Future‐Bias: A (Qualified) Defense

The preferences of ordinary folks typically display a future‐bias. For instance, we care more about pains and pleasures in our future than pains and pleasures in our past. Indeed, this future‐bias is so pervasive, many have taken it for granted that the preferences of rational agents will, or at least can, display this future‐bias to some degree or other. However, the rationality of future‐biased preferences has recently come in for critique. However, in this article, I offer a defense of future‐biased preferences against three recent attempts – offered by David Brink, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan, and Tom Dougherty – to show such preferences irrational.     

Genetic and environmental factors in orientation anisotropy: a field study in the British Isles

Visual acuity for the detection of gratings at four orientations was measured for groups of ten boys and ten girls aged five to seven years, from the following four populations: Scots in Glasgow, Pakistanis in Glasgow, Gaels in Stornoway (Outer Hebrides) and East Anglians in Littleport (Cambridgeshire fenlands). The Glaswegians, both Scottish and Pakistani, showed the normal pattern of anisotropy, with poorest acuity for oblique orientations; the East Anglians showed no significant anisotropy; while the Gaels were unusual in showing poorest horizontal acuity. A group of fourteen Pakistani children in Stornoway differed slightly from a matched group of Gaels. The group differences bore little relation to the visual environments, and were probably due to genetic or cultural factors. The relatively poor horizontal acuity of the Gaels was not correlated with astigmatism. Sex differences were also found, with the boys showing higher mean acuity and a higher ratio between vertical and oblique acuity.