Why don't our institutes teach the methodology of clinical psychoanalytic evidence?

One of the most pressing theoretical, therapeutic, and educational problems confronting the advance of psychoanalysis is our confusion about the nature of clinical evidence. There is considerable disagreement among psychoanalysts about how to define evidence. Recently, there has also been a growing tendency toward evidential nihilism, justified by some of the more radical constructivist-narrative views of postmodern epistemology. Two surveys, conducted ten years apart, of all the psychoanalytic institutes recognized by the American Psychoanalytic Association, indicate a continuing and disturbing neglect of this topic in the curricula of our institutes. This paper reports the views of a number of psychoanalytic educators who participated in these surveys and is intended to stimulate discussion about the causes of this critical problem.     

The empirical basis of color perception

Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of the real-world origins of any spectral stimulus.     

A constraint on eliminating semantic priming by repeating a prime

Repeated semantic primes have been shown to generate an additive semantic priming effect when those primes are different words, but repetition priming of the prime seems to eliminate semantic priming of lexical decisions for reasons that are not clear. These studies replicated this effect but also showed that repetition priming of the prime does not eliminate semantic priming with a longer lag between the repeated primes. The implications of these results for understanding the basic effect are discussed.     

A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Inquisition

Disagreement space consists of all the commitments and understandings required for an utterance to take on its discourse function. These are virtual standpoints that can be called out for explicit argumentation. This paper shows how the Inquisition systematically controlled disagreement space, preventing some apparently important standpoints from ever being argued about, and requiring attention to others that may not have initially seemed relevant. This control of disagreement space constituted violation of the rules for critical discussion. The essay suggests that the idea of disagreement space be slightly enlarged, to show the distinctions among virtual, possible, and actual disagreement spaces. The Inquisition's extra-argumentative power is what permitted its specification of the possible disagreement space. The analysis suggests that pragma-dialectics may have application in the criticism and analysis of social institutions.     

Deductivism and the Informal Fallacies

This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'. Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy of equivocation.     

Two Sides of Any Issue

Seneca in his Moral Epistles to Lucilium ridicules Protagoras’ claim that both sides of any position can be equally well argued. Cicero, on the contrary, in the surviving fragments of his dialogue, the Republic, maintains in the person of Laelius that the thorough exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of any position pro and con is the best and often the only dialectical avenue to the discovery of difficult truths. There are therefore at least two sides to the issue of whether philosophers ought to address their arguments to the two sides of any issue. This paper examines the epistemic advantages and disadvantages of the same reasoning agent playing both roles of advocate and critic, as opposed to encouraging only distinct independently minded reasoning agents each to consider any of the opposing sides of an issue in dispute. The question in argumentation theory posed by this inquiry in simplest terms is whether a single thinker considering both sides of an issue is more able to arrive at truth, or whether, as the popular adage has it, two minds are inherently dialectically better than one. The answer proposed here is that it does not matter provided that the conflict of opposing views are in some manner resolved with the sincere intention of arriving at the truth.     

The PHQ-9 as a brief assessment of lifetime major depression

The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9; R. L. Spitzer, K. Kroenke, J. B. W. Williams, & The Patient Health Questionnaire Primary Care Study Group, 1999), modified to ask about the worst period of depression lifetime, was validated against lifetime mood disorder diagnoses established by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; M. B. First, R. L. Spitzer, M. Gibbon, & J. B. W. Williams, 2001) in 526 participants. PHQ-9 dichotomous scores corresponded highly with major depressive episode (MDE) Criterion A, MDE, and major depressive disorder (MDD), odds ratios >or= 9.5, and area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) >or= 0.84. The continuous scale score was higher in participants who did (M=17.14, SD=7.36) than in those who did not (M=6.05, SD=6.29) meet MDE Criterion A, t(524)=18.09, p<.001; was correlated with number of MDE Criterion A symptoms, r(525)=.67, p<.001; and detected MDE Criterion A (AUC=0.88). The PHQ-9 as a lifetime measure may be used to complement or replace more costly interview assessments.