Psychological assessment versus psychological testing. Validation from Binet to the school, clinic, and courtroom

Increasingly, psychological assessment is conducted with clients and patients involved in child custody and personal injury litigation. Clinical neuropsychologists are being asked sophisticated questions by attorneys regarding the validity of practitioners' most highly respected tests. Research reviewed here bears on the validity of test-buttressed clinical opinions, including research related to the following psychometric properties of individual test scores: standard errors of measurement, test-retest stability and subtest-to-subtest intercorrelations. The highest and the lowest subtest scores used as indices, respectively, of an individual's premorbid level of cognitive functioning and the degree of current impairment from that presumed earlier level is not justified when used in isolation from the life history and current medical findings. Although many practitioners use information from the wider research, courtroom experience suggests that a number do not; contrariwise, the attempt of Faust and Ziskin (1988a) to undermine the courtroom testimony of every psychologist who serves as an expert witness is also criticized.     

Towards a theory of algorithm-determined cognitive test construction

A rationale for, and data from, a trial of a theory of item generation by algorithms whose origins are cognitive models of task performance are presented. Since Spearman (1904), intelligence has been operationally defined and assessed in human subjects by administering identical test items whose content and order have been fixed only after empirical iterations. In our approach, intelligence is ostensively defined by theoretically determined algorithms used for item construction and presentation. Knowledge of what cognitive factors limit human performance makes it possible to vary within tightly specified parameters those features of the tasks that contribute to difficulty, which we call radicals, to let those components of the tasks that do not contribute to difficulty vary randomly, and to counterbalance aspects of answer production that might induce biases of response. Empirical data are based on the generation of five different short tests demanding only functional literacy as a prerequisite for their execution. Four parallel forms of each test were administered to young male Army recruits whose scores were collated with their Army Entrance Test results, which were not previously known to us. Results show that the parallel, algorithm-generated item sets are statistically invariant, which item generation theory demands; and that the individual tests differentially predict Army Entrance Test scores. We conclude that IQ test performances are parsimoniously explained by individual differences in encoding, comparison and reconstructive memory processes.     

A Study of the Role of Gender in Family Therapy Training

A survey of the role of gender in family therapy training programs was conducted by the Women's Task Force of the American Family Therapy Association (AFTA) in order to determine the extent to which gender issues were included in the curriculum. Questionnaires were sent to 285 programs in the U.S., Canada, and overseas. Only 19% (n = 55) of the original sample participated, with the East Coast representing the largest proportion of respondents. Findings revealed that the three most frequently addressed gender issues are: 1) the impact of cultural and economic conditions on single, female-headed families; 2) gender issues associated with wife abuse; and 3) an examination of the implications of the therapist's gender in therapy interventions. Only 27 programs identify with a feminist model or have a clearly defined sense of gender awareness. A significant finding associated with the introduction of feminist content was the difficulty of integrating gender issues with major theoretical models. Trainee resistance and lack of faculty awareness were also considered obstacles to including gender in program curriculum.     

Convergent and Discriminant Validity of FACES-III: Family Adaptability and Cohesion

Research on earlier versions of the Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scales (FACES) has ostensibly shown that the scales lack discriminant and convergent validity (23). However, these studies have defined convergence as agreement between family members or as agreement between family members and family therapists. Such definitions confound real differences between respondents' perceptions of the family with the notion of convergent validity. In the current study, we take a different approach to construct validity. Multiple measures of family adaptability, cohesion, and talkativeness were administered to two family members (insiders) and two significant others (outsiders). The two insiders' responses were averaged together, as were the two outsiders' responses. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we demonstrated that family adaptability, cohesion, and talkativeness are distinct traits, and that the different sources of information about these traits, including FACES-III (24), have convergent validity.     

Looking at Systems as Process

This article proposes that the social systems family therapists are concerned with may usefully be conceived of as interactive processes. It discusses limitations to the organismic view, in which social systems are seen as autonomous entities with boundaries, internal structures, and self-perpetuating behaviors, and argues, from Maturana and Varela, that social systems are qualitatively different from organisms. It develops from chaos theory an alternative view in which social systems are seen as complex nonlinear processes. It proposes that this view can free the therapist from the notions of family dysfunction and the systemic function of symptoms, and from reifications in which the family is seen as having covert rules, keeping secrets, neutralizing the therapist, and the like. This view leads to a redefinition of the therapist's place in the system and to the conclusion that family therapists can only influence systemic process by working with individuals.     

The infant's theory of self-propelled objects

"Theory of mind" is treated as a modular component of human social behavior and an attempt is made to find the origins of this component in the perception of the infant. According to the theory I describe here, the infant assigns a high priority to changes in motion and divides the world into two kinds of objects on the basis of this criterion: those that are and those that are not self-propelled. How the infant perceives these two kinds of objects is described by four basic assumptions. First, when the state of motion of a nonself-propelled object is changed by another object, the infant's principal hard-wired perception is causality; when a self-propelled object changes its motion without assistance from another object the infant's principal hard-wired perception is intention. Second, if two self-propelled objects are related in a special way--a relation called the BDR sequence--the infant perceives not only intentional movement but also one object as having the goal of affecting the other object. Third, the BDR sequence has a more powerful consequence: the infant perceives that the affected object intends to reciprocate. Fourth, the infant expects that reciprocation will preserve valence (not form), where valence is formulated either as the preservation/denial of liberty, or as an aesthetic response.     

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.     

Performance of criminal psychopaths on selected neuropsychological tests

Screening batteries of standard neuropsychological tests were administered to 2 different samples (Ns = 90 and 167) of male prison inmates. Scores on the revised Psychopathy Checklist were used to divide inmates in each sample into high, moderate, and low psychopathy groups. There were no group differences in test performance in either of the samples, even when the effects of self-reported psychopathology and substance abuse were taken into account. The overall prevalence of both test-specific and global neuropsychological impairment was low and did not vary significantly across the 3 groups. The results provide no support for traditional brain-damage explanations of psychopathy.