REALLY BELIEVING IN FICTION

Abstract: How is it possible to respond emotionally to that which we believe is not the case? All of the many responses to this “paradox of fiction” make one or more of three important mistakes: (1) neglecting the context of believing, (2) assuming that belief is an all‐or‐nothing affair, and (3) assuming that if you believe that p then you cannot also reasonably believe that not‐p. My thesis is that we react emotionally to stories because we do believe what stories tell us – not fictionally‐believe, not make‐believe, but believe in the ordinary way in which we believe anything at all.     

The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited

abstract This paper re‐examines some well‐known and commonly accepted arguments for the non‐individuality of the embryo, due mainly to the work of John Harris. The first concerns the alleged non‐differentiation of the embryoblast from the trophoblast. The second concerns monozygotic twinning and the relevance of the primitive streak. The third concerns the totipotency of the cells of the early embryo. I argue that on a proper analysis of both the empirical facts of embryological development, and the metaphysical importance or otherwise of those facts, all three arguments are found wanting. None of them establishes that the embryo is not an individual human being from the moment of conception.