Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary.     

Financial deprivation selectively shifts moral standards and compromises moral decisions

Previous research suggests people firmly value moral standards. However, research has also shown that various factors can compromise moral behavior. Inspired by the recent financial turmoil, we investigate whether financial deprivation might shift people’s moral standards and consequently compromise their moral decisions. Across one pilot survey and five experiments, we find that people believe financial deprivation should not excuse immoral conduct; yet when people actually experience deprivation they seem to apply their moral standards more leniently. Thus, people who feel deprived tend to cheat more for financial gains and judge deprived moral offenders who cheat for financial gains less harshly. These effects are mediated by shifts in people’s moral standards: beliefs in whether deprivation is an acceptable reason for immorality. The effect of deprivation on immoral conduct diminishes when it is explicit that immoral conduct cannot help alleviate imbalances in deprived actors’ financial states, when financial deprivation seems fair or deserved, and when acting immorally seems unfair.     

Nozick's experience machine is dead,long live the experience machine!

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment (Nozick's scenario) is widely used as the basis for a “knockdown” argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Recently, however, it has been convincingly argued that Nozick's scenario should not be used in this way because it elicits judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. These arguments all include alternate experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also elicit judgments marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. In this paper, several experiments are conducted in order to create and test a relatively bias-free experience machine scenario. It is argued that if an experience machine thought experiment is used to evaluate internalist mental state theories of well-being, then this relatively bias-free scenario should be used over any of the existing scenarios. Unlike the existing experience machine scenarios, when this new scenario is used to assess internalist mental state theories of well-being, it does not provide strong evidence to refute or endorse them.     

Analyzing the Rate at Which Languages Lose the Influence of a Common Ancestor

Analyzing the rate at which languages change can clarify whether similarities across languages are solely the result of cognitive biases or might be partially due to descent from a common ancestor. To demonstrate this approach, we use a simple model of language evolution to mathematically determine how long it should take for the distribution over languages to lose the influence of a common ancestor and converge to a form that is determined by constraints on language learning. We show that modeling language learning as Bayesian inference of n binary parameters or the ordering of n constraints results in convergence in a number of generations that is on the order of n log n. We relax some of the simplifying assumptions of this model to explore how different assumptions about language evolution affect predictions about the time to convergence; in general, convergence time increases as the model becomes more realistic. This allows us to characterize the assumptions about language learning (given the models that we consider) that are sufficient for convergence to have taken place on a timescale that is consistent with the origin of human languages. These results clearly identify the consequences of a set of simple models of language evolution and show how analysis of convergence rates provides a tool that can be used to explore questions about the relationship between accounts of language learning and the origins of similarities across languages.     

老年膀胱癌患者术后生活质量及其影响因素的研究

调查老年膀胱癌患者术后生活质量现状及其影响因素,为护理干预和健康管理提供依据。选择我院2013年6月至2014年1月收治的老年膀胱癌患者142例作为研究对象,于患者术后3个月采用膀胱癌特异性量表（FACT-BL）,社会支持评定量表（SSRS）进行数据收集。结果老年膀胱癌患者术后FACT-BL平均得分为（94．33＆#177;8．31）分,SSRS平均得分为（33．70＆#177;4．42）分,不同手术方式躯体状况（PWB）,社会/家庭状况（FWB）,FACT-BL 得分差异具有统计学意义（P＜0．05）,老年膀胱癌患者术后生活质量与社会支持呈正相关关系（P＜0．05）。手术方式与老年膀胱癌患者术后生活质量密切相关,应结合患者的具体情况选择合适的手术方式,实时观察患者的社会支持水平。     

青少年早期社交回避与同伴关系问题:有调节的中介模型

为探讨青少年早期社交回避、同伴关系问题、情绪调节能力和学业成绩的关系,本研究构建了一个有调节的中介模型。采用自我报告、同伴提名和学校记录的方式对上海地区小学4年级至初中1年级共660名被试进行测查,结果显示:(1)社交回避可以正向预测同伴关系问题;(2)情绪调节能力在社交回避与同伴关系问题之间起部分中介作用;(3)学业成绩调节了社交回避通过情绪调节能力影响同伴关系问题的中介作用前半路径。相对于学业成绩较高的儿童,社交回避更容易通过学业成绩较低儿童的情绪调节能力影响同伴关系问题。研究结果不仅可以从情绪调节能力和学业成绩的角度为社交回避个体的同伴关系问题提供解释,而且对引导同伴社会化、提升社会适应的过程具有启示意义。     

