Adolescents' understandings of infidelity

This study explored younger adolescents' (aged 14–17 years; N = 204; 50% girls) understandings of infidelity and whether these understandings differed for girls and boys. Analyses revealed that younger adolescents' understandings of infidelity included an array of physical, affective, cognitive, and verbal behaviors with an extradyadic partner. No gender differences were found. In addition, younger adolescents' understandings of infidelity were compared to older adolescents' (aged 17–21 years; N = 214; 50% girls) understandings. Results showed that younger adolescents' salient understandings of infidelity more often included light, affectionate behaviors such as hugging and kissing an extradyadic partner, whereas older adolescents' salient understandings more often included heavy physical behaviors, including sexual intercourse and oral sex. Gender comparisons with older adolescents revealed that boys' salient understandings of infidelity included higher numbers of heavy physical behaviors, whereas girls' salient understandings included higher numbers of light, affectionate behaviors. Results demonstrate that infidelity is a complex and multifaceted construct for adolescent girls and boys and suggest that developmental researchers should examine understandings of infidelity beyond sexual extradyadic experiences. Implications for adolescent development and psychosocial health are discussed.     

Where should the balance be between “scientist” and “practitioner” in Australian undergraduate psychology?

The scientist—practitioner model of training in psychology has been widely influential in the development of undergraduate curricula in Australia. The model had its origins in post‐war America and has formed the basis for accreditation of psychology courses in Australia since the late 1970s. Recently a reconsideration of the model in Australian undergraduate psychology was argued for, suggesting that the absence of significant practical skills development in most curricula is detrimental to the discipline's graduates and their employers. The authors agree that the need for some practical skills development in undergraduate curricula is becoming increasingly important for psychology. Many of the exemplars of curriculum revision provided, however, are impractical and are unlikely to make significant contributions to Australian programs. There is an urgent need to consider the graduate attributes desired for 3‐year and 4‐year trained psychology graduates who will go on to employment without completing postgraduate study. Curriculum innovation to enhance graduates' employability will flow from this development, and will be likely to incorporate information technology solutions, rather than placement experience. This process is entirely compatible with the scientist—practitioner model of training and education in psychology.     

Discovering Ourselves by Unfolding our Panorama: Interviewing Pioneers in Counseling

In the last analysis, the essential thing is the life of the individual. This alone makes history, here alone do the great transformations first take place, and the whole future, the whole history of the world, ultimately spring as a gigantic summation from these hidden sources in individuals. In our most private and most subjective lives we are not only the passive witnesses of our age, and its sufferers, but also its makers.     

What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem*

There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima facie justified.2 Another reason that some give for rejecting normative foundationalism is that it leads directly to skepticism.3 There is no way, they claim, to move from so‐called basic propositions (typically given as first person introspective reports) to “external world” propositions by employing normatively acceptable principles of reasoning.4 Still others have thought that the invention of a nonrea‐soned reason was as ad hoc as the invention of an unmoved mover.5     

Waiter,There's a Fly in My Soup! Reflections on the Philosophical Gourmet Report

Editor's note: with this essay, Hypatia inaugurates a new column. We welcome musings on the state of the profession, the life of the independent scholar, political activism, teaching, publishing, or other topics of interest to feminist philosophers. We particularly invite submissions that pick up conversational threads begun by earlier contributions to the column, so that Musings becomes a forum for talking to one another. If you have an idea for the column, please tell us about it.