapy for obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders: case studies

Cognitive behaviour therapy is effective for obsessive-compulsive disorder and for obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders such as trichotillomania. Unfortunately, many people with these disorders, especially those living in rural areas, have limited access to treatment. Telephone-administered cognitive behaviour therapy may help address this problem. In a recent study of telephone treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder, we found that such treatment was often effective (42% in remission at post-treatment, and 47% in remission at 12-week follow-up). This article presents 2 case reports of the same treatment, applied to obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders (trichotillomania and compulsive skin picking). Treatment was associated with symptom reduction for both participants, although one subsequently relapsed. Possible reasons for relapse are discussed. The findings encourage further studies to identify the characteristics of people most likely to benefit from telephone treatment for spectrum disorders.     

The role of central and peripheral vision in postural control duringwalking

Three hypotheses have been proposed for the roles of central and peripheral vision in the perception and control of self-motion: (1) peripheral dominance, (2) retinal invariance, and (3) differential sensitivity to radial flow. We investigated postural responses to optic flow patterns presented at different retinal eccentricities during walking in two experiments. Oscillating displays of radial flow (0° driver direction), lamellar flow (90°), and intermediate flow (30°, 45°) patterns were presented at retinal eccentricities of 0°, 30°, 45°, 60°, or 90° to participants walking on a treadmill, while compensatory body sway was measured. In general, postural responses were directionally specific, of comparable amplitude, and strongly coupled to the display for all flow patterns at all retinal eccentricities. One intermediate flow pattern (45°) yielded a bias in sway direction that was consistent with triangulation errors in locating the focus of expansion from visible flow vectors. The results demonstrate functionally specific postural responses in both central and peripheral vision, contrary to the peripheral dominance and differential sensitivity hypotheses, but consistent with retinal invariance. This finding emphasizes the importance of optic flow structure for postural control regardless of the retinal locus of stimulation.     

Mentoring and Psychological Contract Breach

Purpose

Mentoring and psychological contracts are related and important organizationally based social exchange relationships. Research indicates that social support from internal mentors might buffer the negative effects of psychological contract breach (PCB), but less is known about the possible negative influence that mentors might have on psychological contracts. This study investigates protégés' perceptions of their mentors?? failure to fulfill mentoring obligations and protégés?? perceptions of PCB. Because either the formality of the mentoring relationship or the supervisory status of the mentor might serve as additional signals of the mentor??s status as an organizational agent, and, therefore, exacerbate the negative association between mentoring breach and PCB, both are investigated as potential moderating variables.

Design/Methodology/Approach

A sample of 144 protégés from various occupations completed a questionnaire assessing mentoring breach, PCB, job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

Findings

Results indicate the relations between mentoring breach and the outcome variables of interest were mediated by PCB, and that the relation between mentoring breach and PCB is stronger in supervisory mentoring relationships. A similar result was expected, but not confirmed, for formal mentoring relationships.

Implications

The current study provides evidence that the actions (or inactions) of mentors contribute to PCB and related negative outcomes. Such knowledge might encourage organizations to provide training to potential mentors in managing the mentoring relationship to minimize the probability of mentoring breach.

Originality Value

The current study is the first to examine the potential negative effect that mentoring relationships might have on protégé psychological contracts.     

Cognitive Load Disrupts Implicit Theory-of-Mind Processing

Eye movements in Sally-Anne false-belief tasks appear to reflect the ability to implicitly monitor the mental states of other individuals (theory of mind, or ToM). It has recently been proposed that an early-developing, efficient, and automatically operating ToM system subserves this ability. Surprisingly absent from the literature, however, is an empirical test of the influence of domain-general executive processing resources on this implicit ToM system. In the study reported here, a dual-task method was employed to investigate the impact of executive load on eye movements in an implicit Sally-Anne false-belief task. Under no-load conditions, adult participants displayed eye movement behavior consistent with implicit belief processing, whereas evidence for belief processing was absent for participants under cognitive load. These findings indicate that the cognitive system responsible for implicitly tracking beliefs draws at least minimally on executive processing resources. Thus, even the most low-level processing of beliefs appears to reflect a capacity-limited operation.     

Expanding in a Different Direction: Reclaiming the Twofold Nature of the Moral Object

This paper argues that the impasse in Catholic moral theology around the role of the object in determining the moral species of the act was rooted in shared misunderstandings of Thomas Aquinas's analysis of human action. The paper describes Thomas's account of moral action centering upon his claim in ST I‐II.18.6 that the object is twofold. This distinction was often missed on both sides of the proportionalist debates. The paper argues that understanding the moral object as twofold upholds the essential elements of both sides of the proportionalist debates, holding them in their rightful balance. Moreover such an understanding offers an essential framework for Catholic theologians attending to the essential connection between acts and agents in accounts of morality.     

Knowing minds, controlling actions: the developmental relations between theory of mind and executive function from 2 to 4 years of age

This longitudinal study examined the concurrent and predictive relations between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in 82 preschoolers who were assessed when they were 2, 3, and 4 years old. The results showed that the concurrent relation between EF and ToM, after controlling for age, verbal ability, and sex, was significant at 3 and 4 years of age but not at 2 years of age. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that EF at age 2 significantly predicted ToM at age 3 and that EF at age 3 significantly predicted ToM at age 4, over and above the effects of age, verbal ability, and prior performance on ToM tasks. However, ToM at ages 2 and 3 did not explain a significant amount of variance in EF at age 4. Bootstrap procedures revealed that verbal ability at age 3 fully mediated the relation between ToM at age 2 and EF at age 4.     

Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of others' mental states

The ability to attribute mental states to others is crucial for social competency. To assess mentalizing abilities, in false-belief tasks participants attempt to identify an actor's belief about an object's location as opposed to the object's actual location. Passing this test on explicit measures is typically achieved by 4 years of age, but recent eye movement studies reveal registration of others' beliefs by 7 to 15 months. Consequently, a 2-path mentalizing system has been proposed, consisting of a late developing, cognitively demanding component and an early developing, implicit/automatic component. To date, investigations on the implicit system have been based on single-trial experiments only or have not examined how it operates across time. In addition, no study has examined the extent to which participants are conscious of the belief states of others during these tasks. Thus, the existence of a distinct implicit mentalizing system is yet to be demonstrated definitively. Here we show that adults engaged in a primary unrelated task display eye movement patterns consistent with mental state attributions across a sustained temporal period. Debriefing supported the hypothesis that this mentalizing was implicit. It appears there indeed exists a distinct implicit mental state attribution system.