Depression and mental control: the resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts

In three experiments we examined depressed individuals' mental control abilities and strategies. Experiment 1 revealed that although depressed college students were initially successful in suppressing negative material, they eventually experienced a resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Analysis of subjects' stream-of-consciousness reports indicated that this resurgence was associated with the use of negative thoughts as distracters from the unwanted item. In Experiment 2 depressed subjects acknowledged that positive distracters were more effective than negative ones in suppressing negative thoughts. This acknowledgement suggests that depressed subjects in Experiment 1 did not deliberately focus on negative distracters but that those thoughts automatically occurred because they were highly accessible. Experiment 3 demonstrated that depressed subjects' use of positive distracters could be increased somewhat when we provided such distracters and made them easily accessible. Taken together, the findings suggest that depression involves an enhanced accessibility of interconnected negative thoughts that can undermine mental control efforts.     

Denial and Confirmatory Search: Paradoxical Consequences of Medical Diagnosis1

An experiment was conducted to examine the effects of medical diagnostic-test results on illness appraisal and the recall of symptoms and behavior. Subjects were tested for a fictitious enzyme deficiency and were told either that the test result was positive (deficiency present) or that it was negative (deficiency absent). In addition, some of the subjects were told the test was accurate 95% of the time and others were told it was accurate 75% of the time. As predicted, subjects judged the enzyme deficiency as less serious and more prevalent when presented with positive test results. Subjects with positive test results also recalled more behaviors that had been labeled as risk factors. Although positive test subjects tended to report more deficiency-related symptoms, diagnosis did not affect the free recall of general symptoms. In addition, information concerning the reliability of the diagnostic test had no effect on judgments or recall but did affect information seeking. Subjects with positive test results were less likely to request a definitive follow-up test when their results were unreliable. The results are interpreted as evidence for independent confirmatory search and denial processes following medical diagnosis.     

Disarmament Decisions as Social Dilemmas1

The individual deciding on a nuclear weapons production policy is faced with a dilemma in which a choice must be made to support one of several conflicting defense policies. In order to investigate the social-psychological variables that are related to armament policy decision making, a telephone survey was conducted in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Adult subjects (N= 110) responded to questions concerned with cognitive, attitudinal, and emotional responses to nuclear arms. Participants were also asked to choose a weapons production policy for the United States under conditions of continued and decreased Soviet nuclear arms production. Results indicated that respondents decisions about nuclear weapons production were related to their support for deterrence, the availability of their nuclear-related images, their emotional response to nuclear war, their attributions of responsibility for the prevention of nuclear war, and their political party affiliation. Distinctions between antinuclear decision-makers and pronuclear decision-makers are discussed.     

Influence of positive affect on the subjective utility of gains and losses: it is just not worth the risk

A modification of the procedure originally used by Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1956) to measure subjective utility was used to study the influence of positive affect on individuals' perceived value (utility) functions. Results indicated, as expected, that persons in whom positive affect had been induced showed a more negative subjective utility for losses than did controls. This indicates that losses seem worse to people who are feeling happy than to those in a control condition. The subjective utility functions of the two groups did not differ as much, however, when people were considering potential gain. Thus, at least in the situation tested in this study, potential gains did not seem to be more appealing (nor less so) for affect subjects than they did for controls. These findings are discussed in relation to theoretical issues in decision making and work suggesting that positive affect can promote increased sensitivity to losses in situations of potential meaningful loss.     

Autonomic arousal feedback and emotional experience: evidence from the spinal cord injured

We interviewed spinal-cord-injured, other handicapped, and nonhandicapped subjects to investigate the relation between the perception of autonomic arousal and experienced emotion. The three groups differed significantly on only one measure of affect intensity, with the spinal-cord-injured subjects more often reporting stronger fear in their lives now compared with the past. In addition, spinal-cord-injured subjects often described intense emotional experiences. Spinal-cord-injured subjects who differed in their level of autonomic feedback differed in intensity on several measures. Subjects with greater autonomic feedback tended to report more intense levels of negative emotions. The findings indicate that the perception of autonomic arousal may not be necessary for emotional experience. There were weak trends in our data, however, suggesting that the perception of arousal may enhance the experience of emotional intensity. The subjective well-being reports of the handicapped groups were comparable to those of nonhandicapped subjects, indicating successful coping with their disability.     

Personality in adulthood: a six-year longitudinal study of self-reports and spouse ratings on the NEO Personality Inventory

Previous longitudinal studies of personality in adulthood have been limited in the range of traits examined, have chiefly made use of self-reports, and have frequently included only men. In this study, self-reports (N = 983) and spouse ratings (N = 167) were gathered on the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985b), which measures all five of the major dimensions of normal personality. Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses on data from men and women aged 21 to 96 years showed evidence of small declines in Activity, Positive Emotions, and openness to Actions that might be attributed to maturation, but none of these effects was replicated in sequential analyses. The 20 other scales examined showed no consistent pattern of maturational effects. In contrast, retest stability was quite high for all five dimensions in self-reports and for the three dimensions measured at both times in spouse ratings. Comparable levels of stability were seen for men and women and for younger and older subjects. The data support the position that personality is stable after age 30.     

A "change-of-standard" perspective on the relations among context, judgment, and memory

We conducted three studies that tested a "change-of-standard" perspective on the relations among context, judgment, and recall. Each study consisted of two or three sessions held a few days apart. All subjects read about the sentencing decisions of one or two target trial judges and of six nontarget trial judges who consistently gave either higher or lower sentences than the target judge(s). Each study varied both the standard that was available when subjects initially judged the sentencing decisions of a target judge and the standard available when subjects subsequently recalled those decisions. To accomplish this, we varied the context of judgment, the timing of judgment, and the overall category norm for trial judges' sentencing decisions that was available at recall. We found that although subjects had been exposed to the same target information and had initially judged it in the same way, their recall of the information was different depending on whether and how a change-of-standard had occurred between judgment and recall. Unique predictions of the change-of-standard perspective were confirmed that could not be accounted for in terms of other types of context effects on judgment and memory.