Psychological distress in patients with chronic atrophic gastritis: the risk factors,protection factors,and cumulative effect

This study aimed to examine the psychological status among Chronic Atrophic Gastritis (CAG) patients and to find the cumulative effects of risk and protective factors. A sample of 101 CAG patients completed the investigation. Hierarchical linear regression was used to find risk and protective factors, and examine the cumulative effects in risk factor index (RFI) and protective factor index (PFI). Results showed that nine symptoms from SCL-90-R were severer among CAG patients than those in adult norm. Risk factors including positive family history of cancer and higher negative life events could predict higher GSI (β = 0.206, p = 0.023; β = 0.398, p < 0.001; R² = 0.203); more household resistant, positive coping and stronger resilience were protective factors and could predict GSI negatively (β = -0.188, p = 0.020; β = -0.350, p = 0.012; β = ?0.066, p = 0.621; R² = 0.190). The GSI was positively correlated with RFI (β = 0.338, p < 0.001; R² = 0.113) and negatively related to PFI (β = ?0.378, p < 0.001; R² = 0.133). In conclusion, CAG patients suffered from various psychological distress, and the protective factors should be enhanced cumulatively to protect against psychological distress.     

Judgments of damage to public versus private property in Chinese children at different historical times

This study examined children's judgments of damage to public versus private property in China at two historical times. Participants were two cohorts (1980 and 2012) of elementary school children at ages 7, 9, and 11 years. The children were administered paired stories that described a protagonist who damaged public or private property with a good or bad intention. The results showed that children in the 2012 cohort were less likely than their counterparts in the 1980 cohort to judge damage to public property as more culpable than damage to private property. The cohort differences were more evident in older children than in younger children. The results suggest that macro‐level contexts may play an important role in shaping children's judgments.     

Political Agency,Citizenship, and Non-human Animals

In this essay I challenge the idea that political agency must be central to the concept of citizenship. I consider this question in relation to whether or not domesticated animals can be understood as our fellow citizens. In recent debates on this topic, both proponents and opponents of animal citizenship have taken political agency to be central to this question. I advance two main arguments against this position. First, I argue against the orthodox view that claims political agency is a requirement of citizenship. This position ignores both how citizenship is understood in practice by modern, liberal democracies, as well as the separate functions of citizenship. Further, there are no plausible ways we can consistently extend citizenship to humans regardless of intellectual ability, while denying it to domesticated animals. Nevertheless, I argue that it is important to distinguish two ways in which citizenship is enacted: Citizenship as Membership and Citizenship as Responsible, Political Agent. Domesticated animals should be understood as citizens, despite the fact that they are not responsible, political agents. Second, I challenge the view, put forward by Donaldson and Kymlicka, that animals are capable of certain forms of political agency. I argue that political agency is not crucial to whether, and how, the preferences of these animals matter for political decision-making. The upshot of my argument is that political agency matters much less to debates about the citizenship of non-human animals than both sides of this debate have been inclined to think.     

An All Too Radical Solution to the Problem of Evil: a Reply to Harrison

Gerald Harrison has recently argued the evidential problem of evil can be resolved if we assume the moral facts are identical to God’s commands or favorings. On a theistic metaethics, the moral facts are identical to what God commands or favors. Our moral intuitions reflect what God commands or favors for us to do, but not what God favors for Herself to do. Thus, on Harrison’s view, while we can know the moral facts as they pertain to humans, we cannot know the moral facts as they pertain to God. Therefore, Harrison argues, the evidential problem of evil inappropriately assumes God to be intuitively moral, when we have no reason to suppose a perfectly good being would match the expectations provided by our moral intuitions. Harrison calls his view a new form of skeptical theism. In response, I show Harrison’s attempt to dissolve the problem of evil exacerbates well-known skeptical consequences of skeptical theism. Harrison’s new skeptical theism leaves us with problems motivating a substantive religious life, the inability to provide a variety of theological explanations, and, despite Harrison’s comments to the contrary, worsens problems having to do with the possibility of divine deception.