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This article reviews the advantages and disadvantages of both enrichment and acceleration programs for the intellectually gifted and concludes that acceleration is a better option for many students. 相似文献
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Mental health values of national samples of Baptist, Catholic, and Methodist clergy were compared with those previously reported for psychologists. Small differences were found on 3 of 8 value dimensions. Clergy considered untrustworthiness to be more indicative of poor mental health than did psychologists. Psychologists considered receptivity to unconventional experiences to be more indicative of poor mental health than did Catholic and Methodist clergy. Catholic and Methodist clergy considered religious commitment to be more indicative of good mental health than did psychologists. 相似文献
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DON FALLIS 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2011,49(4):347-367
If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010 ) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge‐lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge‐lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge‐lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all. 相似文献
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