A facilitative effect of punishment on unpunished behavior

The key pecking of two pigeons was reinforced on a variable-interval schedule of reinforcement during the presentation of each of two stimuli. In various phases of the experiment, punishment followed every response emitted in the presence of one of the stimuli. In general, when the rate of punished responding changed during the presentation of one stimulus, the rate of unpunished responding during the other stimulus changed in the opposite direction. This sort of change in rate is an example of behavioral contrast. When punishment was introduced, the rate of punished responding decreased and the rate of unpunished responding increased as functions of shock intensity. When the rate of previously punished responding increased after the termination of the shock, the rate of the always unpunished responding decreased. When the procedure correlated with a red key was changed from variable-interval reinforcement and punishment for each response to extinction and no punishment, the rate of reinforced responding during presentations of a green key decreased and then increased while the rate of the previously punished responding during red first increased and then decreased during extinction.     

On choosing between bets

Most attempts to account for the way persons choose between bets emphasize the use which is made of information about their basic attributes, i.e. the gains and losses which might be incurred and their respective probabilities. In experimental investigations of betting behaviour this is usually the only information which the subjects are given (e.g. Edwards, 1955; Hurst and Siegel, 1956). Everyday observation suggests, however, that if given the opportunity subjects will also use information about the outcome of bets. In the experiments to be reported, experimental subjects were told what gains had accrued from three bets in the past, the purpose being to see how this information affected their betting.     

Amorality

Actions are usually grouped into one of several moral categories. Familiar ones include the morally required, the morally permitted, and the morally prohibited. These categories have been expanded and/or refined to include the supererogatory and the “suberogatory”. Some eschew deontic categories such as the above, but nevertheless allow the existence of two comparative moral categories, i.e., the morally better or morally worse. At the risk of adding to the clutter, I want to explore the possibility of yet a further category, viz., amoral action, or actions that, strictly speaking, lack any moral status whatsoever. I think admitting the existence of amoral actions is not only plausible in its own right, but has consequences for our understanding the nature of moral obligation.     

Why Does Disaster Recovery Work Influence Mental Health?: Pathways through Physical Health and Household Income

Disaster recovery work increases risk for mental health problems, yet the mechanisms underlying this association are unclear. We explored links from recovery work to post‐traumatic stress (PTS), major depression (MD), and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms through physical health symptoms and household income in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. As part of the NIEHS GuLF STUDY, participants (N = 10,141) reported on cleanup work activities, spill‐related physical health symptoms, and household income at baseline, and mental health symptoms an average of 14.69 weeks (SD = 16.79) thereafter. Cleanup work participation was associated with higher physical health symptoms, which in turn were associated with higher PTS, MD, and GAD symptoms. Similar pattern of results were found in models including workers only and investigating the influence of longer work duration and higher work‐related oil exposure on mental health symptoms. In addition, longer worker duration and higher work‐related oil exposure were associated with higher household income, which in turn was associated with lower MD and GAD symptoms. These findings suggest that physical health symptoms contribute to workers’ risk for mental health symptoms, while higher household income, potentially from more extensive work, might mitigate risk.     

Schopenhauer on the ethics of suicide

The concept of death is of special importance in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of appearance and Will. Death for Schopenhauer is the aim and purpose of life, that toward which life is directed, and the denial of the individual will to life. Despite his profound pessimism, Schopenhauer vehemently rejects suicide as an unworthy affirmation of the will to life by those who seek to escape rather than seek nondiscursive knowledge of Will in suffering. The only manner of self-destruction Schopenhauer finds philosophically acceptable is the ascetic saint's death by starvation. Here the individual will to life is so completely mastered as to refuse even the most basic desire for nourishment, and thereby passes into nonexistence in complete renunciation of the individual will. Schopenhauer's attitude toward suicide nevertheless embodies an inconsistency. If, as Schopenhauer believes, the aim of life is death, and death is an unreal aspect of the world as appearance, then there appears to be no justification why the philosopher should not rush headlong into it - not to affirm the will to life in an abject effort to avoid suffering, but in order to fulfill life's purpose by ending it for distinctly philosophical reasons immediately upon arriving at an understanding of the appearance-reality distinction.     

A Near‐Term Bias Reconsidered

Standard accounts of prudential rationality enjoin temporal neutrality. “Rationality,” or so says Rawls, “requires an impartial concern for all parts of our life.” And while I accept this form of temporal neutrality, I argue in this paper that a powerful rationale exists for a competing form of prudential rationality according to which it is permissible to be biased toward near‐future rather than far‐future parts of one's life. After arguing that traditional defenses of temporal neutrality do not succeed against this rationale, I offer a new proposal, drawn from the phenomenon of intrapersonal reactive attitudes.     

Microstructural integrity of white matter moderates an association between childhood adversity and adult trait anger

Amongst a number of negative life sequelae associated with childhood adversity is the later expression of a higher dispositional tendency to experience anger and frustration to a wide range of situations (i.e., trait anger). We recently reported that an association between childhood adversity and trait anger is moderated by individual differences in both threat-related amygdala activity and executive control-related dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) activity, wherein individuals with relatively low amygdala and high dlPFC activity do not express higher trait anger even when having experienced childhood adversity. Here, we examine possible structural correlates of this functional dynamic using diffusion magnetic resonance imaging data from 647 young adult men and women volunteers. Specifically, we tested whether the degree of white matter microstructural integrity as indexed by fractional anisotropy modulated the association between childhood adversity and trait anger. Our analyses revealed that higher microstructural integrity of multiple pathways was associated with an attenuated link between childhood adversity and adult trait anger. Amongst these pathways was the uncinate fasciculus (UF; ΔR ² = 0.01), which not only provides a major anatomical link between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex but also is associated with individual differences in regulating negative emotion through top-down cognitive reappraisal. These findings suggest that higher microstructural integrity of distributed white matter pathways including but not limited to the UF may represent an anatomical foundation serving to buffer against the expression of childhood adversity as later trait anger, which is itself associated with multiple negative health outcomes.