Motivational effects in the mere-exposure paradigm

Three experiments investigated the effects of time-pressure and evaluation apprehension on the mere-exposure phenomenon (Zajonc, 1968). Subjects viewed slides of abstract paintings at different frequencies of exposure and subsequently indicated their liking for the stimuli. Evaluation apprehension during the assessment phase consistently undermined mere-exposure effects. Furthermore, when evaluation apprehension was high, time-pressure magnified those effects. These findings were discussed in terms of the notions that (1) prior exposure may increase the sense of processing fluency associated with a stimulus (Jacoby & Kelley, 1990), (2) fluency may be interpreted as plausibility of a judgmental cue evoked by the stimulus, (3) motivational factors like time-pressure and evaluation apprehension may moderate the impact of plausibility information on judgment, hence, may moderate ‘mere-exposure’ effects.     

Machiavellian flexibility in negative mate retention

Among the Dark Triad traits (psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism), Machiavellianism is uniquely associated with flexibility. This flexibility should result in the use of aggressive short‐term tactics only when they do not interfere with long‐term goals. Study 1 found that individuals high in Machiavellianism differed from those high in psychopathy with respect to retrospective accounts of negative mate retention tactics. Study 2 found an interaction between Machiavellianism and relationship type such that individuals high in Machiavellianism tempered the use of negative tactics for long‐term (but not short‐term) relationships. The findings highlight the flexibility of the Machiavellianism construct and its relevance to mating strategies among the Dark Triad.     

THE EFFECTS OF HAVING BEEN SUPERVISED BY A WOMAN ON PERCEPTIONS OF FEMALE MANAGERIAL COMPETENCE1

Responses of male and female managers in state public human service organizations are analyzed to determine if perceptual differences exist concerning the competence of women as managers in these organizations depending on whether an individual has or has not been supervised by a woman. Significant differences were found in only one area: the motivation of women to manage.     

Why a Victim's Age is Irrelevant When Assessing the Wrongness of Killing

Intuitively, all killings are equally wrong, no matter how old one's victim. In this paper we defend this claim — The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis — against a challenge presented by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. Lippert-Rasmussen shows The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis to be incompatible with two further theses: The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious Thesis and The Equivalence Thesis. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that, of the three, The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis is the least defensible. He suggests that the most convincing considerations apparently in favour of the Equal Wrongness thesis may be satisfied just as well if we adopt an alternative principle, a 'Prioritarian View' about the wrongness of killing. We argue that The Prioritarian View does not resolve the trilemma: it too is inconsistent with the other two theses. Instead, we argue, the most plausible resolution of the trilemma involves a rejection, rather, of The Unequal Wrongness of Renderings Unconscious Thesis. In its place, we offer an attractive principle that is compatible with both The Equal Wrongness of Killings Thesis as well as The Equivalence Thesis.     

A NEW REVISABILITY PARADOX

Abstract:  In a recent article, Mark Colyvan has criticized Jerrold Katz's attempt to show that Quinean holism is self-refuting. Katz argued that a Quinean epistemology incorporating a principle of the universal revisability of beliefs would have to hold that that and other principles of the system were both revisable and unrevisable. Colyvan rejects Katz's argument for failing to take into account the logic of belief revision. But granting the terms of debate laid down by Colyvan, the universal revisability principle still commits Quineans to holding that one belief is both revisable and unrevisable: the belief that some beliefs are revisable.