A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Inquisition

Disagreement space consists of all the commitments and understandings required for an utterance to take on its discourse function. These are virtual standpoints that can be called out for explicit argumentation. This paper shows how the Inquisition systematically controlled disagreement space, preventing some apparently important standpoints from ever being argued about, and requiring attention to others that may not have initially seemed relevant. This control of disagreement space constituted violation of the rules for critical discussion. The essay suggests that the idea of disagreement space be slightly enlarged, to show the distinctions among virtual, possible, and actual disagreement spaces. The Inquisition's extra-argumentative power is what permitted its specification of the possible disagreement space. The analysis suggests that pragma-dialectics may have application in the criticism and analysis of social institutions.     

Deductivism and the Informal Fallacies

This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'. Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy of equivocation.     

Two Sides of Any Issue

Seneca in his Moral Epistles to Lucilium ridicules Protagoras’ claim that both sides of any position can be equally well argued. Cicero, on the contrary, in the surviving fragments of his dialogue, the Republic, maintains in the person of Laelius that the thorough exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of any position pro and con is the best and often the only dialectical avenue to the discovery of difficult truths. There are therefore at least two sides to the issue of whether philosophers ought to address their arguments to the two sides of any issue. This paper examines the epistemic advantages and disadvantages of the same reasoning agent playing both roles of advocate and critic, as opposed to encouraging only distinct independently minded reasoning agents each to consider any of the opposing sides of an issue in dispute. The question in argumentation theory posed by this inquiry in simplest terms is whether a single thinker considering both sides of an issue is more able to arrive at truth, or whether, as the popular adage has it, two minds are inherently dialectically better than one. The answer proposed here is that it does not matter provided that the conflict of opposing views are in some manner resolved with the sincere intention of arriving at the truth.     

The PHQ-9 as a brief assessment of lifetime major depression

The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9; R. L. Spitzer, K. Kroenke, J. B. W. Williams, & The Patient Health Questionnaire Primary Care Study Group, 1999), modified to ask about the worst period of depression lifetime, was validated against lifetime mood disorder diagnoses established by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; M. B. First, R. L. Spitzer, M. Gibbon, & J. B. W. Williams, 2001) in 526 participants. PHQ-9 dichotomous scores corresponded highly with major depressive episode (MDE) Criterion A, MDE, and major depressive disorder (MDD), odds ratios >or= 9.5, and area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) >or= 0.84. The continuous scale score was higher in participants who did (M=17.14, SD=7.36) than in those who did not (M=6.05, SD=6.29) meet MDE Criterion A, t(524)=18.09, p<.001; was correlated with number of MDE Criterion A symptoms, r(525)=.67, p<.001; and detected MDE Criterion A (AUC=0.88). The PHQ-9 as a lifetime measure may be used to complement or replace more costly interview assessments.     

Intentionality in Reference and Action

This essay asks whether there is a relation between action-serving and meaning-serving intentions. The idea that the intentions involved in meaning and action are nominally designated alike as intentionalities does not guarantee any special logical or conceptual connections between the intentionality of referential thoughts and thought-expressive speech acts with the intentionality of doing. The latter category is typified by overt physical actions in order to communicate by engaging in speech acts, but also includes at the origin of all artistic and symbolic expression such cerebral and linguistic doings as thinking propositional thoughts. There are exactly four possibilities by which meaning and action intentionalities might be related to be systematically investigated. Meaning-serving and action-serving intentionalities, topologically speaking, might exclude one another, partially overlap with one another, or subsume one in the other or the other in the one. The theoretical separation of the two ostensible categories of intendings is criticized, as is their partial overlap, in light of the proposal that thinking and artistic and symbolic expression are activities that favor the inclusion of paradigm meaning-serving intentions as among a larger domain of action-serving intentions. The only remaining alternative is then developed, of including action-serving intentions reductively in meaning-serving intentions, and is defended as offering in an unexpected way the most cogent universal reductive ontology in which the intentionality of doing generally relates to the specific intentionality of referring in thought to the objects of predications, and of its artistic and symbolic expression.     

Cognitive Abilities of Elite Nationally Ranked SCRABBLE and Crossword Experts

Theoretical models of working memory suggest that the simultaneous processing and storage of information is carried out either as separate or binded mechanisms. We explored working memory capacity and strategy in two elite groups of experts to test the separate versus binded hypotheses. Visuospatial and verbal abilities were measured in elite nationally ranked SCRABBLE and crossword experts and compared with college students matched on quantitative and verbal SAT scores, both exceeding 700 on average. SCRABBLE and crossword experts significantly outperformed college students on all cognitive measures. The crossword experts scored significantly higher on a test of analogies than SCRABBLE experts, but performance for cognitive ability tasks did not significantly differ between expert groups. The techniques and strategies used during competitive play, however, did differ significantly. Findings suggest that visuospatial and verbal working memory capacities of SCRABBLE and crossword experts are binded and occur at extraordinarily high levels. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.