Cognitive Neuropsychology and Developmental Disorders: Uncomfortable Bedfellows

Cognitive neuropsychology provides a theoretical framework and methods that can be of value in the study of developmental disorders, but the "dissociation" logic at the centre of this approach is not well suited to the developmental context. This is illustrated with examples from specific language impairment. Within the developing language system there is ample evidence for interaction between levels of representation, with modularity emerging in the course of development. This means that one typically is seeking to explain a complex pattern of associated impairments, rather than highly selective deficits. For instance, a selective impairment in auditory processing can have repercussions through the language system and may lead to distinctive syntactic deficits that are seen in written as well as spoken language. Changes in the nature of representations and in the relationships between components of a developing system mean that cross-sectional data at a single point in development may be misleading indicators of the primary deficit. Furthermore, traditional cognitive neuropsychology places a disproportionate emphasis on representational (competence) deficits, with processing (performance) deficits being relatively neglected. Methods for distinguishing these two kinds of impairment are discussed, as well as other approaches for elucidating the underlying nature of developmental disorders.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.     

AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL OF THE PRCA FOR MEASURING ORAL COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION

Since 1970 about 80% of the research on oral communication apprehension has used one of two versions of McCroskey's Personal Report of Communication Apprehension. The original 20-item PRCA was introduced for the purpose of measuring apprehension beyond the traditional public speaking context. Although the PRCA-20 is reliable, some serious criticism of it has centered on its ability to tap interpersonal behavior outcomes. In an attempt to bolster its interpersonal applicability, five “interpersonally-oriented” items were added to form the PRCA-25. The studies reported herein demonstrate that both versions fail to possess sufficient reliable variance to be applicable to contexts other than public settings. In addition, it was found that the interpersonal items are a separate component of the PRCA, and as such, do not justify being treated equal in terms of additivity and, therefore, reduce the construct integrity of the PRCA.     

Instrumental responding following reinforcer devaluation

In two experiments, hungry rats were given instrumental lever-press training for an appetitive reinforcer and, in addition, were exposed to another type of food which was not contingent on lever pressing. In the first experiment, exposure to each type of food was on separate days, whereas in the second experiment rats were exposed to each type of food in strict alternation within each session. Subsequently, a food aversion was conditioned to the reinforcer for the experimental group and to the non-contingent food for the control group. In both experiments, animals with an aversion to the reinforcer responded less in an extinction test than animals with an aversion to the non-contingent food. Subsequent reacquisition tests confirmed that the aversion to the non-contingent food in the control group was of comparable strength with that to the reinforcer in the experimental group. The results were discussed in terms of whether the reinforcer is encoded in the associative structure set up by exposure to an instrumental contingency.     

ARGUMENT TO BLISS: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

The essay examines intellectual virtue in the Summa theologiae, taking it as an interpretative key to the epistemology of the Summa theologiae as a whole. Because Aquinas blurs the line between the acquired and the theological virtues, and between virtues and the gifts of the Spirit, it becomes impossible to maintain the distinction between the realms of nature and grace, or between natural reason and revealed truth: grace permeates the most ordinary activities of human reasoning. This reading of the Summa theologiae raises questions about many contemporary debates, particularly those concerning natural law.