Persistence and the importance of nonreward: Some applications of frustration theory and DMOD

Unfortunately our world does not always reward us when we expect it, and we must learn to deal with nonreward. How do these experiences influence our behaviors and how can we use them to help us? InFrustration Theory: An Analysis of Dispositional Learning and Memory (1992), Abram Amsel has answered these questions; he has summarized over 40 years of exciting research and the development of an elegant theory. He has also reviewed recent applications of frustration theory in such areas as fetal alcohol syndrome and attention deficit-hyperactivity disorders. In this invited commentary, we briefly summarize a mathematical model of frustration theory (called DMOD) and review simulations of the model that highlight the importance of the assumptions based on frustration theory (e.g., aversiveness of unexpected nonreward, counterconditioning). We also review assumptions (e.g., unlearning, passive and active “inhibition,” decline in aversiveness of expected nonreward) that are required if one is to simulate intuitive and counterintuitive phenomena.     

Auditory processing and perceptual abilities of “organic” and “functional” stutterers

The present investigation was undertaken to determine whether significant differences in auditory processing and perceptual abilities exist between (1) stutterers as a supposedly homogeneous group when compared with controls, (2) two differentiated subgroups of stutterers, and (3) either of the stuttering subgroups when separately compared with controls. Dichotic listening and masking level difference (MLD) tasks were administered to the two groups of school-age stutterers and an age-matched nonstuttering control group. Stuttering subjects were differentiated into “organic” and “functional” subgroups on the basis of neuropsychological test performances. Organic stutterers performed significantly poorer than did controls on one MLD experimental condition. Functional stutterers performed more like control subjects than like organic stutterers.     

Changes in learning about aversive nonreward accounts for ontogeny of paradoxical appetitive reward effects in the rat pup: a mathematical model (DMOD) integrates results

Baby rats do not show any paradoxical appetitive reward effects (e.g., faster extinction following partial than continuous reinforcement, contrast effects when large and small rewards are given) until they are at least 12-14 days old, but can learn to pattern when reward and nonreward are alternated (e.g., Amsel, 1986). These results have been puzzling, but are now successfully integrated by DMOD (Daly MODification of Rescorla and Wagner's [1972] mathematical model; Daly & Daly, 1982). It was assumed that young rats do not have the capacity to learn about aversive nonreward but slowly gain this ability between 12 and 26 days (1 parameter reflecting the rate of conditioning of aversive nonreward, beta 1 for Vav, is increased from 0 to .15 beginning at 12 days). This theoretical integration has implications for understanding behavioral and neurological development of altricial organisms, and effects of neurological damage and toxic substances.     

The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

Common sense and the common morality in theory and practice

The unfinished nature of Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the common morality after 34 years and seven editions raises questions about what is lacking, specifically in the way they carry out their project, more generally in the presuppositions of the classical liberal tradition on which they rely. Their wide-ranging review of ethical theories has not provided a method by which to move beyond a hypothetical approach to justification or, on a practical level regarding values conflict, beyond a questionable appeal to consensus. My major purpose in this paper is to introduce the thought of Bernard Lonergan as offering a way toward such a methodological breakthrough. In the first section, I consider Beauchamp and Childress’s defense of their theory of the common morality. In the second, I relate a persisting vacillation in their argument regarding the relative importance of reason and experience to a similar tension in classical liberal theory. In the third, I consider aspects of Lonergan’s generalized empirical method as a way to address problems that surface in the first two sections of the paper: (1) the structural relation of reason and experience in human action; and (2) the importance of theory for practice in terms of what Lonergan calls “common sense” and “general bias.”     

Lexicality and phonological similarity: a challenge for the retrieval-based account of serial recall?

The retrieval-based account of serial recall (Saint-Aubin & Poirier, 2000) attributes lexicality, phonological similarity, and articulatory suppression effects to a process where long-term representations are used to reconstruct degraded phonological traces. Two experiments tested this assumption by manipulating these factors in the recall of four- and five-item lists of words and non-words. Lexicality enhanced item recall (IR), but only affected position accuracy (PA) for five-item lists under suppression. Phonological similarity influenced both words and non-words, and produced impaired PA in silent and suppressed conditions. Consistent with the retrieval-based account, words and non-words of high word-likeness appear subject to redintegration. However, some findings, like suppression not reducing the phonological similarity impairment in suppressed conditions, present challenges for the retrieval-based account and other models of serial recall.     

Using Brief Functional Analysis to Select Interventions for Oral Reading

Reading interventions were applied in a brief multielement format to examine their effectiveness at improving the oral reading fluency of three students referred for reading problems. Although each student had different profiles across experimental analyses, effective interventions were identified and a mini-replication confirmed the pattern of results in each case.     

A computer simulation/mathematical model of learning: Extension of DMOD from appetitive to aversive situations

The computer simulation/mathematical model called DMOD, which can simulate over 35 different phenomena in appetitive discrete-trial and simple free-operant situations, has been extended to include aversive discrete-trial situations. Learning (V) is calculated using a three-parameter equation \(\Delta V = \alpha \beta (\lambda - \bar V)\) (see Daly & Daly, 1982; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The equation is applied to three possible goal events in the appetitive (e.g., food) case and to three in the aversive (e.g., shock) case. The original goal event can be present, absent, or reintroduced; in the appetitive situation, these events condition approach (Vap), avoidance (Vav), and courage (Vcc), respectively. In the aversive situation, the events condition avoidance (Vav*), approach (Vap*), and cowardice (Vcc*), respectively. The model was developed in simple learning situations and subsequently was applied to complex situations. It can account for such diverse phenomena as contrast effects after reward shifts, greater persistence following partial than following continuous reinforcement, and a preference for predictable appetitive and predictable aversive events. Application of the aversive version of the model to “reward” shifts is described.